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Abstract 
The poor in urban areas of developing countries suffer from inadequate tertiary 
(neighbourhood level) urban infrastructure; water and sanitation, solid waste, drainage, 
access pavements, street lighting and community buildings. Procurement of tertiary level 
infrastructure is the responsibility of the public sector. Rapid urbanisation is outstripping 
the already lacking resources of public sector. The involvement of private commercial 
sector in the procurement is through the micro-contracts. The term, 'micro-contracts', is 
proposed for the small and medium size contracts. In some cases a third sector like 
NGOs, CBOs and community groups have also played roles in the procurement of 
infrastructure. The processes, roles, relationships and performance of micro-contracts 
procured under routine and community participated strategies were explored with a view 
to promote the role of the community in the procurement process. The constraints to 
contract, relationship between public sector and community groups and ways to 
overcome those constraints were explored. The contract contexts were taken from India, 
Pakistan and Sri-Lanka. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were used. A 
multiple case study approach was adopted for the research. During the research three 
hundred and ninety contracts, more than a hundred interviews and filed notes and more 
than two hundred documents related to the micro-contracts were reviewed and 
analysed. The concept of benchmarking was adopted in performance analysis. 
'Community partnering' is proposed as a procurement strategy to facilitate the 
community to play different roles parallel to the roles of Client, Engineer and Contractor. 
The cost and benefits of community partnering were discussed. It was concluded that, 
for the similar conditions studied, the community partnering between the urban public 
sector and suitable urban communities is an appropriate procurement strategy. The 
recommendations include a number of actions which could be taken to promote the 
community role in urban infrastructure procurement. Areas of future research are 
proposed. 
Key Words: Urban, infrastructure, procurement, developing, public sector, third sector, 
benchmarking, community, partnering, micro-contracts, contracts. 
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Some of the terms defined 
Public sector 
This term is used to identify the Government sector at any level. It includes the 
national, state and local level government organizations. It also includes the 
specialist organization dealing with a particular service and projects with specific 
targets to achieve. 
Commercial private sector. 
This refers to institutions, firms and individuals active in different aspects of the 
infrastructure provision process but always organized to generate profit on the 
investment of their resources. A private contractor getting work from a government 
department comes in this sector. 
Third Sector 
This refers to organizations which have as their objectives the promotion of the good 
of the their members and to institutions which support and mediate on behalf of 
these organizations. The community based organization, Non-Government 
organizations and co-operative societies may belong to this category. Theoretically 
the motive of this sector is not profit making. 
Community groups 
For the purposes of this study community group is taken as people in low income 
urban communities. 
That may include: 
Individual or groups of beneficiaries; 
community groups with no legal status; 
Association or groups with legal status, with or without separate legal personality 
as a group; 
xvi 
* Small-scale artisans and other local or small commercial organizations and 
guilds; and 
Small and local level organizations, particularly NGOs, which support and 
facilitate the flow of public sector funds to individuals. 
Procurement strategies 
These are the mechanisms used to procure infrastructure. 
The remaining terms are defined as and when they occur in the study. 
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Chapter contents 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1.2 
1.1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The provision of infrastructure to low income urban communities has been a topic 
of research for some time. The stimulation for this work has been the increasing 
international interest in promoting the participation of community groups in 
improving access to basic services at the household and neighborhood levels. 
There is a substantial body of work addressing the issues of community 
participation and empowerment, which identifies barriers to increased community 
participation and suggests ideas and techniques for tackling the problems. 
Broadly speaking, this examines matters from the viewpoint of community 
members and groups; appropriate institutional responses to increase the levels of 
participation are also considered. However, regarding infrastructure provision, we 
need to discover and understand how community-based initiatives relate to and 
can link up with the formal procedures of government. Unless we understand how 
and why urban government procedures operate to procure infrastructure, even 
the best mobilised and participative community group can get no further in 
accessing the funds and other resources of urban government. 
This research is concerned with improving access to basic infrastructure for low 
income urban people in developing countries. Cases involving works relating to 
water supply, sanitation, drainage, access, paving, street and security lighting, 
solid waste removal, and community buildings have been investigated. The focus 
is on the procurement of infrastructure; that is, what mechanisms, both 
conventional and unconventional, government and non-government, have been 
adopted in efforts to deliver improved services. This encompasses a wide range of 
issues, ranging from engineering to the institutional, cultural and social background. 
The central theme is how these issues interact through the mechanisms of 
agreements, procedures and contracts whereby things actually get done. The 
cases in which communities have taken a part in the planning and 
implementation of urban infrastructure interacting with the public sector are of 
particular interest. 
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If the processes, roles and relationships of the routine procurement strategies 
and community initiatives are better understood we have a better chance of 
assimilating community initiatives into mainstream procurement strategies. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate ways to promote the role of the 
community in the procurement of urban infrastructure in developing countries. 
The focus of the study is the procurement process, in relation to small and 
medium-sized contracts. The processes studied relate to the small and medium 
size contracts. The contracts studied were procured under routine procurement 
and community participated procurement in urban areas of developing countries. 
The hypothesis of the study is that within the similar representative conditions of 
this study, ' community partnering' between the urban public sector and suitable 
urban communities is an appropriate procurement strategy. 
The study will advance knowledge about the processes, roles, relationships and 
performance of routine procurement strategies for small scale urban public works 
and community initiatives. It will provide an understanding of the constraints to, 
and ways to overcome problems faced by assimilating initiatives into public 
procurement strategies. A focused study on the small and medium size contracts 
related to the procurement of urban infrastructure to the poor in developing 
countries provides a fresh and practical angle to the wider issue of public and 
community partnering in development. 
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Chapter 2 Procurement strategies and related issues 
2.1 The urban setting in developing countries 
The urban population in most developing countries is increasing extremely 
rapidly. Conventional approaches have proved inadequate to meet the demand 
for shelter and services created by this rapid urban growth. This has led to a 
proliferation of informal, unimproved slum and squatter settlements 
'More than 600 million people in cities and town throughout world are homeless 
or live in life-health threatening situations ... by the year 2000, almost fifty per cent 
of then world's total will be living in urban areas'(UNCHS, 1996). The ability of 
government to provide infrastructure will be far outstripped by the inexorable 
increase in demand. The poorest and most vulnerable will continue to suffer from 
the lack of services and work opportunities. 
A shift in the role of the government is advocated to improve infrastructure 
provision. The role of the government is to be transformed from that of sole 
provider to that of an enabler. The constraints faced include the lack of financial 
and institutional resources (UNCHS, 1996). 
Currently, infrastructure typically represents 40 to 60 percent of public 
investment. Developing countries invest $ 200 billion a year in new infrastructure. 
In spite of this, one billion people in the developing countries still lack access to 
clean water and nearly 2 billion people lack adequate sanitation (World Bank 
1994). 
The demand is not only to supplement the financial resources for the 
procurement of infrastructure but also to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the procurement process. 
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A large proportion of a national development budget is utilised through award of 
contracts to procure infrastructure. Small and medium sized contracts are 
significantly large in numbers as compared to the large contracts. This is 
especially true in cases where tertiary infrastructure is provided to the urban poor. 
Thus understanding the processes related to the procurement of such contracts 
is essential to improve the procurement process 
Generally, in developing countries, responsibility for infrastructure procurement 
rests with the public sector. Government departments have set procedures, rules 
and regulations which are governed by the law of the country. 
2.1.1 Modes of public interventions to provide urban infrastructure 
The following section briefly describes the main approaches adopted by the public 
sector to combat the shortfall in housing and infrastructure in developing countries. 
Interventions come both from the public and the private sector. The public sector 
supply of land for housing, constructed houses and infrastructure is much lower 
than the demand. The formal private sector concentrated on the better-off classes 
in the society. Demand from the urban poor was acute, and the informal sector 
became a significant supplier of housing and infrastructure to this group. The slums 
and squatter settlements appeared in the cities. The public sector responded 
(Wakely 1988) to the situation of acute shortage of housing and infrastructure as 
follows: 
I Government built housing and infrastructure. 
The first reaction from the public sector was to construct more houses for more poor 
in the shortest possible time. Mass production of housing units and related 
infrastructure was envisaged. Housing and related infrastructure was provided at 
subsidized rates. Even these rates were not affordable by the poor. It was estimated 
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that this type of housing could not be afforded by over half the population of most 
urban areas (World Bank, 1974). 
Slums were cleared as these were not seen conducive to the nice appearance of 
the urban building blocks. Slum dwellers were displaced: the intentions being the 
they move to the newly constructed government houses. However, many of these 
units remained empty (Wakely 1988). The approach was top-down and did not meet 
the requirement of the slum dwellers. People did not want what was provided to 
them. The people in many cases sold the houses to the better-off and moved to 
another squatter settlement. Communities were not involved in the decision making 
process for the location, design, standard of construction and implementation. 
The cost of construction was high. The approach created a burden on the scarce 
resource of the public sector in the developing countries. Ultimately the whole 
approach was abandoned. 
2 Aided self-help 
This approach resulted in an attempt to reduce the cost of the projects to the public 
sector. The approach entails the provision of labour services by the beneficiaries. As 
an aid the construction material and supervision was provided by the public sector. 
The contractors' overheads and profits were supposed to have been saved. The 
individual control of a householder over construction was reported to have 
minimized wastage (Cotton and Franceys 1988) However, some of the services 
which were provided by private contractors such as construction management and 
site supervision were also transferred to the beneficiaries and the public sector. 
Wakely (1988) summarized the criticism of this approach as follows: 
The savings generated by the use of beneficiaries as labourers were minimal. 
The use of skilled manpower for the supervision of totally unskilled and undisciplined 
manpower was less productive. 
* The householder's time available for building rarely fitted with the regular working 
hours of the public sector officials. 
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The major decision making was still with the public sector. The people were not 
involved in the key decision making. They were not given the choice to volunteer for 
the labour. Labour provision was a pre-condition of the approach. 
* Obligatory nature of participation. 
3 Sites-and-services 
In this approach, land which has not previously been used for housing, or a site 
which has been cleared of shanties is prepared and the plots are blocked out. The 
services are provided before people moved to the plots. The people moved to the 
plots and started construction. It was left with the people to construct the houses 
incrementally according to their needs and resources. 
There was a degree of recognition about the resourcefulness of the urban poor to 
procure and manage their shelter and infrastructure It was also noted that only a 
minority of urban households actually constructed their own houses. However, in 
many cases they contracted local artisans like masons to do construction for them. 
They were involved in the control, management and supervision of the construction 
(Wakely 1988). 
There was delegation of power to the users as far as construction of houses is 
concerned. However, in the provision of related infrastructure the people were not 
involved. 
Slum-upgrading 
Here the idea was to improve the health and environment through the provision of 
services to the existing settlements. This was a radical change from the policy of 
slum clearance. In this approach, an existing slum or shanty is gradually improved. 
The people are not displaced. The size and shape of some plots may be altered. 
There was a greater role of the beneficiaries in the decision making. The idea was to 
devolve responsibility to the lowest effective level. The intended benefits were the 
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sense of ownership by the beneficiaries and hence improved operation and 
maintenance, less burden on the public sector, beneficiaries getting what they 
wanted, no movement from their place of living and community development. 
Sites and services and slum upgrading do not in themselves imply better 
involvement in decision making by the people. They are alternate physical 
approaches. The management approach is a different issue. 
5 Support approach or partnership. 
There has been less debate and relatively few concrete examples of a support 
approach for infrastructure. Infrastructure has important parallels with housing (Cotton 
and Tayler 1994). The support approach advocates a radical change in the role of the 
public sector, away from that as the provider to the enabler. The idea was to help 
people to help themselves. Emphasis was given to understanding on-going practices 
and supporting such initiatives, and it entailed involvement of communities in planning 
and design. The support approach was reported to be cost effective and beneficial to 
community development (Cotton and Franceys 1991). 
The implications of the changed role of the public sector were the introduction of 
supportive legislation and changes in the government regulations, procedures, attitude 
and behaviour. The legislation in force in many developing countries is based on the 
nineteenth century model of public sector as provider of urban services. The implication 
of the support approach includes modifying the legal, regulatory and procedural 
framework to accommodate the new roles of the public sector and community. 
The main approaches could be classified as following either the 'provider' or the 
I support/enabler paradigm'. The 'provider' approach generally advocates the mass 
production of housing and infrastructure through mechanization, standardization and 
control. On the other hand, the support approach emphasizes the means through which 
the participation of small builders and community members could be increased by 
capacity building (Hamdi and Goethart 1989) thereby, achieving the required large 
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scale provision of housing and infrastructure. The participation of the community 
appears to be the critical factor in the support paradigm. Its basic assumption is that the 
people are resourceful. 
The support or enabling approach is based on partnership. Partnership may be 
between a community group and any of the following; 
1 Public sector 
2 Commercial private sector 
3 Non-commercial private sector or third sector 
Issues of the relationship between public and private sector are explored in subsequent 
sections and chapters. 
2.1.2 Relationships (contracts) between public sector and other sectors 
The mode of transaction between the public sector and other sector in infrastructure 
procurement is the contract. This research explores the agreements, procedures and 
contracts that are the basis for the implementation of infrastructure improvements for 
urban low income communities. In engineering terms, the works themselves are minor 
and usually of low cost, but are nevertheless complex to implement given the physical 
and social fabric of low income urban areas. The term micro-contract is adopted to 
refer to the countless number of small contracts for works that are the mainstay of 
urban improvement in the South Asian context. In this thesis, an arbitrary value of 
E10000 is assumed for micro-contracts, on the basis of experience of typical works in 
study areas where the contract value is typically less than El 0,000 [1996 value]. 
This research is based on work carried out in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, where the 
legal framework is based on English law, and was developed during the period of British 
rule. During this period, the Public Works Department was responsible for the 
implementation of building, public health, irrigation and general civil works. Detailed 
procedures were made to handle contemporary problems in the procurement of 
infrastructure (Ali & Ali . 1992 a) and (Ali 
& Ali. 1992 b); it is interesting to review their 
development, and to note that they were frequently amended in response to new 
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situations. It was the then Superintending Engineers responsible for the works who 
suggested changes as and when they felt it necessary. This contrasts sharply with the 
present day; in the post colonial period in Pakistan, for example, there have been few 
changes in almost fifty years. The situation has changed and continues to change, yet 
there is a lack of responsiveness in the procurement procedures to reflect this. 
At this stage, it is useful to consider briefly some of the basic concepts which will be 
central to the analysis of the findings. The procedures refer to the organized systems 
within which projects are conceived, planned, and brought into being by urban 
government. In the legal context contract is a binding agreement between parties based 
on an offer by one party to do something (in our case to construct the infrastructure) in 
return for a consideration (that is, payment). The contracts vary a great deal in their 
degree of formality and specificity. There are some contracts which are relatively vague 
and informal. In many cases no documents exist to describe such contracts. Such 
contracts have been termed as relational contracts (Macneil 1978) and (Williamsons 
1985). 
In urban government in South Asia, the most commonly used procedures for the 
procurement of infrastructure are those which lead to the award of contracts; these 
procedures are discussed in chapter four. Whilst they appear complex to outsiders (at 
times almost mystically so) their underlying objectives are concerned with: 
" Accountability in the spending of public money 
" Transparency in the steps of the decision-making processes 
In relation to the actual contracts, there is a need to focus on who is involved in a 
contract and what their various obligations are. The most commonly used engineering 
contracts recognize three main actors: Promoter, Engineer, and Contractor. 
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Promotor or Client 
Require the work to 
be carried out and 
pays for the works 
Engineer 
Employed by the promotor to: 
1 Act on his behalf. 
2 Prepare design and 
documentations. 
3 Oversee construction on 
behalf of promotor. 
4 Authorise payments. 
Contractor 
Responds to tender with 
an offer to undertake work. 
If offer is accepted enters 
into contract with the 
promotor. 
Is paid for undertaking 
work in accordance with 
the contract. 
Figure 2.1 The roles in the procurement and their interrelationships. 
Note: The solid lines indicate the contractual links and the dashed line indicates a managerial link. There is 
no direct contract between the Contractor and the Engineer. 
A typical case in South Asia (and elsewhere) involves urban government letting a 
contract to a private sector contractor for the construction of infrastructure 
improvements as part of its urban upgrading program. Urban government is the 
Promoter, they have planned and designed the work, and are paying for it to be 
implemented. The urban government appoints an Engineer, who is usually in the full 
time employment of the relevant government department. It is rare for private sector 
consultants to fulfill this role for minor engineering works in South Asia. According to the 
procedures laid down, a Contractor is appointed to do the actual construction work. 
The Engineer has the important role of ensuring that the interests of the Promoter are 
met, and that the Contractor is duly paid for his efforts. The promoter wants the best 
value for money and the contractor wants a good profit; whilst this can involve an 
enormous range of complex and contentious issues, satisfying the various interests 
often comes down to ensuring that three fundamental objectives are met. These are: 
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Cost. - Has the work been completed within the costs agreed in the contract? 
Quality. Has the work been done in accordance with what was specified? 
Time: Has the work been satisfactorily completed within the time specified? 
However, community groups and individual householders do not figure anywhere in the 
procedures, contracts and documentation used in these circumstances. It is assumed 
that they are passive consumers who are deemed to be satisfied if works are 
undertaken to the satisfaction of the urban government as promoter. This is not the 
universal case; this research has found that the involvement of community members 
and groups in the procurement of their local infrastructure is quite widespread outside 
the routine public sector procurement but not, at present, great in scale. 
If the standard procedures, contracts and documentation do not foresee a role for 
community members and groups, then how have these community-based initiatives 
worked? If greater involvement of community members and groups as primary 
stakeholders is to be promoted, then there is a need to investigate to what extent 
existing procedures create barriers, and how these barriers can be overcome in a way 
which is acceptable to the existing power structures within urban government. 
2.2 Organisations, objectives and roles 
Different kinds of organisations may interact through contracts for the 
procurement of infrastructure. The following sections provide a brief overview of 
the issues related to organisations. 
2.2.1 What is an organisation? 
In organisational behaviour literature, an organisation is defined as 'a structured 
social system consisting of groups and individuals working together to meet some 
agreed-on objectives'(Greenberg & Baron 1995). This definition of organisation is 
broad enough to cover a range of organisations such as a neighbourhood 
society, contractors and bureaucracy. Procurement can be considered as a social 
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process. It involves interactions among individuals and organisations. The public 
sector organisations that deal with the procurement of infrastructure can be 
classified as a special kind of organisation termed as 'bureaucracy'. By definition 
a bureaucracy has characteristics of having; formal rules and regulations, 
impersonal treatment, division of labour, hierarchical structure, authority 
structure, lifelong career commitment, rationality (Weber 1921 as reported by 
Greenberg & Baron 1995). Public sector departments can be classified as 
bureaucracies as they have characteristics mentioned above. The implications 
are that any relationship involving the public sector will have to exist under a 
framework of the prescribed rules and regulations of the organisation. This 
research will argue that practices and possibilities within an existing regulatory 
framework are to be considered as a starting point in any desired changes in 
procurement procedures. 
The project organisation or a web of organisations involved in a contract or 
project can be considered as a special kind of organisation whose objective and 
life are limited. A project is a web of inter and intra-organisational relationships 
formed for a set time. 
The organisations that are formed to fulfil the ongoing objectives, like health 
services in general or maintaining peace and order in a country are quite different 
in nature to that of a very short lived project organisation. It is usual that project 
organisations are formed to achieve some specific objective. Project 
organisations may draw resources from relatively permanent organisations to 
achieve particular objectives. 
2.2.2 Organisations for the procurement of infrastructure in the public 
sector 
At various levels in the public sector a whole range of organisations are 
responsible for the provision of urban infrastructure and service. These include 
municipalities, state and national level departments and authorities, and specialist 
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project or programme organisations. To achieve their objectives, these public 
sector organisations also procure resources from outside. In so doing they enter 
into different relationships with different actors or stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are defined as individuals or groups with power to effect the 
organisations under consideration and having a stake in the organisation's 
performance (Freeman 1984). It follows that to meet different objectives, 
organisations enter into relationships with stakeholders. 
Key Points 
" Organisations have well-defined objective. 
" There are different kinds of organisations. 
" Government departments are bureaucracies. 
" Bureaucracies have set rules and procedures. 
" Organisations have stakeholders. 
2.3 The metaphor of contract 
Assuming that project organisations can be thought of as temporary firms, we 
can deduce that: 
" The organisation can be seen as a 'nexus of contracts' between itself and its 
stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
" The contract is an appropriate metaphor for the relationships between the 
organisation and its stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Contracts can take the 
form of exchanges, transactions, or the delegations of decision-making 
authority, as well as formal legal d ocu ments(J ones, 1995). Precedents exist for 
a broad definition of contract(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Williamson, 1984, 
1985, Dunfee, 1991). 
'The contracts vary greatly in terms of degree of formality and extent of 
specificity. Some contracts, say between a firm and its neighbouring community, 
are relatively vague and informal; certainly no documents exist to describe these 
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contracts' (Jones, 1995). Contracts of this type have been called relational 
contracts (Macneil, 1978). In the research context, the contract could be for 
construction, construction supervision or financing between public sector and the 
community group. 
Treating contracts in their broad sense would facilitate understanding informal 
relationships between stakeholders and bureaucracies. The theoretical 
perspective would also help in understanding relationships that are not formally 
documented or which are verbal contracts. 
Jones(1995) traced the basis of such contracts to a 'common thread' in three 
theoretical basis; agency theory, transaction cost economics and team 
production. 
ý Key Point 
* Contract in its broad sense provides a framework to deal with various types of I 
relationships. 
2.4 Agency theory 
A comprehensive account of the development, criticism and usage of agency 
theory is provided by Eisenhardt (1989). Though it is not the intention, nor within 
the scope of this study to prove or disprove the theory, it is considered as a 
useful theoretical hinge for this work. Some points of interest as highlighted by 
Eisendardt (1989) are: 
9 'Agency theory applies to relationships in which one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work. The agent acts 
for the principal'. The problems of conflicting goals and different propensities to 
accept risks were mentioned. Procurement is a situation where such principal- 
agent relationship exists. 
The central question for agency theory becomes: What types of contract best 
suit agency relationships of various types. 
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Contracts are thought to be efficient if they minimise the sum of the following 
agency costs: 
1 Monitoring costs borne by the principal to reduce agent actions that would 
harm the interest of the principal. 
2 Bonding costs borne by the agent to guarantee that the agent will not take 
actions that harm the interest of the principal. 
3A residual loss incurred because monitoring and bonding may not fully align 
agent behaviour and principal interests. 
Various interest-aligning devices were mentioned such as incentive structures, 
monitoring mechanisms, and governing structures that will reduce 'opportunism' 
to an 'efficient' level for which the costs of further reduction outweigh the benefits. 
" The theory uses contracts as its unit of analysis. 
" The theory attempts to resolve the problem that arises when 1) the desires or 
goals of the principal and agent conflict, 2) it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
The concern of the principal and agent researcher includes application to 
employer-employer, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and other agency relations 
(Harris & Raviv, 1978). 
Key Point 
* The agency theory provides a useful theoretical hinge for this research. 
2.5 Principal-Agent relationship: a key in the provision of urban services 
The public sector in the South Asian context is responsible for the urban services 
and related infrastructure. Though it is solely responsible, they do not execute all 
the tasks related to service provision. They buy or procure many goods and 
services or resources to produce goods and service. In such cases we enter into 
a situation that is in effect a principal-agent relationship. 
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Procurement of urban infrastructure involves a diverse form of 
contracts/relationships and diverse kinds of stakeholders or potential agents. A 
list of potential stakeholders is provided in Table 2.1. 
Stakeholders can be defined as the entities that can influence or be influenced by 
Public Works procurement. Some of the potential stakeholders are listed in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1 List of Stakeholders involved in procurement of infrastructure 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Promoter/Client/Owner 
Engineer 
Contractors/Constructors 
Sub-contractors 
Suppliers 
Local Suppliers 
End users 
Interest groups 
NGOs, Cobs 
10. Local Community where the work 
executed 
11. Government Departments concerned 
12. Regulatory agencies 
13. Insurance/surety companies 
14. Banks/Financial institutions 
15. Politicians 
16. The general public 
17. Foreign Donors 
is 
2.6 The framework in which urban infrastructure is to be procured 
The organisations, especially the public sector, exist within legal boundaries. The 
framework of acts, bye-laws, and regulations is used to define the day to day 
business of the organisation. The public sector has developed procedures with a 
view that if these are followed the practices would deem to have been within the 
framework. There are volumes of rules, regulations, manuals, codes and forms to 
explain to government officials how to maintained accounts, how to prepare for 
audit and how to get the work done (Ali, 1992(a) & (b), 1993,1994, Bhattacharya 
1992, Account code 1992, General Financial rules 1992). The procedure of 
particular interest is Public Works procedure that deals with the procurement of 
works in general. 
It can be deduced that for any practice to become a mainstream procurement 
strategy in the public sector appropriate backing is to be found in relevant 
procedures, regulations and laws. 
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2.7 Routines in procurement 
It is quite understandable that a typical official is under a lot of pressure to follow 
wide ranging and complex procedures. The response is to make the actions and 
tasks as routine or repetitive as possible. If some practice had been proved to be 
safe from the point of view of procedure, the easiest and safest way is to keep on 
following it. The drawback is that any innovative approaches that differ from the 
routine are seen as threatening. A related effect is that the boundaries of the 
existing framework are not explored or modified to assimilate the innovations. 
Therefore, any practice different from the routine should be within the broad 
framework or require only a slight adjustment to the procedures. 
This research will explore the ways in which the procurement of urban 
infrastructure is undertaken in a routine manner and ways in which the 
innovations in the procurement of urban infrastructure occurred. A comparison 
and understanding of both kind of processes would help in assimilating one into 
another. 
There is a dearth of studies looking into the relationships where the principal and 
agents are from different kinds of organisations and especially where the 
principal is a public sector organisation. 
In subsequent chapters we will review the available literature relating to 
procurement. 
Key points. 
Principal-Agent theory provides a framework to understand different contracts. 
Officials have to deal with complex departmental procedures. 
Existing routine practices do not encourage innovation. 
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2.8 A review of strategies 
The development of procurement strategies in the UK provides a relevant 
background to the development of procedures in the ex-colonies of the British 
Empire. One key factor in the development of contracting systems was the 
relative economic power of the parties involved. The increased involvement of 
contractors in the development of their conditions of contract reflects the relative 
increase in their power. 'Over the centuries that power has been modified to the 
point where economic power rests with the contractor. When the contract has 
been delayed the contractor blames the building owner and sues for 
damages'(Nisbet 1993) 
Salzman (1952) described the contracts used in the fifteenth century. These were 
short and without many attachments such as drawings or specifications. Only 
references were made to some drawings. 
Nisbet (1993) gave an account of the development of the procurement 
arrangements in the UK. The standard forms of the RIBA, ICE, and of 
government contracts, which have influenced the national and international 
contract even in developing countries, had maintained the principles which dated 
back to 1895. The principles were: 
* The general contract system applied (i. e. the whole of the works would be 
carried out by one person or organisation) 
The work would be completed for a predetermined lump sum price 
the design and working drawings would be complete before work started 
* the administration of the contract would be the sole responsibility of an 
architect or engineer 
The same principles were endorsed for the post war construction (Simon 1944) 
but with the following criticisms on the procurement strategy: 
insufficient pre-contract preparation 
extensive numbers of variation orders 
Indiscriminate competition 
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Poorly defined relationship between the general and nominated sub- 
contractors 
The remedies were also identified and recommended: 
e the building owner should do his thinking in advance and see that work is not 
started on site until the whole of the job has been carefully thought out and 
that all requirements have been accurately defined in drawings, specifications 
and bills of quantities 
* the general contractor should be selected by competitive tender from a limited 
and carefully selected list of builders 
9 the general contractor should co-ordinate and control the whole of the works 
on site and have under him sub-contractors with whom he knows he can work. 
One dominant procurement system, traditional contracts, played a crucial role in 
the procurement of infrastructure in developing countries. 
Traditional contracts can be described as a combination of the three components 
organisation structure, basis of remuneration, and selection system (Nisbet 
1993). The components of the traditional contracting system is tabulated in Table 
2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Components of traditional contacting system 
Organisation structure Basis of remuneration Selection system 
1 Construction only by one 1 Lump sum with no detail. 1 Competition unlimited. 
builder <-> general contract 
system. 
2 Construction only by two 2 Lump sum with schedule of rates 2 Competition between a 
or more builders <-> for valuing variations. selected number of firms. 
separate trade system 
3 Design, construct and 3 Lump sum with priced bills of 3 Negotiation with two or more 
equip by one builder <-> quantities. firms. 
turnkey system 
4 Schedule of rates without 4 Appointment of one firm. 
quantities. 
5 Schedule of rates with quantities, 5 Two stage selection 
i. e. bill of approximate quantities. combines initial competition 
with subsequent negotiation. 
6 Cost reimbursement with fee that 6 
may be fixed, a percentage or 
combination of both. 
7 Cost reimbursement with 7 
maximum limit and with variable 
fee. 
'<-->' indicates the comparison between the categories. 
Banwell (1964) and Latham (1994) were other reports that dealt with the 
procurement in the UK context. The problems that were highlighted in the Simon 
report were revisited in terms of conflict and the loss due to the conflicts. The 
emphasis on a team approach is the response to combat conflicts within the 
construction industry. 
The choice for a client has increased considerably in recent times. 
Different 
strategies have come forward with the claims of meeting certain requirements. 
The strategies include; traditional, construction management, management 
contracting, 'design and manage' and 'design and build' 
(CUP 36 1992). The list 
is not exhaustive as different financing arrangement could generate 
the 
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strategies like 'Build Operate and Transfer'(B. O. T) or 'Build Operate Own and 
Transfer' (B. O. O. T) or Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) (HM Treasury 1995). 
The key in classifying the different strategies is the role of the stakeholders. in 
traditional strategy the role of the contractor is restricted to construction while in 
design and manage the contractor gets involved in the design process as well. In 
construction management the contractor's role is to manage other trade and 
design contractors on behalf of the client without having any direct contractual 
link with the other contractors. In management contracting there are contractual 
links with the trade contractors. In option like BOT or BOOT , the contractor is 
involved in the operation. In PFI the contractor is providing the finances. 
One could generate different strategies by selecting the role of the contractor in 
different ways. One can see the Principal-Agent relationships in all the 
arrangements. However, the roles of the stakeholders may be different in 
different situations. 
Some of the advantages and disadvantages of the different contract strategies 
are provided in HMSO CUP 36 (1992). Table 2.3 provides a summary of the 
factors /variables affecting the selection of strategies. 
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Table 2.3 Summary of advantages and disadvantages of contract strategies 
Parameters Ob ti jec ves Traditional Construction 
Management 
Managemen 
t Contracting 
Design 
& 
Manag 
e 
Design 
& Build 
Timin l l g ear y comp etion 
-- Cost price certainty befo re 
construction starts 
Quality prestige level in design 
and construction 
Variations avoid prohibitive costs of 
change 
.. ...... 
Complexity technically advanced or 
highly complex building 
Responsibility single contractual link for 
project execution 
Professional 
Responsibility 
need for design team to 
report to sponsor 
Risk Avoidance desire to transfer complete 
risk 
Damage 
Recovery 
ability to recover costs 
direct from the contractor 
Buildability contractor input to benefit 
the department 
Source: Adapted form HMSO Cup 36 
Note the factors in the table above do not include the socio-economic factors 
such as poverty alleviation and empowerment of communities which are 
increasingly becoming objectives of the new generation of urban development 
projects in developing countries. It is to be noted that if such factors are to be 
included, the selection criteria would need to be modified. Currently the main 
performance criteria are time, cost and quality. 
Key Points 
Traditional contract is the dominant mode of procurement 
Time, cost and quality are the main considerations 
Introduction of new factors may change the criteria of strategy selection 
cri eria. 
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2.9 Risks and contracts 
It is important to explore the concept of risk in relation to contracts, particularly 
with respect to situations in which community groups rather than conventional 
contractors are to be given the opportunity to procure infrastructure. 
Once the procurement strategy is chosen according to the objectives of the client 
the next step is to choose the conditions of contract. There are many standard 
conditions of contract available. However, in the public sector only prescribed and 
approved conditions of contracts are used. In South Asia it is found that the 
Public Works Departments are still following the same conditions as were used 
during the colonial days prior to 1940's apart from some very minor changes 
made to the conditions. The result is that the choice for public sector works in 
developing countries is restricted. The database index in the appendix provides a 
listing of conditions of contract available, including the ones used in developing 
countries and the ones used in the community-participated procurements. There 
is a recent trend in developing countries to use the international conditions of 
contract, like FIDIC(Federation Internationale Des Ingenieurs-Conseils), for the 
domestic procurements. The examples are conditions of contract developed by 
ICTAD, Sri Lanka and the Pakistan Engineering Council. However, there is still a 
need to develop appropriate conditions of contracts for minor and micro works. 
The conditions of contract apportion the various risks among the parties involved. 
Risks are uncertainties where a numerical value for probability could be assigned 
(Fellow & Langford 1980). The other decision scenarios are certainty and 
uncertainty. In practical terms the risks and uncertainties could be considered as 
same. 
There are many ways in which the risk could be classified in the context of 
construction, for example physical, financial, performance, and legal and political 
risks (Liu, 1994). Another classification was by Clamp (1993) in relation to shorter 
forms of contract such as: 
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1 Fundamental risks-war damage, nuclear pollution, supersonic bangs 
2 Pure risks-Fire damage, storm 
3 Particular risks-collapse, subsidence, vibration, removal of support 
4 Speculative risks-ground conditions, inflation, weather, shortages and taxes 
The classification of risks can be used to analyse risk-apportioning in different 
contract strategies and in different standard conditions of contract. 
Typical risks include: 
1. The project failing to be built within the stipulated design and construction 
time. 
2. The failure to obtain the expected outline planning, detailed planning or 
building regulations approvals within the time allocated in the design phase. 
3. Unforeseen adverse ground conditions delaying the project. 
4. Exceptionally inclement weather conditions delaying the project. 
5. Strikes by the labour forces. 
6. Unexpected price rises for labour and materials. 
7. The project failing to be let to a tenant upon completion. 
8. Accident to an operative on site causing physical injury. 
9. Latent defects occurring in the structure through poor workmanship. 
10. Force Majeure (for example flood, earthquake. ). 
11. A claim for loss and expense from the contractor caused by the late 
production of design details. 
12. Failure to complete the project within the client's budget. 
Rationale of sharing risks 
The recommend principles for sharing of risks are as reported in Liu (1994): 
0 All risks are rightfully the owner's unless transferred, transferred to or 
assumed by another party for a fair compensation. When the risk is so 
transferred, consider where the receiving party has the competence to fairly 
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assess the risk and expertise necessary to control or minimise it (Casey 
1979). 
0 If a risk is imposed upon a party, an opportunity for the reward to the party 
should exist for properly dealing with the risks. (Nadel 1979). 
0A risk should be best allocated to the party that is in the best position to 
control it (Nadel 1979). 
0 Steps should be taken to assure that risks are actually allocated as intended 
(Nadell979) 
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Figure 2.2 Qualitative risk apportioning in different contract strategies 
Client 
1 Management 
12 Prime Cost 
Fee 
Fixed Fee 
13. Approximate Quantities 
Remeasured 
14 Lump Sum 
Fluctuation 
Fixed Price 
5 Design And Build 
6 Package Deal 
Risk Contractor 
Source: Clamp (1993) 
The strategies 1,2, and 3 in figure 2.2 do not put disproportionate risk onto the 
contractor. If the community group lacks the capacity to undertake the major 
proportion of the risks as contractor then strategies similar to those above could 
be adopted. On the other hand if the community is playing the role of client and 
not in a position to take the risk then the strategies 4,5 and 6 may be considered. 
The above strategies should be taken only as guide and many combinations of 
strategies are possible. 
Figure 2.2 is intuitive; it could also be noted that the admeasured contracts are 
considered to allocate the risks equally. The fundamental risks are generally the 
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risk of the client. In the context of the minor and micro works, because of the low 
cost and the shorter duration of the works, the risks in general will be lower as 
compared to the major works. If the overall risks involved are relatively small the 
proportion of the risks to different parties would also be relatively small. 
Since a) the risk which needs to be apportioned are minimum and b) the capacity 
of the client (public sector) to manage the risks in relation to small contractors is 
high, it can, therefore, be argued that the client may be able to assume higher 
risks without losing any additional benefits. 
It seems that apportioning the speculative risks will have a cost impact on the 
tender cost. Any contractor who would assume risk would in turn include the cost 
of managing or transferring such risk in the tender. Such cost include the 
premium to the insurance companies. The premiums charged from the 
contractors would in turn depend on the evaluation of the contractor by the 
insurance company. If the public sector is more capable of handling the risk then 
insurance cover taken by the public sector instead of the contractors may be 
more cost effective. 
Key points 
" Contracts apportion risks among stakeholders. 
" Different strategies apportion risks differently. 
" Different parties may have different capacities to carry risk. 
" Risks should be transferred to the party which can control them. 
2.10 Enforcement of contracts 
Legal contracts are in general enforced by the court of law. Llewenllyn (1931) 
distinguished between 'iron rules' and 'yielding rules' and advocated the concept 
of contracts as a framework (after Williamson 1985). However, there are many 
matters in contract such as conflict resolution, that are resolved without recourse 
to a court of law. Such mechanisms are called private ordering. In relational 
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contracts such concepts could be quite useful in understanding how the contract 
works in such situations. 
The other concept is that of the 'self-enforcing' contract. Telser (1981) described 
a self-enforcing contract as one that if one party violates its terms the only 
recourse of the other party is to terminate the agreement. 
Key Points 
9 Contracts can also be enforced outside a court of law. 
* Court ordering is one way of enforcing contracts. 
2.11 Selection of appropriate procurement arrangements 
In the conventional construction related literature the underlying assumption was 
that the contractor would be a professional contractor. 
Though the classification of the procurement strategies could be found in the 
literature, there is little work which traces what actually happened in term of 
adopting a particular strategy to achieve objectives. The literature remains 
inconclusive to relate a particular strategy with success in a particular context. 
The tone of many studies is prescriptive or normative. 
After reviewing different contracting systems, Warszawaski (1975) concluded that 
the traditional contracting system suffers from two main drawbacks 1) the 
contractor cannot contribute to the design and 2) the construction work cannot be 
started before the design is complete. The conclusion was not very different from 
that of Simon (1944). 
Smith et al. (1975) pointed out that the different terminologies, like construction 
management, management contracting, used in the procurement systems need 
to have a legal backing. The contractual relationship occurring under 
different 
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procurement strategies was also classified. However, there was no conclusion as 
to what relationship was suitable in what conditions. 
Gore (1980), proposed a rationale for awarding the contract. The context used 
was the Indian public sector. This paper is unique in that it deals with the 
procurement systems of a developing country. The systems discussed were 
1. Lump sum contract (LSC), 
2. Percentage rate contract (PRC), 
3. Item rate contract (IRC). 
In the LSC system, the contractor agrees to execute a complete work, with all its 
contingencies according to the drawings and specification, for a fixed sum. The 
merits were reported as having: 
* less administrative work. 
* less work in measurement and billing. 
e ease in planning and monitoring. 
e The client has fewer worries that the contractor side would claim for additions 
and deletion of work 
9 quick decision in award of work. 
The limitation of the system reported was the completion of the design before the 
invitation to tender. 
In the two other systems, PRC & IRC, the contractor undertakes the execution of 
the work at fixed rates. In the PRC system the bill of quantities and schedule of 
rates, as worked out by the department, is attached to the tender indicating the 
anticipated value of the work. The contractor has only to quote an overall higher 
or lower percentage of value for which he is prepared to execute the work. 
This system reduces the administrative work of computation of tenders. Note that 
this is different from the item rate system of bidding commonly used in the UK. 
In IRC the contractor quotes independently for every item. 
The'merits'of both IRC & PRC include; 
9 the tolerance in variation 
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" reduction in overpayments 
" modifications in design in context of the major work 
" rigid control over consumption of material 
The promoter's ease and convenience were a major factor in the elaboration of 
the merits and demerits of the systems. 
The rules for the choice of the system were proposed as : 
1. adopt LSC system when constructions are of repetitive and standard type and 
those wherein variations or deviations are not likely 
2. to adopt PRC or IRC when the aforementioned conditions do not exist, 
however, preference may be given to PRC. The main reason given for the 
preference was the less administrative work in tendering process. 
3. to adopt more than one system when a project is a combination of standard 
and changeable designs in different parts thereof. 
The examples for the use of PRC were also provided; parking areas, roads, 
compound walls, water supplies, drainage. 
As evidence, performance of one hundred building contracts was reported. The 
criteria [dependent variable] used were the variation in completion time, variation 
in completion cost, and incidence of disputes. The system of the contract was 
treated as the explanatory variable. By using very basic descriptive statistics it 
was concluded that the priorities would be '1) LSC; and 2) PRC or IRCI. 
The 'splitting up' of the project was suggested to 'encourage keener competition 
as contractors other than large firms will also enter the competition'. It implies that 
at the time of writing the paper the author felt that only large firms had been able 
to compete for the contracts. One could argue that there would be a loss of 
economies of scale if projects are reduced in size. However, no such discussion 
was offered. 
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It is to be noted the systems of contract or contract-strategy like turnkey or 
management contracting were not considered. One reason could be that, in the 
public sector, the traditional contracting systems were the major option. In 
traditional contracting system the main contractor role is to construct only. It 
remains to be seen whether the passage of time will allow the public sector to 
include in their 'menu' of choices for contract strategies other than the three 
conventional ones mentioned above. 
The difficulties in devising a method to choose an appropriate system can be 
summarised as: 
1 No single person or body is fully conversant with all the main procurement 
arrangements (Hamilton, 1987). Even if we assume that there is such a body 
the next stage would be what to do with such knowledge. 
2 There is no general overt consensus between the experts to systernatise the 
procurement selection (Nahapiet and Nahapiet, 1985 and Hamilton, 1987). 
3 No mutually exclusive sets of criteria uniquely and completely determine the 
appropriate procurement arrangement (Ireland, 1985). 
Skitmore & Marsden (1988) attempted to develop a universal technique for 
selection of appropriate procurement arrangements using a multi-attribute 
technique and discriminant analysis to tackle the problems mentioned above. 
A modified version of the National Economic Office's(1985) procurement path 
decision chart was used. The procurement options consisted of: 
" negotiated traditional contracts 
" competitive traditional contracts 
" develop and construct [competitive] 
" negotiated design and build 
" management contracting 
" turnkey contracting 
The criteria consist of: 
o speed, pre-construction and post construction 
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9 certainty, original price, estimated time, and how much a client has to pay for a 
period of time 
" flexibility, accommodating the changes 
" quality level 
" building complexity 
" risk avoidance and responsibility 
" price competition, value of money, maintenance cost and competitive 
tendering 
Though it was demonstrated that the techniques could be applied if someone 
could assign the scores, the reliability and validity of the method was unknown. 
Gordon (1994), provide another prescriptive and classificatory study. He 
described the choices available, 'Contracting methods have four parts: scope, 
organisation, contract and award. He contended that the improvements could be 
achieved by: 
1 Shortening the duration of the project by overlapping design and construction 
and /or eliminating the bidding. 
2 Providing flexibility for changes during the construction time. 
3 Creating more designer/contractor teamwork by reducing the adversarial 
relationship. 
4 Allowing the contractor to participate in the design process. 
5 Providing incentives for the contractor to save the owner money. 
6 Providing alternative financing methods. 
It was contended that 'the use of groups of drivers will guide the owner in 
choosing the correct method. I 
'Drivers-The three drivers were described as: project drivers, owner drivers and 
market drivers. The project drivers include; 1) time constraints, 2) flexibility needs, 
3) design process interaction. The owner drivers include; 1) construction 
sophistication, 2) current capabilities, 3) risk aversion, 4) restrictions on methods, 
5) other external factors. The market drivers include; 1) availability of appropriate 
contractors, 2) current state of the market, 3) package size of the project' 
(Gordon. 1994) 
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'The risk we are most concerned about when choosing the contract type is 
financial risk-the risk of what the final cost of the project will be. Optimising the 
cost of a project depends on properly assessing the risks, allocating the risks, and 
ensuring that each party manages the risks allocated to them' (Gordon 1994). 
The possibility of shifting the risks completely to either owner or contractor was 
mentioned. The author further added that 'the risk should be sought between the 
owner and his contractor or designer to use the value of bearing the risk while 
minimising a contingency charged for accepting the risk'. It was argued that 'most 
owners put as much financial risk as possible on the contractor. What they do not 
take into consideration was that some risks may be less expensive to be borne 
by the owners themselves. A company's efficiency in handling risk is based on its 
power to control risk, its possible reward for controlling the risk and its financial 
position. An owner must choose a contract, or series of contracts, that most 
efficiently allocates the financial risk of the various parts of the project'. It was 
further reported that negotiating a contract can produce a better relationship, but, 
if only one contractor is involved. It is very difficult to determine the market price 
for the work. The client may get the contractor and relationship they want, but 
might pay too much for the project. 
Two perceptions of construction were mentioned. These regarded construction 
as 'commodity or a service'. Gordon (1994) argued that 'construction involves 
both'. He suggested that the 'key to determining a successful award method is 
isolating the two types of prod ucts-commod ities and services-and awarding each 
in an appropriate way: commodities should be awarded by bidding, while 
services, if needed, should be awarded with multi-parameter bidding or 
negotiations, both of which value contractor's qualifications). 
The paper suggested that in the last thirty years the menu of choices for the 
selection of contracting methods has increased. The description has become 
more systematic. Consideration of commodities and services is also important 
in 
the linking of construction related activities with some other subjects. 
The 
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shortcoming of the traditional system is systematically highlighted. The desired 
objectives have included the lack of adversarial relationships. As can be seen 
the issues are becoming more and more broad and one can feel that the 
implication of having a choice of procurement system is still to be explored. 
One logical result of accumulations of such heuristic rules was to develop 
knowledge systems. One such example is an expert system develop by Sodipo 
(1993). The approach was to use the same heuristic rules in decision-making 
processes in contract strategy. 
Among very few studies related to developing countries are those done by Ofroi 
(1991) and Aniekwu & Okpala (1987). The studies are related to the construction 
industry and its problems in general. 
2.12 Performance improvement 
Improvement in performance has been the main concern of the branch of 
management literature termed Total Quality Management (TQM). It is described 
as 'management process of continuous internal improvements throughout an 
origination that ultimately results in improvements in the finished product' (Kubal 
1994). The theoretical developers among other include: 1) Edward Deming(after 
Kubal 1994), teacher of Japanese manufacturing industry, 2) Phillip B. 
Crosby(1979), advocate of 'zero defects' approach, 3) Taiichio Ohno (1988), 
famous for the 'Just in time' method ( Kubal 1994). Strange and Vaughan (1993) 
critically view the applicability of TQM in construction. 
The two approaches, TQM and participation, which have a relevance to the 
research are briefly described: 
1 To encourage innovation the quality programs should empower employee. 
2 In a totally different context of development, Chambers (1997) advocates 
empowerment of the community for development. Empowerment is a key in 
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the process improvement may it be business, construction or community 
development. 
Key points 
" Process improvement is important. 
" Empowerment is recommended in management and development sciences. 
2.12.1 Partnering 
The partnering approach seeks to go beyond the details of contracts and seeks a 
partnering attitude, or at the least lack of an adversarial attitude among the 
stakeholders to achieve mutually agreed objectives. Kubal (1994) argued that 
partnering 'is not a legal or contractual obligation'. 
Partnering can be defined as a long term commitment between two or more 
organisations for the purpose of achieving specific business objectives by 
maximising the effectiveness of each participant's resources. The relationship is 
based on trust, dedication to common goals, and an understanding of each 
other's individual expectations and values. Expected values include improved 
efficiency, and cost effectiveness, increased opportunity for innovation and the 
continuous improvements of quality products and services (Hancher 1991). 
A working definition after Cowen et al. (1992) of project partnering is that it is a 
method of transforming contractual relationships into a cohesive, project team 
with a single set of goals and established procedures for resolving disputes in a 
timely and effective manner. 
Hellard (1995) gives a comprehensive account of how partnering could be 
implemented. However, the tone remains prescriptive. Similar ideas are 
advanced by Mosely et al. (1991), NEDO (1991) and Harback et al. (1994). 
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Abudayyeh (1994) reported partnering experiences and their success in the USA 
context. He emphasised the importance of relationship between owner and 
contractor and argued that new attitudes and behaviour patterns need to be 
developed. The importance of the changing attitude and behaviours for 
partnering is worth noting. 
Larson (1995) performed an empirical study to explore 'the relationships between 
the project success and partnering'. The success of the project was measured in 
terms of 'controlling costs, meeting schedules, the technical performance, 
avoiding litigation and satisfying customers'. 'Partnering is based on the 
realisation that the traditional adversarial relationship between the owners and 
contractors often degenerates into a 'lose-lose' relationship for everyone except 
the lawyers' The key themes behind partnering are teamwork, collaboration, trust, 
openness, and mutual respect$. 
Research (Larson 1995) was designed 'to consider alternative approaches to 
managing contractual relationships on construction projects'. Four 'fundamentally 
different approaches to managing the owner-contractor relationships' were 
described as 'Adversarial', 'Guarded Adversarial', 'informal partners' and 'project 
partners'. The two central questions tackled were '1) What is the relationship 
between the four different approaches to managing owner - contractor[pri nci pal- 
agent] relationship and various indicators of project success 2) what effect does 
the bid status of the project have on these relationships'? 
A qualified conclusion was reached; 'partnered projects achieved superior results 
in controlling costs, technical performance, and in satisfying customers compared 
with the projects managed in adversarial. guarded adversarial, and even informal 
partnering manner. Further, whether the contract was awarded on a low-bid or 
non-low bid basis did not effect the relationship between partnering and project 
success'. 
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Contrary to the general belief, Bates (1994) argued that the partnering approach 
could be equally useful for small contracts. He argued that the benefits of 
partnering are desirable for small projects. The benefits included: 
avoidance of litigation and claims 
control of cost growth 
control of schedule 
quality 
safety 
developing a problem solving strategy where consensus dominates and 'win- 
win' solutions are always the goals. 
He further elaborated the principles which are equally applicable to the small 
contracts. These were: 
" Shared goals arrived at through consensus 
" Mutual trust and respect among stakeholders 
" New attitude and behaviour patterns 
" New methods and means of effective communication 
" Total commitments from top to bottom of all stakeholders 
It is important to note that the thrust is on the relationships by which the 
stakeholders could trust each other. Warne (1994) described creation of 'trust- 
culture' fundamental to partnering process. 
The concept of partnering will be explored further in relation to community 
involvement in infrastructure procurement in subsequent chapters. 
2.12.2 Benchmarking 
'Benchmarking is the practice of being humble enough to admit that someone is 
better at something and being wise enough to learn how to match and even 
surpass them at it. A benchmark is a measured 'best-in-class' achievement 
recognised as the standard excellence for those business practices,. (after 
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Anderson and Peterson 1996). Some of the important works related to 
benchmarking include Jackson et al. (1994) and Anderson and Peterson(1996). 
Lema & Price(1995) explores the definition, scope and applicability in the context 
of construction industry. It was defined as a 'Systematic search for best practice 
that lead to superior performance'. Kubal (1994) defined it as 'measuring, 
recording, and evaluating a firm's progress towards a particular quality goal'. 
Internal, external and third party benchmarking has been described (Fisher et al. 
1995). However, the main approach is as follows: 
study and understand one's own process 
find the best Benchmarking partners 
study the partner's process 
analyse the difference between ones' own and ones' partner's process. 
implement improvements based on what is learned from the benchmarking 
partner. 
Some of these concepts will be applied to the performance of the of micro- 
contracts for procurement of infrastructure. 
2.13 Parallel developments 
It was noted earlier that the theme of empowerment and partnering in business 
management and community development has a common theme of trust. Some 
of the relevant concepts of participation in general and in construction in 
particular are described below. 
2.13.1 Participation 
There is an extensive literature relating to social and anthropological aspects of 
community participation (Cohen & Uphoff 1977, Korten 1980, Paul 1987 & Ghai & 
Hewit de Alacantara 1990). Participation may mean different things to different 
people. Shades of community participation were represented by Sherry Arnstein's 
ladder of participation: co-optation, manipulation, therapy, informing, consulting & 
placation (reported in Hamdi 1995). Many scholars have attempted to define 
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participation. The common theme was that of contributing, influencing, sharing 
redistribution of power, control, resources and benefits. The pioneering work came 
from the rural development area. The ideas in urban development work follow 
similar concepts. Paul (1987) described different levels of participation namely; 
information sharing, consultation, decision making and initiating action. 
Participation engenders financial, social and psychological cost and benefits 
(Narayan 1995). She described the main reasons for participation as; project 
effectiveness, project efficiency, empowerment and equity. Project effectiveness is 
defined as the degree to which the project objectives are achieved. Efficiency 
measures the relationship between the inputs and the outputs . Empowerment is 
the transfer of power to those lacking it. Equity is the measure of the fair distribution 
of the benefits to disadvantaged groups. Oakely et al. (1991) included 
sustainability, coverage and self-reliance to the list. 
There is still a difference of opinion on the role of participation as a mean or an 
end. (Hamdi 1995 and Picciotto 1992). Community participation could be seen as a 
desired end in itself from the point of view development of the community. 
However, another outlook could be to see community participation as a mean or a 
tool to achieving other objectives. For example, the financial contribution by the 
community to tertiary infrastructure may reduce the cost to the public sector. 
Another example could be that due to the participation process the community 
developed the sense of ownership and thus better care of infrastructure and less 
maintenance. 
Hamdi (1995) gave an account of the historical and theoretical development of 
the community participated or enabling approach for housing. The work of Turner 
& Habraken, both non-engineers, was considered to be of a critical nature in 
community participated approaches (Hamdi 1995). There is a stream of literature, 
mainly in planning related activities, advocating participation. 
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UNCHS (1996) emphasised the role of the community as a partner. The role of 
the public sector is advocated as an enabler and not a provider. Again it is to be 
noted the partnering relationship between the public sector and other sectors was 
emphasised. 
Cohen & Uphoff (1980), observe that 'with all these activities the disturbing fact is 
that there is little agreement on what participation is or on its basis'. They went 
further; 'there is little systematic knowledge to draw on in the social sciences 
concerning development participation'. The suggestion was to regard' 
participation as generally denoting the involvement of a significant number of 
persons in a situation or actions that enhance their well-being, for example their, 
income, security or self esteem'. The dimensions of participation were described 
as I) what kind of participation is under consideration; 2) who is participating in 
it; 3) how is participation occurring . 
The paper relates to a rural setting. For implementation, it was argued that 'rural 
people can participate in three ways: 1) resource contribution; 2) administration 
and co-ordination efforts; 3) programme enlistment activities. Resource 
contribution can take a variety of forms, such as the provision of labour, cash, 
material goods and information'. In administration and co-ordination efforts the 
people can participate 'as either locally hired employees or as members of 
various project advisory or decision -making boards. They can also be members 
of voluntary associations who are playing a role in co-ordinating their activity with 
those of the project . 
The paper concluded with the gene ralisations: 1) participation has many 
connotations; 2) participation for development is not the same thing as 
participation in politics; 3) participation is not just an end in itself, 4) participation 
is not a panacea; 5) there is a connection among different kinds of participation; 
6) participation even in 'development' terms is inescapably 'political'. 
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2.13.2 Community participation in procurement 
Taylor and Norval (1994) advocated the development of appropriate procurement 
systems for developing communities. Use of non-formal contracts was 
considered to be a major factor in the construction sector. Some socio-economic 
objectives were discussed in the context of South Africa. The concept of 
community participation and community contracting was described. However, the 
roles described for community was limited to the labour contractors. That is the 
role of community was limited to the suppliers of labours. 
Gopal & Marc (1994) and Gopal (1995) have advocated the use of community 
participated procurement strategies in the context of World Bank procedures, 
highlighting problems and proposing solutions. However, the study did not take 
any account of the existing procedures in developing countries. 
The World Bank (World Bank 1995) realised that community participation in 
procurement was one of the alternative methods in procurement strategies. The 
other alternatives include; limited international bidding, national competitive 
bidding, shopping, direct contracting, force accounts procurement under BOT 
and similar private sector arrangements. There is little detail given of how to use 
the alternative methods and why to use them. The term 'alternative' gives a 
feeling that, unless it can be shown that the international competitive bidding is 
not feasible, the alternate methods are only theoretical possibilities and as such 
are not used. 
Kent & Rimarachin (1994) attempted an empirical study of public work in rural 
Peru. 'About 17% of the respondents reported using a combination of family 
labour and hired labourers to satisfy the project labour requirements'. 'More than 
eight per cent of all project beneficiaries reported using hired labourers 
exclusively'. This finding highlighted that that the people are not simply volunteer 
and paid labour. 
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It was reported that 'an average of 20% of all project costs were borne by the 
community. On the smaller-scale projects this might represent a total value Of US 
$4,000-5,000, whereas for larger-scale projects, notably roads, community 
contributions can come to US $100,0001. 
The 'issues of equity and the incidence of levels of indirect taxation on those 
typically least able to contribute - the rural population and the urban poor' were 
also hinted. 'The distortion of benefits from public works construction is also a 
concern. For many projects, the benefits to the households are clear and direct, 
that is, irrigation canals, potable water, and sewerage systems. However, for 
major projects like roads, the benefits to individual households and even many 
communities are difficult to measure and arguably small 
Three recommendations were made: 'community participation in the construction 
of public works is most effective when the project is of a local character, only 
requires the participation of one, or at most a few, co-operating communities, and 
when the benefits are direct'; the state institutions implementing the project 
should work with previously constituted and respected local organisations with a 
democratic character; municipal governments, as the government institution 
closest and most responsible to local residents, should receive greater resources 
which would allow them to take a more active role in the mobilisation and 
direction of local and provincial public works'. 
More empirical work was advocated to find out how 'the community participation 
works in a wider range of types of projects and in other social and environmental 
contexts; at what levels of administrative, political, and geographic aggregation 
can reasonable generalisations about participation and its role in the financing 
and implementation of public works construction be reached and public policy 
decision made; more in-depth analysis needs to be conducted on individual 
projects to establish more specifically the social and economic impact of the 
projects and the distribution of project benefits to different community members 
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and groups'. Another empirical study was reported by Narayan (1995). The study 
considered the contribution of community participation but again in rural contexts. 
In an urban context, Cotton & Tayler (1994), provided an overview of 
infrastructure provision in developing countries. Community management was 
advocated. The desired effects of the approach include some socio-economic 
factors, prospects for employment generation and income generation. 
It is worth noting that in both rural and urban settings in less developed countries 
it is hard to find reported incidences of popular participation where the project 
was financed by the local government. There is little work on the interaction of 
public and participatory procurement of infrastructure. 
Slums, shanties and informal settlement created new problems for the urban 
managers especially in the public sector. The paradox is that legally there should 
be no informal settlements. In reality in some cities a high proportion of 
population live in some form of 'other than formal settlements'. It is difficult, in the 
domain of the public sector, to deal with the non-legal entities and with the 
groups who are not 'registered contractors '. The relationships or contracts 
studied were mainly between the public sector and the commercial private sector. 
There were few cases of contracts between the public sector and third sector or 
community groups. 
The most important case reported is that of 'community contracting' by the NHDA 
in Sri Lanka (Pathirana & Sheng 1992). They studied sixty three community 
contracts. 'NHDA awards contracts, similar to commercial contracts to local 
residents[Community Development Council]'. It was 'decided to bypass the 
commercial contractors not only to reach more communities at the same time, but 
also to improve the quality of the infrastructure produced' 'Profit making is the 
main objective of the commercial contractors who have a tendency to minimise 
the cost by reducing the quality I. 
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It was further mentioned that the work was 'good or very good'. cost'less' and the 
overall implementation took less time. The reduced margins of profit for the 
contractors[from 35 to 15%], and the by passing of tendering procedures were 
reported to be the main cause of the reduction in cost and time. 
The status of the completion of the contracts was classified into: 'completed 
within time and cost; completed with time overrun, within cost estimate; 
completed within time, within cost overrun; completed with time overrun and cost 
overrun; incomplete /not started I. It was further argued that 'most of the 
community contracts[45%] were completed within the time allowed for the work'. 
55 percent were not completed in time. It is very difficult to relate the cost, time or 
quality performance to an approach like community contracting without 
comparing it with other types of contracting under the same conditions. 
It was concluded that 'community contract systems are good methods for 
providing basic services in low- income settlements: they can provide basic 
services of good quality at lower costs within a set period of time. As the 
communities are generally satisfied with the results, it is likely that they will feel 
more responsible for the management and maintenance of the services. 
The literature reviewed is not conclusive in answering the question how and why 
to select a particular procurement method to achieve defined objectives. The 
question how and why to assimilate the community participated initiatives in the 
procurement strategies has rarely been asked. 
Furthermore, the literature lacks the description of what happens, and what would 
happenif a certain method is adopted. This is especially so in the context of the 
developing countries. for which evidence from the literature is quite limited. 
However, the message is that the people are not completely satisfied with the 
traditional competitive bidding and there are alternative methods to be used. 
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In the light of the previous discussion, the use of the benchmarking approach 
may be quite useful in understanding the process and performance of both 
routine and non-routine including community participated procurement. 
Partnering is a desirable concept between the stakeholders in procurement. 
However, it remains to the seen how the partnering could be achieved especially 
between the public sector and community groups. 
Partnering is another promising approach where a deliberate attempt is made to 
avoid adversarial relationships between the principal and the agent. 
Key Points 
" There is convergence of management and development thinking on partnering 
and empowerment. 
" Benchmarking is a way to understand, measure and compare performance. 
" Participation in procurement of urban infrastructure is an area of importance 
where there is a major gap in reported experience. 
Few empirical studies have been done in community procurement. 
How and why to assimilate the community participated initiatives in the 
procurement strategies is a question worth pursuing. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the overall methodology adopted for the research. The 
research question is stated. The overall design and unit of analysis are 
described. The choice available for the research methodology and the reason for 
choosing a methodology is provided. The questions regarding the reliability and 
validity of the study are discussed. The sources of data, the reasons for choosing 
these sources, the methods of collection and analysis are described. The 
methods used to collect and analysed the data are described. 
3.2 Research question and strategy 
The research question could be stated as: How to promote the role of community 
in the procurement of urban infrastructure for poor in developing countries at 
tertiary level? 
The research question directs the researcher to investigate the processes, roles 
relationships and perceptions of stakeholders in procurement of infrastructure 
where community involvement is potentially present and where it is not present. 
In this work no single method was selected beforehand. Appropriateness of 
method in relation to the research question was given prime consideration when 
selecting the research methodology. 
There are many methods cited in the texts dealing with research design. The 
main methods are experiments, surveys, histories and the analysis of the archival 
information (Hakim 1987). The main advantages and disadvantages of the 
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methods have been covered in literature (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992) and as 
such these are not repeated here. Different strategies have advantages and 
disadvantages depending on: 
" The nature of the research question 
" The control the investigator has over actual behavioural events 
" The focus on contemporary or historical phenomena. 
A summary of situations relevant for different research strategies was reported by 
Yin (1994). The table is reproduced as below as Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Strategy Form of research Require control over Focus on 
question behavioural events contemporary events. 
(2) (3) (4) 
experiments how, why yes yes 
survey who, what, where, how no yes 
many, how much 
archival analysis who, what, where, how no yes/no 
many, how much 
history how, why no no 
case study how, why no yes 
The different strategies are not mutually exclusive and variations within one 
strategy may occur. One such variation in experimental strategies is the 'quasi- 
experimental' approach. These are the occasions where the experimenters 
cannot manipulate the variable but the logic of the experiment design can be 
followed (Campbell and Stanley 1966, Cook and Campbell 1979). 
In this research the situation under study was of a contemporary nature. The 
research was about phenomena occurring in the present or having occurred in 
recent past but with a link to the present. Consideration of column 4 of the above 
table guided that the 'history' is not applicable in this research. 
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The phenomena under study like many social phenomena involved many 
variables. Some of those variables may not even be identified. There was no 
control possible over the phenomena under study, unlike the laboratory situation. 
Consideration of column three guided that 'experiment' is also not feasible. 
The main emphasis of the question was on 'how' and not on 'how much'. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of community participation in the procurement is 
not frequently occurring and little is known about it; this indicates towards a case 
study being more appropriate as compared to the survey method 
Within the framework of the case study, survey techniques were also used to do 
some preliminary research. However, because of the uniqueness of the 
phenomenon and depth of the study required for research purposes, the overall 
design selected remained the case study. It is to be noted that during research 
various techniques for the data collection and analysis are used. 
3.3 Case Study 
Yin (1994) defined case study research as 'an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case 
study enquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be 
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation 
fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis. ' 
It is quite evident from the above description that emphasis on the study of the 
contemporary situations and uncontrollable variables has brought the case study 
and quasi-experimentation approaches quite close together. Therefore, the 
choice of the research method comes out to be case study with the logic of 
q uasi-experimentation . 
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3.3.1 Validity and reliability 
In any research method the key consideration is objectivity, which can be divided 
into two components: reliability and validity (Kirk and Miller 1989). 
e Reliability is the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same 
answer however and whenever it is carried out. 
e The validity is the extent to which it gives the correct answer. Yin (1994) has 
described the concepts of construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability as they apply to a case study. 
Much attention has been given in design and conducting of the research to 
ensure its reliability and validity. In this research, the use of multiple sources and 
forms of data, triangulation, preparation of an accessible database and use of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques have greatly helped in achieving the 
ta rg et. 
3.3.2 Logical replication and statistical replication 
It is worth mentioning that a distinction is made between logical replication and 
statistical replication. This distinction is the key to answering questions related to 
the external validity or the generalisation of the case study. Yin (1994) has 
reminded us that the 'case study, like an experiment, does not represent a 
sample' and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalise the theories, 
analytical generalisation and not to enumerate frequencies, statistical 
generalisation. 
A major insight is to consider multiple cases as one would consider multiple 
experiments-that is, to follow a 'replication' logic. This is far different from a 
mistaken analogy in the past, which considered multiple cases to be similar to 
the 
multiple respondents in a survey or to the multiple subjects within an experiment - 
that is to follow a 'sampling' logic. 
3.5 
The replication logic is analogous to that used in multiple experiments. Thus if 
one has to assess only three cases of a rare, clinical syndrome in psychology or 
medical science, the appropriate research design is one in which the same 
results are predicted for each of the three cases , thereby producing evidence 
that the three cases did indeed involve the same syndrome. In each of these 
situations, an individual case or subject is considered akin to a single experiment, 
and the analyst must follow cross-experimental rather than with in-experiment 
design logic. 
The logic underlying the use of multiple-cases is the same. Each case must be 
carefully selected so that it either 1) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or 
2) produce contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). 
3.4 What is the overall research design? 
Research design is considered by some as an action plan to reach from the initial 
set of questions to the conclusions (Yin 1994) and by other as a logical model of 
proof that allows the investigator to draw logical inferences(Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1992). 
The overall research methodology in this research is multiple case study. The 
research design for the multiple case study comprises of five important 
components (after Yin 1994): 
1. Study questions 
How to assimilate the community initiatives in the public sector procurement 
strategy for urban infrastructure in developing countries at tertiary level?. 
2. Its propositions 
Partnering between the community group and public sector is an appropriate 
procurement strategy. The strategy would assimilate the community initiatives 
in the public sector procurement of tertiary level urban infrastructure. 
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3. Its unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis in our study is the relationships or a set of contracts. The 
contracts between the public sector, private sector, community groups in a 
particular organisational context are included in this research. A contract is 
the main mode of relationship between the parties involved in the 
procurement. The Contract gives an indication to the stakeholder involved in 
the procurement process. 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions 
This is the link between data and hypothesis. It is a guide to the kind of data 
to be collected and later how to analyse the data to reach to the conclusion. 
5. The criteria of interpreting the findings. 
This refers to the analytical framework to handle the data collected. 
3.5 Source of Data 
The rationale of the study has been to investigate the processes, roles, 
relationships and performance of routine procurement strategies and community 
participated ones. A brief out line for the sources of data is represented in the 
following flow chart in Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1 Chart outlining the sources of data. 
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The organisations involved in the procurement of tertiary infrastructure were 
identified in the countries under consideration, that is, India Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
These three countries in South Asia were selected based on some known 
initiatives in the region and existing links with the organisations involved in 
community participated procurement. The main organisations from where the 
data was collected are listed in the data base index. The contracts selected were 
micro-contracts, as those contracts were the main contracts used in the 
procurement of urban infrastructure at tertiary level. 
The contracts studied were selected under two main criteria, namely: 
1 The situations where community groups played a role in the procurement. 
2 The situation where community groups did not play a role in the procurement. 
In terms of the organisations there were basically: public sector, commercial 
private sector and the third sector (please see list of acronyms and terms) 
including end-users. The review of literature including unpublished literature, 
personal links and initial investigations were all used to identify the case contexts 
for the detailed study. 
The following sections include a brief description of the organisations from where 
the data for this research was collected. All of the public sector organisations 
mentioned below have the legal framework based on English Law. 
3.5.1 Sindh [name of province] Katchi Abadi [squatter settlements] 
Authority, Pakistan(SKAA) 
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, is an autonomous body was formed in 1987 by an 
act of the State Government. Sindh is one of the four provinces of Pakistan. The 
country's largest city, Karachi, is located in the same province. The act defines 
the responsibilities and the authorities of the organisation. In short the purpose of 
3.9 
the organisation was to regularise the katchi abadis(squatter settlements) and 
upgrade them. The organisation is the leading authority in dealing with matters 
related to the regularisation and upgrading of the katchi abadis. 
The authority is located within the Ministry Of Local Government along with 
Public Health Engineering Department; Department Of Local Bodies, Rural 
Development And Municipal Corporations. 
The director general is the chief executive of the organisation. The Governing 
body comprises of members, the Mayors of all the four corporations, four 
members of parliament, the Finance Director of SKAA, the Director General of 
SKAA, the commissioners of Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur divisions, a 
member board of Revenue, the secretary of the Local Government Department 
and the Minister of Katchi Abadis. The formation of a separate authority and 
positioning of the organisation with all the relevant organisations shows that the 
Government was concerned and serious about the provision of an instrument for 
dealing with the problems of the katchi abadis. It reflects the government's 
recognition of the importance of the distinctive needs of the katchi abadis. Earlier 
the responsibilities for regularising the katchi abadis rested with the concerned 
municipal authority. SKAA was given the status of authority which is higher than a 
municipal or metropolitan corporation. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the 
authority comprises of the province. 
It does remain a question whether the functions of the katchi abadis overlaps with 
the existing organisations or not. How do the old organisations adjust to the new 
organisation? The creation of the new organisation also reflects the 
dissatisfaction of the Government with the overlapping functions and lack of trust 
within old institutions. The creation of the new authority gives freedom to deal 
relatively independently on matters related to raising finance. The old institutions, 
like the municipal corporation, have become agents of the authority in addition to 
their defined roles. The authority also refrains from dealing directly with the 
workings of the municipal corporations. 
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[Sources for the previous section included data base entries: 37,38,39,40,129,145,147,250. ] 
3.5.2 Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project 
The project is located in the City of Faisalabad the third largest city in Pakistan. 
The project is funded by Department for International Development, UK. It was 
proposed as a community-based katchi abadi and slum upgrading project. The 
project included development works related to urban infrastructure. Two main 
aims for the project were envisaged. 
1 Improving the economic and social welfare 240,000 people in katchi abadis 
and slums. 
Improving infrastructure 
The project is to be implemented in phases. In Phase 160,000 people are to be 
covered in pilot area in two years. The second phase will serve 180,000 people 
over a period of four years. 
The project proposed to adopt the community participation approaches. The work 
was to be carried out in partnership with the local communities. The project 
management unit (PMU), an agency of Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA) 
was established to implement the project. A management consultant was hired 
by the Donors. The PMU comprises of the personnel hired particularly for the 
project, people transferred from the mainstream FDA and the foreign consultant. 
The main function of the PMU was the smooth execution of the project activities. 
It was intended that at the end of the project the best practices developed by 
PMU will effectively absorbed by FDA. PMU undertook some of the activities 
undertaken by the NGOs in SKAA like community organisations. Unlike SKAA, 
FDA is not a dedicated organisation for regularisation and up-grading of the 
Katchi Abadis. 
The community was to contribute 50% of the project cost for tertiary level 
infrastructure while the remaining cost is borne by the government. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 137,256,257,253. ] 
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3.5.3 Karachi Metropolitan corporation, Pakistan (KMC) 
The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) is the Municipal authority for 
Karachi. The municipal system in Karachi had gone through many changes due 
to the politically unstable situation in the last five years. According to the Sindh 
Local Government manual a two tiered local body's system was introduced in 
1987. A metropolitan corporation was set up in 1988 along with the four zonal 
committees in four districts; Central, East, West and South. The Mayor is the 
chief executive of the corporation. The Mayor is to be elected by the councillors 
from each local council area. The local councils have the powers to levy taxes. 
The salient compulsory functions of the corporation include provision and 
maintenance of urban infrastructure including water and sanitation, drainage, 
street lighting and solid waste management. 
There are approximately 600 katchi abadis with an estimated population of 3.0 
million. This means that approximately 30 % of the city population lives in Katchi 
Abadis. A special bureau, the Katchi Abadi Bureau deal with the problems of 
development in squatter settlements within municipal areas. Until the 
establishment of SKAA in 1987, KMC was the sole developing agency concerned 
with the katchi abadis in the municipal areas. The Asian Development Bank(ADB) 
funded a development project to improve the condition of selected squatter 
settlements. The KMC Katchi Abadi Bureau handled the project. Orangi Pilot 
project (OPP), an NGO, acted as an advisor to KMC. A project director was 
appointed to run the projects under loan. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 58,62,84,90,120,245,246,264. ] 
3.5.4 Orangi Pilot project-Research and Training Institute, Pakistan. (OPP- 
RTI) 
This well-known N on-Govern mental Organisation is based in Orangi township, 
Karachi, Pakistan. The organisation was established in 1979 by Bank of Credit 
and Commerce to develop a model of social welfare. Doctor Akhtar Hameed 
Khan undertook the project. The programmes included the urban sanitation, 
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health, education and credit. OPP supported the activities of building sanitation 
systems in Orangi on a self-funded basis. OPP has also acted as consultant to 
the public sector and donors in procuring infrastructure for low income urban 
communities. The model for sanitation developed by the OPP (Khan 1992) has 
been given much attention in urban context and has been advocated by the 
government authorities as well (Hasan 1993). 
OPP pioneered the ideas of internal and external works. Internal works mean 
neighbourhood or tertiary level works. It is contended by OPP that the internal 
works were to be completely financed by the community. External works are non- 
internal works including secondary and primary infrastructure which is necessary 
to support the tertiary level. OPP is one of the few NGOs who is acting as a 
consultant to public sector. It provides a linkage between public sector and the 
and the private sector. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 37,38,39,250,252,261. ] 
3.5.4.1 Slum improvement programmes (SIPs) in India 
The programmes are funded by the Department for International Development of 
the UK in the cities of Hyderabad, Vishakapatnam, Vijayawada, Indore, Calcutta, 
Cuttack, and Cochin to improve the living conditions of the urban poor. Slum 
improvement programmes (SIPs) are integrated urban development projects. The 
projects incorporate physical improvements in water and sanitation, drainage, 
access, solid waste and street lighting. They also included programmes such as 
pre-school, non-formal education, adult literacy, primary health care, community 
and economic development. SIPs promote community participation as a key to 
self-realisation by developing community level organisations. In the recent SIPs 
like Cochin and Cuttack the emphasis is on poverty reduction. 
In Cuttack the project aims to improve the access of 143,000 slum dwellers from 
106 slums to urban services. A project management unit(PMU) is set under the 
Administrator of Cuttack Municipal corporation. 
3.13 
The Cochin Project aims to secure better access for the poor of Cochin to 
'improved services and livelihood opportunities by improving the capacities of all 
the stakeholders to identify needs and to plan for and implement solutions. ' 
The project is considered to be a new breed of SIPs. It proposed to 'increase 
participation by the primary and secondary stakeholders; integration with other 
government programmes; better targeting of vulnerable groups and those living 
outside the recognised slums; and capacity building for beneficiaries, service 
delivers and planners. ' The implementing agency is Corporation of Cochin. A co- 
ordination committee was to oversee the activities of the project. 
There is no cost sharing in SIPs from the beneficiaries in terms of finances. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 32,33.1 
3.5.5 National Housing and Development Authority. (NHDA) 
NHDA is a national institution which deals with the issue of housing in Sri Lanka, 
including the 'One Million Housing Programme'. It is in this authority that the 
community contracting was pioneered by a major authority in South Asia. The 
background of the NHIDA, million housing programme and development of the 
community contracting in NHIDA is provided by Pathirana & Sheng (1992) and 
UNCHS (1994). 
Housing for poor had been a politically sensitive issue in Sri Lanka. The 
governments at different time tried to address the issue. A summary of the 
interventions is as follows. 
1971 to 1977-Public sector housing programme to provide houses to target 
groups. 
1978 to 1983-Hundred thousand houses programme included construction of 
36000 urban housing units. 85 % were targeted towards poor. 
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1979 to 1984-Slums and shanty upgrading programme to implement 53 low 
income settlement projects in Colombo benefiting 40000 people. 
The Million Houses Programme included the settlement upgrading and provision 
of basic services and development of community organisation. The role of the 
government subsequently changed from provider to enable. The Million housing 
project was implemented within the supportive framework. 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) are community organisations which 
played a significant role in the execution of the community contracts. This 
research will look in detail at the roles and nature of these community 
organisations. 
Among other activities, the authority also lends money for housing purposes. 
Currently they are involved in another projects where housing is provided on the 
basis of political constituency. 
The officials of the authority have very close links with some of the NGOs and the 
clean seftlements programme. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 157,338,340,344,358] 
3.5.6 Clean seftlement programme (CSPU). Sri Lanka 
The aim of the programme is to 'improve the quality of the life of the people in 
urban low income settlements'. This programme follows on from the programmes 
developed under NHDA. The project was integrated in nature as it was to deal 
with the sustainable environmental infrastructure, income generation, health and 
education. The community participated approach was to be adopted. 
A unit, Clean Settlement Programme Unit (CSPU), was created in the Ministry 
Housing Local Government and Construction to implement the project. Many 
officials who are working in the unit have worked on the NHDA's programme. The 
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project is currently in the pilot phase, working in six areas. Ultimately the project 
aims to covers 200 low income settlements covering 20,000 families. The project 
is funded by the World Bank. 
A significant of the project is the involvement of NGOs, CBOs , and other 
government organisations. The other radical change was that the community was 
to provide a twenty percent (20%) cash contribution towards the cost of internal 
works while the remaining cost is to be borne by the government. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 156,157,309,359. ] 
3.5.7 Sevanathe 
Sevanathe is a Non-Government Organisation which aims to 'fulfil the need for 
community approach in urban planning and environmental management, 
particularly in low-income areas of Colombo'. It was established in 1989. The 
organisation was to act as an urban resource centre 'for information sharing, 
networking, leadership training, technical assistance, skill development, and 
systematic data collection' 
Sevanathe is acting as a consultant in the Clean Settlement Programme. 
The other work included the works under Metropolitan Environmental 
Improvement Programme (MEIP) funded by the Japanese embassy and 
community contracting in Kandy in central Sri Lanka. The organisation advocates 
community action planning and promotes community contracts. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 213,234,321 ] 
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3.5.8 Colombo Municipal Council (CIVIC) 
The corporation of Colombo is involved in provision of urban infrastructure for the 
city of Colombo. The role of CIVIC is quite critical in relation to the subsequent 
operation and management of the assets constructed by any agency within 
municipal areas. Officials from CIVIC are often invited to participate in the co- 
ordination of upgrading projects like that of CSPU. 
They have many departments responsible for different activities like drainage, 
solid waste, water and project implementation. The data for the process and 
performance of the contract was collected from drainage and project divisions. 
The Municipal Corporation of Colombo has not been directly involved in 
community contracting but provides a good comparison of an organisation 
involved in routine procurement through micro-contracts. The Community 
Development Councils that played a vital role in the community contracting were 
initially introduced by the CIVIC under a UNICEF funded Urban Basic Service 
(UBS) programme. 
[Sources for the section above included data base entries: 204,205,310,349,357] 
Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of the contract's contexts. 
Table 3.2 Twelve contract contexts classified under the dominant potential 
role the community played in procurement of urban infrastructure for low 
income communities in developing countries. 
Dominant role of the community groups Contract context Countries 
1 Non community participated. SKAA-Conventional. 0 Pakistan 
No Role of community except as KIVIC Small contracts. 0 Pakistan 
passive consumers. NHDA Conventional. 0 Sri Lanka 
CIVIC Drainage Division. * Sri Lanka 
CIVIC Project. 0 Sri Lanka 
SIP Conventional. * India 
2 Community participated 
" Community as Client. OPP 0 Pakistan 
FAUP Pakistan 
" Community as Engineer. 41 KMC/ADB. Pakistan 
" Community as Construction contractor. 0 SIP community contracts. India 
" CSPU contracts. 40 Sri Lanka 
" FAUP 0 Pakistan 
" Departmental works in SKAA. 41 Sri Lanka 
" NHDA Community contracts. 0 Sri Lanka 
0 Sri Lanka 
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The data relates to the processes, relationships, roles and performance of 
contracts. 
Key Points 
" Research question was established before the data collection. 
"A hypothesis was formulated. 
" Unit of analysis identified. 
4o Research methods were considered and a research methodology selected. 
* Sources of data identified. 
3.6 How was the data col/ected and why? 
Multiple techniques for data collection were used. A sample of factual information 
provided was triangulated with the documents or with other informants to build a 
degree of confidence on the source of information. For example if a figure is 
reported by an informant in an interview, that figure was triangulated either with 
the documents or with the information provided by the other informants. If two 
informants were talking about a same situation a similar account adds to the 
reliability of the information. The main reason for doing that was to increase the 
reliability of the evidence. The other factor was the appropriateness of the 
technique in relation to the nature of the data. Both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques were used for data collection. A index is provided in Appendix 1. The 
main techniques that were used to collect the data were as follows: 
3.6.1 Questionnaire survey 
Surveys used to get the opinion of the officials, contractors and consultants 
related to the contracts used mainly in routine procurement. That was done in the 
initial stage of the research. A typical public sector municipal organisation was 
selected. The advice provided in the standard texts for survey research (Fink and 
Kosecoff 1985) was followed. Purposive sampling was used to get the basic 
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information related to procurement process and the perception of the 
stakeholders involved. The questionnaire was intended to be exploratory nature 
in . The purpose of the questionnaire was to: 
Cross check the awareness of the respondents regarding the procedural 
issues with the information gathered by the initial review of documents. 
2 Get some base line factual information. 
3 Explore the perception of the respondent with respect to the contractual 
procedures 
procurement. 
in routine procurement and the community participated 
Provide guidance for the further research. 
Both post and face-to-face meetings were used to fill the questionnaires. Any 
additional information observed or told during such questionnaire surveys was 
also noted and used in the analysis. Table 3.3 shows the breakdown of the 
questionnaire surveys done. The surveys were completed by the beginning of 
1995. In total fifty three (53) questionnaires were completed by the respondent. 
Table 3.3 Breakdown of the questionnaires-Stakeholders and country. 
Stakeholders Numbers Organisation and Country 
Officials related to tertiary 
infrastructure provision 
5 
18 
Urban 
Urban 
Local Government, 
Local Government, 
Pakistan 
India 
Micro-Contractors 25 Urban Local Government, Pakistan 
Consultants 
/Engineers 
5 Urban Local Government, Pakistan 
3.6.2 Serni- structured interviews 
Detailed interviews were used to get the in depth understanding of the attitudes 
and perceptions of the people involved with micro-contracts. 
In semi-structured interview the questions were not set before the beginning of 
the interview. No standard questions were prepared before the interviews. A 
checklist was used. (see Appendix 2) 
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There are certain steps involved in an interview research: (Kvale 1996). 
Thematising and Designing 
In the light of the research scope certain themes were listed. The themes were: 
" Process in the procurement. Who does what? And which actions follow what? 
" Roles and relationships in the procurement process 
" Performance of the contracts. 
* Perceptions and attitudes about the other stakeholders. 
The themes acted as a guiding framework. In case of semi-structured interview 
checklist were used to make sure that the themes have been covered during 
interview. 
Interviewing. 
This is the stage where the actual interview takes place. Special care was taken 
in the choice of word, the tone and the way in which the questions were asked to 
make sure that there is no significant influence of the interviewer on the 
respondent. Leading questions were avoided. 
Knowledge of the local language in Pakistan and India had proved to be very 
useful. For example in some case the special words are used for bribery as in 
Karachi; one such term is 'Chai Pani' which literally means 'tea and water' but 
meant that someone wants bribes. 
The processes were viewed from the standpoint of the people related to the 
contracts. The process description was greatly facilitated by the interviews. The 
key informants were interviewed more than once and in some cases with a long 
gap of one year. These statements provided a clue to the changes, or otherwise, 
during the gap. 
Transcribing. 
Tape recording and key notes taking were used simultaneously in most of the 
cases. In the initial run the notes taken by the author and an independent person 
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were compared to check the accuracy of the transcription. Almost all the 
interviews were personally conducted by the author to minimise the variation in 
the ways the interviews were conducted, although it was quite time and resource 
consuming. The time lag between the interviews and the actual transcription was 
restricted as far as possible to not more than two days. 
Six visits were made to Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka for data collection including 
interviews between October 1994 and present. Details of the people interviewed 
are provided in the data base index. In total one hundred and twenty five (125) 
interviews were conducted. The people interviewed were all related to the 
procurement of urban infrastructure at tertiary level. 
Analysing 
A limited use of QSR. Nudist software for qualitative data analysis was made. The 
software helps in dealing with the unstructured data including interview 
transcripts and documentary information. The narration and the researcher's 
comments were kept separate to clearly show the linkage of the researcher's 
comments with the respondent statements. A particular attention is paid during 
analysis to the notes related to the gestures and the way the words were used 
during interviews. 
Verifying 
Initially, for some key informant, during follow up meetings the analysis along with 
the transcription of the previous interview was shown to the interviewee for their 
comments. 
3.6.3 Field observations 
A limited number of sites were visited to see the on-going and completed works. 
Field notes were taken recording the observations of the author and 
conversations with the people on site. Some use of an interpreter was necessary 
in cases where language was a barrier. When an interpreter was used care was 
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taken that the interpretation explained what was said by the respondent and not 
what the interpreter thought about the topic. 
3.6.4 Focus group discussion and opinion writing exercise 
A Focus Group discussion can be described as a form of group interview where 
the reliance is on the interaction within the group based on the topic(Morgan 
1988). The technique is particularly useful in the exploration of a phenomenon of 
which little is known (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). 
A group of people related to the procurement of infrastructure were used to get a 
clear understanding of the process, to verify the direction of study, and to build 
performance indicators. 
The participants, twelve in number were, all practising engineers in a developing 
country dealing with the procurement of urban infrastructure. They had the 
experience of working in both the low income settlements and in other localities. 
The average experience of each expert in general procurement was 14.5 years 
and in low income procurement 4 years (see Table 3.4). They reportedly had 
handled directly more than 200 contracts in recent past and up to approximately 
800 contract in the last five years. All had worked on the projects funded by the 
International donor agencies as well as the local government projects. 
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Table 3.4 Table Experience of focus group panel 
Participan 
t number 
General 
Professional 
experience 
(years) 
Experience specific 
to low income urban 
communities 
(years) 
1 7 4.5 
2 21 7.5 
3 28 
4 10 0.5 
5 13 2 
6 25 2 
7 29 0.5 
8 22 7 
9 15 
10 14 4 
11 13 2 
12 12 8 
Total 209 46 
Median 17.42 3.83 
Mean 14.5 4 
Standard 
Deviation. 
7.3 
I 
2.6 
I 
The opinion-writing exercise was used to explore the wishes and apprehension of 
the officials likely to undertake the community participated procurement. The 
panel was also asked to write a note to the higher officials proposing a 
procurement procedure to promote community involvement at the end of the 
session. The expert group was revisited after approximately six months, one 
member was absent and one additional member joined in. The additional 
member was of equivalent professional experience. They were asked to re-write 
the note to the higher officials. 
The exercise was done in a group as well as individually. The notes were 
compared to identify any peer influence on the opinion. Twelve participants wrote 
the note. The statements included suggestions as well. An analysis on the notes 
was performed. The salient features of the outcome of written notes is reported 
in 
chapter six. 
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3.6.5 Analysis of documents related to the contracts. 
The researcher was particularly fortunate to get access to some of the 
confidential documents related to the contracts besides the published and 
unpublished literature related to the contracts under study. Some of the internal 
correspondence, memos, and file notes gave a very useful insight into how the 
process worked and why things were done in a particular way. Approximately two 
hundred and fifty (250) such documents were reviewed. Details of such 
documents are also provided in the data base index. 
In addition to the above documents, quantitative and qualitative data was 
collected from the files related to three hundred and ninety micro-contract. The 
performance indicators were developed mainly on the basis of this information. 
3.7 Data base-Summary of data records 
During research a substantial amount of both quantitative and qualitative data 
were analysed. It was not possible to present all the data in its raw form. 
However, it was considered important that a clear summarised record be kept in 
a form that is accessible by anyone. That resulted in the data base index 
presented in the Appendix 1. A summary of data is presented in Table 3.5 
Table 3.5 Summary of data base 
Data items Quantity 
analysed 
Questionnaire 53 
Individual micro-contract 390 
Quantitative data 
Qualitative 
Interviews and filed notes 125 
Documentary records it (including 246 
confidential contract notes) 
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3.8 How was the data analysed? 
The analysis provides the link between the data and the conclusion. 
The data was primarily analysed using SPPS for Windows (Nourusis 1993) and 
QSR. Nudist software for qualitative data analysis. Non-parametric and parametric 
(Siegel 1956 & Meddis 1984) tests were used. Non-parametric tests unlike 
parametric tests, do not rely on the assumptions that the population comes from 
the normal distribution and equality of variance. Non-parametric tests are in 
general, less powerful but they are most useful in situation where the data is in 
ranking scale or when data are from non-normal distribution. The tests are 
suitable for smaller size samples (Norusis 1993). Multiple regression was used in 
exploring the relationship between the performance indicators and the value and 
duration of the contracts. The detail is provided in the sections dealing with the 
analysis, mainly chapter seven. (see Appendices 4 to 9). 
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4.1 
Chapter 4 Procurement process in developing countries 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the process of procurement which are used routinely. The 
issues related to the evaluation of contractors, contractor selection criteria and 
contract documentation are discussed. It described the legal requirement of a 
party to enter into a legal contract with the public sector in the context of urban 
government in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. The alternatives available in the 
procurement process are also discussed, relevant literature is cited. 
4.2 Procurement of urban infrastructure. An outline of process. 
This section presents a series of boxes to describe the process involved in the 
procurement of urban tertiary infrastructure in the study countries of South Asia. 
The Text Box 4.1 describes the main steps involved in the process. Text Box 4.2 
gives an overview of the possibilities in procurement strategies. Text Box 4.3 
describes the steps in contract award process. Comments are provided along 
with the narration in the boxes. 
The boxes are based on the information collected from documents and interviews 
with stakeholders. 
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Text Box 4.1 What is the procedure which Engineering Departments of 
Urban Government use to procure infrastructure?. 
This procedure stems from the Public Works Departments (PWD), and its 
principles are used by most government implementing agencies 
Narrative 
1 Formulation of a scheme and its requirements need not 
necessarily be done by the Engineering Department 
(ED); the ED procurement procedure starts once the 
requirements of the scheme have been put before it, 
regardless of their origin. 
2 Preliminary cost estimates are prepared. 
3 These estimates are approved by the ED; this is 
termed administrative approval. 
4 The necessary surveys, plans and designs are drawn 
up by the ED engineers 
5 Detailed cost estimates are prepared on the basis of 
these plans (see Text Box 4.4). 
6 These estimates are approved by the appropriate 
officials in the ED; this usually involves the Chief 
Engineer; this is termed technical sanction. 
7 The work is awarded; there are a number of options 
available for implementing construction of the 
infrastructure; (see Text Box 4.2). 
8 Completion of construction and finalisation of work. 
9 Completion and end of the defect liability period. 
Commenta 
In general, the basis here is 'rule of 
thumb' and past data. 
The basis of these cost estimates is the 
government approved Schedule of Rates 
(SoR) and approved details. PWD is the 
main source of reference. 
The preference is always for competitive 
bidding. 
Marked by the last entry of the 
measurement book, as reflected in the 
cornDletion certificate. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 91,92,24b, 283,28b 
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Text Box 4.2 What are the different procedures which urban government 
can use to implement construction of infrastructure? 
Narrative Commentary. 
1. Award of the work to a private sector contractor using the system Of 0 This is the routine method of 
competitive tender; see Text Box 4.3. The most commonly used procurement used in almost 
method for micro-contracts is for tenders to be submitted on a all situations. 
'percentage plus' basis; that is, rather than fill in his own rate for 
each item of work, the contractor takes the engineers' estimate as 0 The wordings of the items are 
per the government schedule of rates and adds on a percentage of standard; experienced the total. This percentage has to include his profit, but more contractors know what is and importantly it must also allow for the difference between the is not included in the SoR, 
schedule of rates and the actual market rates for materials and and often do not consult it. labour. 
2. Departmental Works in which work may be executed directly by the 
ED through employing daily skilled and unskilled labour. A muster 
roll of the labourers has to be maintained. The materials required 
are issued from the government store by indent or purchase directly 
chargeable to an authorised agent. 
3. Piece work agreements and Work Orders are strictly 'contract 
types'; they are included here as they can be used for very small 
works, up to about IRS 2000-3000. They can be undertaken at the * This now generally limited to 
discretion of the Engineer and do not have to be submitted to such maintenance work. 
lengthy procedures as larger contracts. 
4. Entrustment of Works by Negotiation; registered voluntary 
organisations or co-operatives engaged in 'social service' or 'local 0 This has very limited use. 
improvement efforts', or one or more 'beneficiaries of works' may be The responsible Engineer 
entrusted to carry out the works. The ED negotiates rates. must show that: by adopting 
5. Co-operative Societies can be formed for the purposes of negotiation, the cost of work 
undertaking minor works. These exist in India; examples are is not more than it would 
'unemployed engineers' and 'labour' co-operatives. In some cases have been in tendering; and 
the ED is empowered to award a certain quota of work at a discount that unusual circumstances 
which can be as much as 10% on the tender price. warranted such a procedure. 
6. Labour Contract: the ED arranges for construction materials to be 
available at the site; the labour contractor hires the necessary labour 
and undertakes to carry out the work. Payment is based on the 
measured quantity of work carried out. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 30,91,92,245,283,285,345 
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Text Box 4.3 How does an Engineering Departments arrange contracts 
through competitive tendering? 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 1. ED issues a tender notice, either by advertising in the press The decision is based on the value 
or placing a notice on a notice board, which invites a sealed of the work. Beyond a certain value 
tender for the advertised works. For larger contracts, the tender has to be advertised. 
provincial government may do this on behalf of municipalities. The advertisement has to be 
2. This notice specifies the earnest money deposit, security processed through a central body, 
money (see Text Box 4.7), estimated cost, date and time for which takes time. 
the submission of tenders. Text Box 4.6 describes the 
requirements for prospective tenderers. 0 'Tender boxes' are still used in 
3. Tenders are opened at the specified date and time by the some departments. 
officer inviting tenders or by his authorised agent, in the 0A board which generally includes a 
presence of the contractor or their agents. representative from the accounts 
4. Tenders are serially numbered, signed by the officer opening section is responsible for opening 
the tenders and the rates are read out. the tenders. 
5. A comparative statement is prepared. Rejecting the lowest bidder puts the 
6. The tenders together with the comparative statement with the onus on the rejecting officer. The 
recommendations of the Assistant Engineer or Sub-Divisional main issues are to explain why, in 
Engineer or Executive Engineer are sent to the competent the absence of mistakes in the 
authority for accepting the tender. Usually the lowest tender is contractors' offer, the department 
accepted but the lowest tender may not be accepted if the should be deprived of the benefit of 
capacity of the contractor is doubted or his record of previous the lower cost. 
work is not satisfactory, or due to other valid reasons. The case for rejection becomes 
Depending upon their rank, government engineers and very hard to make, if it is done 
officials have the authority to accept tenders up to a certain subsequent to enlistment or 
amount. prequalification of the contractor, 
7. After the tender is accepted and the contractor deposits the who is thereby deemed suitable to 
requisite security money. bid. 
8. A work order authorising commencement of the works is 
given to the contractor and all the tender papers are page 
numbered and indexed. 
9. A contract bond or agreement is prepared and sealed and 
kept in safe custody. 
Source: Interviews ana aocurnems, Tor exampie UdLd Udbt:: týl ILI ItVý 4-týJ, 4-t I, 
4.3 Methods of ascertaining the value of the work 
The idea is that the market determines the prices or the value of the work. The 
methods could be classified into two broad categories; 
1 Competitive 
2 Non-competitive. 
The classification is only indicative. There is an element of competition 
in the 
negotiation and there is an element of non-competitiveness 
in the selection of 
bids after the pre-qualification. The form of competition that 
is routinely used is 
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invitation of sealed bids. The sealed bid system is considered to be transparent 
and audit friendly (refer to data base entries 254,247 and 285). 
Professionals make estimates which are used as a base line and the final 
contract value is determined by the offers. In many developing countries the 
Pubic sector develops a schedule of rate which becomes the basis of all 
engineering estimates (PWD 1982). Text Box 4.4 described the basis of cost 
estimation in a public sector of developing countries. 
Text Box 4.4 The problem with Cost Estimates: who uses which cost ? 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Government engineers prepare detailed cost 
estimates for technical sanction. 
2. These estimates have to be based on the latest This provides a standard basis for tendering (see 
edition of a Schedule of Rates (SoR) provided by Text Box 4.1 
the Public Works Department. 
3. The SoR is updated periodically; the problem is High construction cost inflation means that the 
that in practice many years may elapse between estimates rapidly become unrealistic. 
updates. If the actual cost of a contract increases beyond 
4. The cost estimates which are given technical a certain limit then the approval process (see 
sanction do not reflect the actual cost of Text Box 4.1) has to be repeated. 
procuring the works unless the SoR is up to 
date. 0 In one extreme case, the SoR was over 15 years 
5. The market rate for doing the work is therefore old, with tender prices coming in at many times 
nearly always greater than the engineers' cost the estimated value. 
estimate. 0 These estimates serve no purpose in terms of 
6. Prices tendered for work have to reflect the managing the work for the contractor 
market rate. I I bource: interviews and documents, tor example data base entries 57,202,245,255,283,285 
Key points 
There are set procurement procedures which are used in the public sector. 
Competitive tendering is routinely used. 
The registered contractors are used. 
The estimation of cost is not based on the current market rates. 
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4.4 Status of Documentation in procurement 
There is a range of routine practice. In some cases only work orders with some 
outline plans would suffice and in some cases, especially in large contracts a 
series of documents is used. In general the documents could be classified 
according to function. One set of documents specifies what is to be done, 
another giving the conditions of bidding, and whilst another highlights the 
conditions under which the work is to be executed. 
The bidding document is a very important element in the contractual procedures. 
In the most formal set up and for the conventional contract strategy the bid 
document includes the following (Guidelines For Tender Procedures-ICTAD 
1990) : 
1 Invitation For Bids 
2 Instruction To Bidders 
3 Bidding Data 
4 Part-1 General Conditions Of Contract 
5 Part- 2 Conditions Of Particular Application 
6 Technical Specifications 
7 Form Of Bid, Appendix To Bid, Bid Security 
8 Bill Of Quantities 
9 Form Of Agreement, Forms Of Performance Security 
10 Advance Bond payment guarantee 
11 Drawings 
12 Explanatory Notes 
The purposes of the bidding documents are manifold. They form the basis for the 
legal contract between the contractor and the contractee, providing financial 
sureties and technical information to execute the work. The above documents 
provide information to help the contractor work out a reasonable offer. 
Standardisation is necessary to provide each bidder with equal basis for bidding. 
In some cases contractors visit the site and have pre-bid meetings. The 
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information provided to one bidder is circulated to all bidders so that there is no 
element of favouritism. Some or all of the documents become the contract 
document. In some cases the document relates to the post-bid negotiation which 
then becomes part of the contract. 
The elements in the bidding document vary according to the contract strategy 
adopted. For example, in BOT, the set may not include the specifications and 
drawings but broad requirements. Each of the elements varies according to the 
details required by the client. In some cases the method specification is 
considered enough while in some cases the performance specification is 
provided. Different professional bodies related to the particular type and nature of 
the work has developed standard specifications, conditions of contract, drawings, 
details and form. In general the contract manager compiles and synchronises the 
documents with minor amendments. It is rare that the tender document has to be 
written from first principles. 
The client decides the level of details to be provided to the contractor. In 
developed countries the contractor, through their associations, has a say in the 
bidding procedure. FIDIC is the favourite condition of the donor agencies. The 
World Bank, except for some amendments, has the same basic conditions of 
contract as the FIDIC (Guidelines Procurement Under Loans and IDA Credits 
World Bank 1995). In developing countries the whole process is one sided and it 
is the Public sector who dictates the process [date base entry 285]. 
Demands put on the contractor in the documents could be classified into two 
broad classifications. 
A) Directly related to the provision of work. 
B) Complementary to the works which are required to be provided by the 
contractor in compliance with the general conditions of the contract. 
Some of these demands are as follows: 
Provision of security bonds and guarantees. 
Provision of performance bonds. 
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" Provision of insurance for property, material, and works at site. 
" Provisions of third party insurance. 
" Provision of insurance against accidents and injury to workmen. 
" Provision of stamp duty in accordance with the regulations. 
" Provision of fees, taxes, octroi. 
In some bills of quantities these are costed separately and are classified as 
preliminaries (ICTAD). 
The community groups are again excluded in the sense that the demands of the 
process to even comprehend the details of preliminaries are, in general, beyond 
their capacities. 
The other interesting aspect about the documents used for bidding and contract 
formation stages are their use for management purposes (Pasquire 1991). The 
relevant question is; how much of the documentation could be used for the 
management of the works?. The proportion of the documents not used as 
management tools or where some rework has to be done before it could be use 
for management purposes is wastage. The message is that documents or the 
information should be in such a form that it could be a) utilised or at least b) used 
with the minimum of rework and c) should not lead to demands beyond the 
capacity of the contractor. 
The literature is quite silent on the issues related to the contract between the 
public sector and the non-commercial private sector including community groups. 
Even the literature related to private commercial sector is restricted to relatively 
large contractors. 
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[Key points 
e The documentation used in contract procedures may not be appropriate forý 
the small and medium size contractors. 
I* Current documentation could be a constraint to the involvement of community I 
groups. 
I* Documents do not help contractors in managing the contract. 
4.5 Selection of the bidders 
The public sector requires its contractors to be of demonstrable legal status. In 
general, some sort of registration as a company or as a registered co-operative 
society, is required to be a government contractor. 
The firm can enter into a contract with the public sector as a registered 
organisation, company or society to undertake commercial or non-profit based 
activities. The registration is generally done by the registrar at district level. The 
registration has its own requirements and a set procedure. This registration is 
different from the registration with a department as a contractor. 
Later the contractor may be registered with the concerned department to 
undertake certain a class of work. In some relatively large projects there is an 
additional requirement that the contractor has to be pre qualified. When pre- 
qualification is used the restriction of being registered with the department is 
generally waived. 
There is a considerable body of research concerned with assessing contractor's 
capacity and prices. Diekmann (1981) advances a multi-attribute utility theory for 
the selection of contractors. Nguyen (1985) proposed 'fuzzy set' as a method of 
evaluating the bids. The contractor-qualification procedures and decision factors 
4.10 
were discussed (Wright 1986). A formal evaluation of parameters such as 
reputation, past performance, financial stability, experience record, firm capacity, 
current work load, and technical expertise were proposed (Russel. 1990). Russel, 
et al. (1990 ) proposed a knowledge based system for pre-qualification of 
contractors. 
Russel & Jaselskis (1992 a) concluded, after a survey, that owner-performed 
contractor evaluations and subsequent monitoring would reduce the chances of 
contractor failure. The owner evaluation consists of similar consideration as 
described in section 5.2. The failure was defined as 'a breach of the contractors' 
legal responsibilities to the owner sufficient to permit the owner to terminate the 
contract). 
Jaselskis & Russel (1992), applied the technique of risk analysis to the same 
data using the theoretical basis of Decision Theory, and came up with very 
similar conclusions. 'The evaluation methods available include owner-contractor 
pre-qualification, surety bonding, or owner-contractor pre qualification along with 
surety bonding. Method selection is important because it strongly effects the 
subsequent project outcome'. It was further contended that 'A 'good' amount of 
owner-contractor evaluation leads to the smallest per cent increase in the project 
schedule'. 
Russel & Jaselskis (1992 b), went on to develop a mathematical model 'to aid 
owners in predicting the chance of construction contractor failure prior to contract 
award'. This concentrated on the relationships between the failure of construction 
contractor and the pre-award activities. 
Tam (1992) proposed a model to predict the contractor performance in Hong 
Kong Construction Industry. 
Hatush and Skitmore (1997) tried to explore the links between the contractors' 
selection criteria and the project success factors of time, cost and quality. 
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The registration of contractors is generally taken by a particular department but in 
some countries the registration of contractors has been centralised. In Sri Lanka, 
for example, a national organisation by the name of Institute of Construction 
Training and Development register the Public sector contractors. The process of 
registration requires the demonstration of specific capacities in certain areas 
similar to one described in Text Box 4.5. 
Text Box 4.5 Central registration of contractors in Construction Training 
and Development in Sri Lanka. 
Who is eligible to apply for registration in ICTAD? 
How a contractor gets registration in ICTAD.? 
How is the application for registration evaluated? 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The registration of contractor for public works is done The contractors who are paying 
centrally by ICTAID. They have nine categories of have to pay as the registration in 
construction contractors. The lowest three cover the works ICTAID is mandatory for the public 
up to 1,2 and 5 million respectively. The contractors pay works. 
annual registration fees. For the lowest three it is RS 500, 
RS 1000, and RS 1500 respectively 
Eligibility for applicants is restricted to: Registration in ICTAD is not the first 
2. Those registered in Sri Lanka for the purpose of carrying out step. ICTAID deals only with 
the business of Building and Engineering construction either organisations which are registered 
Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act or with the as prescribed. 
provincial secretariats. Could be restrictive to the 
In addition the applicant needs to have at least 60% international bidders. 
ownership by Nationals of Sri Lanka and not to be among the Getting blacklisted in the public 
contractors recorded on the government blacklist. Also they sector has serious repercussions 
should not be legally insolvent or declared bankrupt for the contractors. 
Process of registration 
3. The three kinds of documents involved in the registration are 
as follows: The process of registration is 
" Registration scheme, this is covered in the guideline. governed by documents. 
" Application. 
" Client guide, this is instruction to the clients regarding the 
registration. 
4. Steps in the registration of the contractors 
" Submission of application 
" Officials go through the documents and see if the required 
documents are there. If found adequate the application is Implication is that if the required 
accepted. documents are not there 
the 
application would be rejected right 
0 Another officer examines the documents and evaluates and away. --. I 
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verifies them. The verification is on sample applications. The * Not all applications are verified. verification may include contacting previous employers or the e Contact with the referee is optional. organisations issuing the documents. 
" If found in order the application is approved. 
" If not found in order the application is sent back with a list of 0 The deficiencies are pointed out. the deficiencies and a further submission is requested. 
" Summary of the application is prepared and send to the 0 No objection from the Contractors NCCASL for any objections from the members. The time Association is obtained. This could provided is 14 days. be taken as a cross check. 
" If no objection is received the registration is issued. 0 Basically six steps in the process of 5. The applicant has the right to appeal and re-appeal against registration. 
the decision. 0A record book for each contractor's 6. A contractor record book is planned to be kept for each performance. 
contractor. 
Evaluation of application. 
7. The point system is used. The points are allocated according Apparently objective method as the to the prescribed rules. rule to assign the points are 
prescribed. 
The points allocated are compared with the minimum There is no justification of these 
requirement of the category of the contractors. The lowest numbers. The objectivity is based 
three contractors require 1.25,4 and 20 points. The top three on the subjective decisions. The 
required, 85 135 and 215 points. lower point in the lowest three 
categories provide some ease to 
smaller contractors. The M9 
category is equivalent to the 
community contractors. 
It is not the factors but the ways in 
8. The main considerations are: which they are assessed which will 
" Financial abilities-Assessed on the basis of the one year old govern the access of the new- 
bank statements, working capital, net worth and overdraft comers such as community groups 
facilities. For the lowest three categories[M7-M9] to the system. The established CDC 
assessments could be on the basis of fixed deposits, saving may be able to enter the system of 
accounts, current accounts or a wealth certificate. registered contractors if the initial 
requirement related to the legal 
status of the applicant is modified or 
interpreted sympathetically. 
Standard factors in capacity 
evaluation. 
" Technical abilities-Assessed on the basis of human Incentives to certain actions. 
resources, plant and equipment work experience and 
organisation. 
" Some other considerations like employment of trade-tested 
people, implementation of quality management systems are 
taken into account. Note as the category gets higher, 
9. Factors which governed the assessment of the categories the factors for consideration 
are: increase. However, the barriers 
" For M9- Financial ability and supervisory staff. remain in terms of having to 
" For M8-As above plus plant and equipment. demonstrate capacity in a particular 
" For M7 as in M8 plus professional staff. form. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 221,221,223 
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In some cases this registration is so difficult that even to attain the required status 
requires considerable resources of time and money. The process becomes 
relatively more severe if the contractor is a new-comer in the business. For large 
contractors such competencies are routine. 
These requirements effectively exclude the community groups from the 
procurement process. The result is that access to the procurement process is 
effectively reserved for private commercial contractors. 
There is a screening mechanism adopted by many public sector organisations. 
The idea behind screening or evaluation of contractors is to reduce the risk of 
contractor's failure. The evaluation of contractor is complemented by sureties that 
the successful contractor needs to submit to the client. Text Box 4.6 describes 
briefly how the bidders are selected in developing countries. Text Box 4.7 
describes the financial demand made on contractor for surety purpose. 
Text Box 4.6 Who is allowed to bid for Engineering Department work by 
submitting tenders? 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The Engineering Department operates a system whereby 
only those contractors who are enlisted can submit tenders 
2. The contractors are enlisted within a particular class (usually 
four or five) which specifies the financial limit of the works for 
which they are deemed competent to bid. Text Box 4.7 
describes the administrative requirements. 
3. The requirements of enlistment are to demonstrate capacity in The requirements are demonstrated 
terms of experience, financial credentials, tools and by submitting relevant documents. 
equipment owned and personnel employed. 
4. The contractors are enlisted for a particular duration and are 
required to pay an enlistment fee. 
5. In general if a contractor is already working in one department Litigation against the department is 
it is relatively easy to work in another department. one of the reasons for 'blacklisting' 
Conversely, if a contractor does not perform well in one a contractor. 
department then he can be banned from other departments. 
In Sri Lanka, contractors may be required to attend training 
courses. 
6. In large scale works, potential bidders are selected for the 
one project only; this process of prequalification is similar to 
that of enlistment. 
Source: Interviews and documents, Tor exampie aaia Dase enmes tz, to i, tiz-, iou, /-, +z), zzju, zoo, 
285 
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Text Box 4.7 What administrative and financial demands are made on a 
contractor who bids successfully for Eng ineering Department work? 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Earnest money (2%-3% of the tender value) For micro-contractor this could be an additional 
must be deposited. financial burden. 
2. A performance bond for small works may or may 
not be required. A typical bond is 10% of the 
contract value and is released after the end of 
the defect liability period. 
3. insurance is not usually required for very small No recourse to easy and fast compensation in 
works. case of an accident. 
No study has been carried out on the 
4. On acceptance of the tender, the contractor has frequencies of accidents or claims for small 
to deposit typically 10% of the tendered amount works. 
as security money with the department. This is 0 These demands have high associated costs 
inclusive of the earnest money already which may reach over 25%; this can create 
deposited. In some cases the money is deducted serious problems in arranging finance. 
from the running bills. All money is released at 0 The ultimate cost of this is borne by the client; it 
the end of the defect liability period. is reflected in the tender prices.. 
5. Liquidated damages can be imposed if there is 
serious time overrun. 0 Generally used as a bargaining tool. Actual 
incidences of imposition are rare. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 62,74,91,92,153,155,245, 
283,285 
Sureties are used to provide an additional safety net for the client. An evaluation 
of the capacities of the contractor is generally done to ascertain that the 
contractor is capable of undertaking the work.. In some cases this review takes 
place simultaneously with the price offer. But generally it is done before the offers 
are invited. The criteria (Client Guide and Explanatory Hand Book-ICTAD 1995) 
include but are not limited to: 
1 Experience of the contractor in the relevant field. 
2 Financial stability. 
3 Numbers and credentials of the people employed in the firm. 
4 Current work load. 
5 Plant and tools owned. 
6. References from previous employers. This is to make sure that the contractor 
is not a troublesome entity for the public sector. 
In some cases only documentary evidence is required but in other cases 
interviews are also held to ensure that the contractor can give a responsive and 
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reasonable offer to carry out the work. Documentation could take the form of the 
audited balance sheets for three years as evidence of financial stability. 
The criteria favour the already established commercial contractor. As previously 
stated, they effectively deny access of community groups to the infrastructure 
procurement contracts. The underlying question which needs to be answered 
satisfactorily before the contract is awarded is can the contractor perform 
successfully. 
The message that the contractor evaluation is important to predict contractor 
failure is quite clear in the literature. The methods used are prequalification and 
surety bonds or both. The time spent in evaluation is worthwhile in term of the 
benefits. However, when tackling the three questions of how to do it, what factors 
to be considered, and which among the long list of the factors is the significant 
one, the feeling is that the process is still an art rather than an exact science. 
Sophisticated techniques have been used but the basic assumptions have not 
been challenged. 
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FK-e-y Points 
* Public sector clients are protected against the non-performance of the ý 
contractors screening methods and sureties. 
1* An organisation wishing to be a contractor has to pass many screeningý 
stages. 
I* Only organisations with demonstrable legal status could enter into a legal I 
contract with the public sector. 
Criteria for evaluating the capacity of the contractor are established. 
There is little empirical evidence supporting the assumption that the screening 
of contractors does protect client from non-performance of the contractors. 
I* The legal and procedural requirements are designed for the commerciall 
private sector. 
I* The requirements effectively exclude the community groups from thel 
procurement process. The result is that access to the procurement process is I 
effectively reserved for private commercial contractors 
4.6 Selection of contractor 
In practice the criterion for selection of the contractor is the lowest bid. The lowest 
bid can be rejected but in practice this is seldom done. The argument put forward 
in support is that if the contractor has fulfilled the basic criteria that indicate 
capacity to give a reasonable and responsive bid, the only concern left is that of a 
mistake being made. 
The argument against the award to the lowest bid is that if the bid is too low as 
compared to estimated made by the professionals then there is no way that the 
contractor could deliver the work to the quality specified (refer to data base entry 
285). Different opinions exist. One solution is to have a threshold below which the 
bid should be rejected. Some think that this should be the Engineers estimates, 
some think that the average of the bids should be used and some have gone into 
detail analysis after reference to a data base of similar bids. 
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Merna & Smith (1990), outline the bid evaluation regarding the public sector civil 
construction contracts. This study, among others raised the issue that there are 
some factors besides the cost that needs to be considered. However, current 
practice in South Asia local government is still the acceptance of the lowest bid 
given by the selected bidders. 
Key Point 
9 Contractor is ultimately selected on the basis of the lowest bid. 
4.7 How does the routine procurement work in practice? 
This section provides text boxes, Text Boxes 4.8 and 4.9, to trace the contracting 
and billing process in a typical public sector authority. 
Text Box 4.8 Conventional contracting and billing process in Colombo 
Municipal council for small contracts, not exceeding 150,000 rupees. 
The quotations are called through notice on the board. 
These findings are based on a review of files and semi-structured interviews with 
the officials. The public department is legally represented by the 
Engineer/Manager, the end user is the client and the conventional contractor is 
the constructor. 
In this scenario the Pubic Sector is effectively the user's agent or Engineer. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. There are three categories of contractors in Work is categorised according to the cost of the 
drainage section of CIVIC. One category could work. 
undertake work of up to 10,000 rupees, the 
second category could take care of work up to 10- 
50,000 rupees and the last up to 50-150,000 
rupees. Beyond this it goes to the project division. 
2. It was reported that, in general, it takes one month 0 Payment for even such small scale work could 
for payment and if it goes to the Mayor then it take three months. The higher the rank of the 
could take 2-3 months. officials involved the longer the delays. 
3. As a rule for the time estimates the factors 0 There are heuristic rules but no systematic 
considered are the value of the work, place of the methods to estimate the duration of contract. 
work, that is, whether access would be restricted 
like in high traffic roads. It was reported that for 
the work of up to 10,000 rupees, 7 days are 
taken, for 10-50,000 rupees, 10 days and for the 
work of above 50,000 rupees it takes 14 days. 
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4. Steps of the process. 
5. Document along with the application submitted. 
6. Inspection of the premises and report by the 
inspector. 
7. Approval by the Connection Engineer. 
8. Call for quotation from registered contractors. 
9. Documents are prepared including the B. O. Q.. 
1O. Quotations invited. The notice board is used for 
the invitation. Normally it takes 7 days but in 
urgent cases it can be opened in 3 days. Specific 
date and time is given for opening. 
11. Quotations opened in the presence of Engineer, 
tender clerk and head clerk. 
12. Tender evaluation report is prepared by the 
technical staff assistant after checking by the 
clerk. Department estimations are also prepared 
and if the quotation is below 23% or above 17 % 
of the department estimates they are not 
accepted. This range, as we were told, is based 
on what is regarded as the reasonable profit to 
the contractors. 
13. Quotation got approval depending on the selected 
quotation value. ME Municipal Engineer] can 
accept up to 25,000 rupees, MC [Municipal 
commissioner] up to 75,000 rupees, and Mayor 
up to 150,000 rupees. Beyond this it goes to the 
approval of the council. 
14. In the contract amount, the standard fees for the 
connection and the departmental charge at the 
rate of 15% of the contract value, are added and 
the applicant is informed and asked to pay. 
15. The applicant pays the amount, the CIVIC provides 
the sketches of the road cutting if required for the 
contractor to get permission from the other 
agencies. 
16. Contractor submits the documents like insurance, 
all risks, third party and workmen compensation 
policies. 
17. Agreement signed by the contractor and sent to 
the Mayor through the municipal commissioner. 
In this case the work was the house connection 
of drainage . 
Note the approval is to be obtained from the 
Municipality regardless of who is constructing. 
Absence of such permission could results in 
delay the other services from municipalities. 
Use of the notice board will restrict the notice to 
the people who come and see the board 
regularly. The practice of using notice boards is 
existing and could be used or extended for 
community participated procurement. The 
standard designs and specifications make it 
possible for the contractor to submit the bids in 
such a short time span. 
" No outsider, tender opening committee is 
internal. 
" Heuristic rule for rejecting the 'unworkable' bids. 
" This range also indicates the accuracy of the 
Engineer's estimates. The benefit of having a 
pre-defined range is that the onus is not directly 
on the person who is rejecting as in the case 
where the range is not defined. It is implied that 
the work will not be workable for the contractor 
out of this range as he will not be making a 
reasonable profit. How could a contractor make 
a reasonable profit if the bid is below 23% of 
the estimates, which may be outdated. 
The explanations could be that the estimates 
are higher than the cost of the work to the 
contractor or the contractor is not giving the 
quality as specified. 
" Effectively beyond the IRS. 25,000 the matter 
goes out of the technical set-up. Beyond the 
IRS. 150,000 mark the approval is dependent on 
the meeting of the council. It is very hard to give 
a time for such arrangements. The time taken 
for the approval of the tender could be as long 
as the construction time or even more. 
" Effective connection and management charges 
are 15 % of the contract value. The end users 
directly pay for the work managed by the 
Municipality. 
" Contractor to co-ordinate with the other 
agencies. 
The procedural demands are high on the 
contractor even in such a small value contract. 
From Municipality it is the mayor who finally 
signed. It may take a long time. Delegation is 
not exercised in the execution of this duty. 
Without waiting for the signatures on contract 
as this may take long time. 
The work may start but the payment can only 
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18. Site handed over to the contractor. 
19. Contractor informed about the commencement 
date and the supervision starts. 
10 
20. Work note issued to the overseer by 
TSA[technical superintendent assistant] for 
supervision of the work. 
21. On completion the overseer informs the TSA. 
22. Inspector measures and prepares the bill. 
23. Head clerk checks the accuracy. 
24. Inspector checks for the quantity and quality. 
25. On receiving from the inspector TSA certify 
send it to the Engineer 
26. Engineer certifies the quality and quantity 
recommends 
27. S. E recommends and certifies. 
28. DME recommends for payment. 
be made once the agreement is signed. This 
may take months. The risk of delayed payment 
due to non-signature of the contract is borne by 
the contractors. 
The Overseer is the main link between the 
contractor and the department. 
the Measurement and pay. Note the long chain of 
the officials. 
and 
and The authority of payment would be IRS. 50,000 
for the M. E, Rs. 150,000 for the municipal 
commissioner and IRS. 300,000 for the Mayor. 
29. Authority approves for the payment. The authority 
for payment is double the authority of accepting 
tender. 
30. Bill comes back from the authority 
31. Vouchers prepared 
32. Goes to accountant 
33. Payment made 5% retention and 5% security is 
kept and released after defect liability period. 
Which is in general 3-6 months 
There are approximately thirteen links or steps 
in the process of paying even the smallest of 
the bills. If a higher official is involved then the 
time at one stage could be significantly longer 
as compared to the overall time of the process. 
Procedural barriers. Even of the small contracts 
the 10 percent money would be blocked for 
some months. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 196,310,315,352 
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Text Box 4.9 Trails of Events in the process of contracting and billing 
process- CIVIC Conventional contracts. 
The works included water & sanitation, drainage, roads and footpath and 
landscaping. 
Narrative -- T-Commentary 
Typical filel 
Contracting process 
24-9-91 -Application received. It took 14 days to get recommendations from the 
8-10-91 -Inspector recommended. inspector. I 
One day for the connection engineer to approve. 9-10-91 -Application approved The same days as the application approved. 
In seven days the quotations were opened. 
9-10-91 -Quotations invited. The evaluation report took another seven days. 
16-10-91 -Quotations opened. Thirteen days to approve the bid. But the contract 
23-10-91 -Evaluation prepared. was not signed. 
Ten days to send the file to the town hall. 
5-11-91 -Approval of authority. The contract dated 20-11-96, that is five days after 
it reached the Town Hall. 
15-11-91-Send to the authority in Town Hall for 
signature. 
20-11-91 -Contract date. It took 47 days to come out of the hall after 
signatures. 
6-1-92-File came back. The site was handed over to the contractor the 
same day that the contract is received. The delays 
6-1-92-Site handed over. were in the higher offices. 
It took only three days to complete the work once it 
started. It took ninety days before the work could 
start. There is a need to have an idea of the overall 
9-1-92-Work completed. delivery time as compared to just the contract time 
if the urban services are to be improved for the 
urban areas. 
Billing process 
21-1-92-Prepared by the inspector. 
Four days. for the voucher preparation. 
21-1-92-Check by the inspector. TSA forwarded. Same day. 
22-1-92-Engineer forwarded. It took only seven days as the file did not go to the 
23-1-92-SE forwarded, DME forwarded, higher offices. However, if the time is calculated 
ME forwarded. from the day that the work was completed it took 
28-1-92-Voucher prepared. 19 days for payment for the three days work. The 
28-1-92-Accountant signed. time for payment is quite reasonable in general but 
28-1-91 -Payment made if we consider the duration of contract it is 
approximately six time the contract duration. 
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Typical file 2 
Contracting process. 
8-4-94-Application received. 
11-5-94-Inspector recommended. 
12-5-94-Application approved. 
13-5-94-Quotations invited. 
Quotations opened. 
26-5-94-Recalled. 
3-6-94-Opened. 
3-6-94-Evaluation prepared. 
28-6-94-Approval of authority. 
1-7-94-Site handed over 
4-7-94-Work completed. 
4-7-94-Send to the authority. 
24-8-94-File came back. 
Billing process 
14-9-94-Prepared by the inspector. 
14-9-94-Checked by the inspector. 
21-9-94-TSA forwarded. 
21-9-94-Engineer forwarded. 
ME forwarded after SE and DME. 
MC approved on-date not clear. 
12-10-94-Voucher prepared. 
12-10-94-Accountant signed. 
12-10-94-Payment made. 
It took thirty three days to get the recommendation. 
One day for the Engineers approval. 
In one day the quotations were called. 
The quotations were called twice and it took ten 
days and eight days respectively to open them. 
On the same day an evaluation report was 
prepared. 
It took twenty five days to get the approval. 
Three days to hand over the site. 
Three days to complete the work. 
Four days to send the file. 
It took fifty one days to come back after sending it 
for signature. 
It took eighty four days to reach to the stage of the 
site handover after which the three days work 
could start. The lead time is an important 
consideration in overall delivery of infrastructure. 
Seventy two days after completion of work. 
Six days for TSA to forward. 
Seven days for the ME to forward. 
It took twenty eight days as compared to the seven 
days in the previous bill, as another step, reference 
to the of Municipal Commissioner, was now 
included. MC was the authority. It took one 
hundred and eight days to get paid for the three 
days work. Very often, the payment time is roughly 
the same regardless of amount of bill. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example clata t)ase entries -itjo,. 3 iu, o iu, oul- 
The above text box indicates the atmosphere in which the new contractors would 
have to survive unless the process is changed radically. 
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Key Points 
e Even for very small contracts the procedural requirements are stringent. 
* Time taken for fulfilling the procedural requirements is more than actuallyl 
doing the work. 
Involvement of many signatories is seen to be a way of increasing 
accountability. 
Delay in payments could influence the performance of contractors who are 
short of up-front capital. 
I* No advance provided to the small contractors. 
Only contractors with some capital could survive in the public sector 
contracting. 
4.8 Recognised alternative routes to the procurement of infrastructure 
The literature describe a wide range of options available, but in general the urban 
government in the study countries routinely adopt the traditional contracting 
through competitive tendering procedure. Some of the alternatives to the 
competitive bidding have now been recognised at international level (World Bank 
1995): 
1 Limited international bidding. 
2 National competitive bidding 
3 Shopp i ng [national and international] 
4 Direct contracting 
5 Force accounting 
6 BOT and similar 
7 Community participation in Procurement within existing regulatory framework. 
Recognising that there are some other routes available for infrastructure 
procurement other than international or domestic competitive bidding is a 
valuable first step. It was acknowledged by the World Bank that community 
participation in procurement is also a valid route for the procurement of 
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infrastructure. In the context of developing countries Text Box 4.10 shows some 
of the alternatives in an Indian state. 
Text Box 4.10 Alternatives in procurement strategies An example of 
Alternatives 
Govt of Kerala Procedures 
The Govt of Kerala procedure's allow the following in addition to the standard procedure of 
requesting tenders from enlisted contractors 
Departmental Works; the concerned department can directly undertake the work and purchase 
the material and labour. Estimates are made and approved for the materials and labour 
required to undertake the (usually minor) works. Labour can be recruited specifically for the 
works. A daily muster role of labourers used has to be maintained, which can be supervised by 
an overseer. 
Entrustment of works by negotiation; any recognised voluntary organisation engaged in 'social 
service' or 'local improvement efforts', or one or more 'beneficiaries of works' may be entrusted 
to carry out the works. The proviso is that the agreed cost of execution does not exceed 75% of 
the estimated cost of the works. One of the objectives is clearly to try to cut the cost compared 
with that of conventional contracting. 
Petty works; these are classified as being up to Rupees (RS) 3000 (approx. E65), and can be 
undertaken without going through the full procedure described under 'preparation of plans and 
estimates' in the 1990 Government Rules. This may be useful in some cases, particularly for 
minor rehabilitation or improvement of existing facilities; however, one does not get a lot for RS 
3000 
Engineer's co-operative 
In India, to combat the un-employment of Engineers, the Government has encouraged the 
formation of Engineer's co-operatives 
" The co-operatives have a fixed quota in the public works, in some cases up 20%. 
" These co-operatives are given exemption from submitting the earnest money. 
" It is reported that the experiment is successful and the targeted group has benefited. 
" Registration is to be under the same procedures as that of the other co-operatives. 
Labour co-operative societies 
Labour in some of the states of India can form labour co-operatives. 
A quota is fixed for them in public works. 
If they do not want to do the job themselves they can hire someone else to do the job for them 
Source: Data base entry 13 
1 Kerala Gazette extraordinary published by, Government of Kerala, 1990. 
2 Kerala Municipal Corporations( Public works and supplies) rules, 1990. 
It is pertinent to note that there are certain alternatives to routine competitive 
bidding that are allowed at both international and national levels. 
Against the impression one gets if only the routine processes of procurement are 
observed, there is an element of flexibility available within the current procedural 
framework to allow for deviations from the routine procurement. The implications 
of the Kerala and similar rules, as we will see in chapter six, are wide ranging. 
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They not only allow other than competitive bidding but also allow the entry of 
non-registered contractors. 
4.9 Role of community in procurement 
Can community play any role in planning, design(advice), and construction phase 
in the routine procurement of urban infrastructure? If we imagine a typical 
informal community group it will not be able to enter into any legal contract with 
public sector as it has no legal status (refer section 4.5). 
It is worthwhile to examine what roles the community groups and small and 
medium size private contractors are playing currently in the routine procurement 
of infrastructure. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the roles of the key 
stakeholder in routine procurement. These roles are discussed in more detail in 
chapter six and seven. 
Table 4.1 Role Matrix of key stakeholders in routine procurement of 
infrastructure 
Project context Stakeholders Roles 
Client Constructor Engineer/Advis 
or/Supervision 
PWD and related 
procedures. 
1 Community/CBO None None None 
2 Public sector None 
3 Private contractors None None 
4 NGO None None None 
Source: Interviews and documents. 
In a routine procurement of infrastructure there is effectively no role for the 
Community, CBO or NGO. 
If a group does attain the legal status the criteria for contractor evaluation, surety 
requirements and other procedures are so complicated that in practice, such 
group would be excluded from the process. This is an important finding and, 
influences the direction of this research in the following ways The potential 
direction of enquiry is to explore: 
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1 Mechanisms used in the community initiatives along with alternative 
procurement strategies and investigate whether there are opportunities to be 
gained from the non-routine situations, such as Entrustment of Works (see 
Text Box 4.10). 
2 The small scale contractor already in the procurement process and their 
capacities to see how the community groups could attain such level. 
It is worth reminding ourselves that the desired participation of community faces 
constraints from the procedure adopted as routine in procurement of 
infrastructure. 
Key Points 
Existing routine procurement procedure is a constraint to the community 
participation in procurement. 
Alternative routine procurement processes are available in the existing legal 
and procedural framework. 
Contracting with non-commercial private sector including community groups is 
possible under some special rules. 
Role of community in the routine procurement process is negligible. 
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5.1 
Chapter 5 Opinions of key stakeholders in procurement of urban 
infrastructure. Results from initial survey. 
5.1 Introduction 
In the procurement process, the key stakeholders included the officials playing 
the role of Client, their consultants/Engineer and micro-contractors. It uncommon 
in public sector departments in the study countries to hire an independent 
consultant for micro-contracts. In the beginning of the research a detailed 
questionnaire survey was conducted on a limited number of the client, 
consultant, and micro-contractors' representatives. The respondents were 
selected from a typical urban local organization in study countries. Some very 
basic questions were asked from the officials to see if they are aware of the 
procedural issues and to corroborate the finding from the document reviews and 
interviews. Non-parametric tests were run to see the goodness of fit. The non- 
parametric tests were considered to be relevant as they do not require certain 
assumptions required by the parametric tests (Siegel 1956). The tests are 
particularly useful when dealing with relatively small samples. The significance 
level was set at 0.05. The tests are described in Appendix 3. 
5.2 Key findings related to the Public sector officials and their consultants 
working in developing countries. 
5.2.1 Basic factual information 
Some of the key basic information is tabulated in Table 5.1. This indicates 
whether the officials and their consultants associated with the public sector 
procurement of infrastructure are aware of the issue listed. The breakdown of the 
5.2 
respondent is given in Table 3.3 in chapter three. Unless otherwise mentioned 
the results were supported by the binomial and/or chi-square test. 
Table 5.1 Awareness of procedural issues in public sector-officials and 
their consultants. 
Issues No Yes 
Count % count % 
1 Enlistment of contractors 0 0 10 100 
2. Contracting out the work 0 0 28 100 
3. Classification of 
contractors 
0 0 5 100* 
4. Financial procedures 2 7.1 26 92.9 
5. Legal regulations 1 3.6 27 96.4 
6. Standard conditions of 
contract 
0 0 28 100 
7. Selection and pre- 
qualification 
1 3.6 27 96.4 
8. Classification of works 1 3.6 27 96.4 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
'*' The calculated P-value is more than 0.05, hence it can not be statistically said that the 
difference in the percentage is not by chance. 
Evidently the awareness regarding the current procurement procedures was 
quite high among the officials and their consultants. They seem to be an 
appropriate source to get more information regarding the routine procurement 
process. The other set of questions was aimed at obtaining their perceptions 
about the way in which the process worked. 
5.2.2 Perceptions of officials and their consultants in public sector procurement. 
The key opinions of the officials and their consultants related to the procurement 
process on routine procurement procedures as well as on issues related to 
involving communities in procurement is tabulated as Table 5.2. The 'Statement I 
column contains a summary of the questions to which the informants were asked 
to respond. The 'Concurred' column indicates the percentage of responses which 
the informant deemed to be in agreement with the question posed. The 
'Comments' column includes a statement synthesized by the researcher from the 
range of responses to the question. 
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Table 5.2 Perception of officials and their consultants in developing 
countries-Key results of questionnaire survey. 
Statements Concurred Comments 
By % 
More than 60% of the 74 Contracting is the perceived to be main method of 
infrastructure development procurement. This ties in with the literature and 
budget are contracted out. document review. 
Managing one contract is 74 Favours dealing with a single party. 
easier than dividing it into 
smaller packages. 
Small scale contracting is 81 Community has better chance to get a small scale 
beneficial to local community. contract. Only one respondent had the experience 
of working with the community. 
Majority (75-100%) of the work 87 The work is standard hence of less risk. The work 
is of repetitive nature. involved tasks which are standard. The contractors 
are habitual of such tasks. 
A fair share of work, up to 50 78 This is happening where the sub-contracting is not 
% is sub-contracted out by the permitted. Sub-contracting is common even in small 
contractor. scale contracting. The officials know and accept it. 
The implication is that this mechanism must have 
some appeal to all the parties concerned. Another 
implication is that the 'real' contractor is the sub 
contractor who does not have a direct contractual 
link with the public sector. The third sector 
contractors may have been denied the access to 
the procurement process. This also highlights that 
there are indirect mechanisms available which may 
also be explored for the community groups. 
The conditions of contract 96 The implication is that some stakeholders do not 
should be understandable to understand the conditions of the contract used. This 
all the parties involved. supports the interview finding where some 
contractors are illiterate and who admit that they 
cannot understand the conditions (see data base 
entries 316,317 and 318) or conditions of contract 
is English. 
5.4 
Statements Concurred Comments 
By % 
Modification is required in 50 This implies that some of respondent may have 
conditions of contract to thought the existing conditions have the scope to 
involve communities. accommodate the community participation or they 
have not thought enough about it. 
The majority of interviewees 60** There are some redundant clauses in the conditions 
thinks that 36% of the clauses of contract. One way to simplify the contract 
is not used. documents it to make it shorter. 
Separate modified contracting 81.5 The consensus is that as far as the overall process 
procedure is required to is concerned it needs modification. 
encourage community 
participation 
There will be audit 95 The perception is that the community contracting is 
observations (queries) if the irregular and may raise objections. There is a fear of 
work is awarded to the audit objections. 
community instead of enlisted 
or pre-qualified contractors. 
The work cannot be awarded 81 The perception of majority of respondents is that the 
to any body without routine method of competitive bidding is the only 
competition. available method. 
A bid bond is essential even 82 The perception about the importance of the financial 
for tertiary level contracts. surety. They do not conceive of any situation where 
the requirement may be relaxed. 
Security deposit is essential 89 Even where the bills are paid in arrears the security 
even for tertiary level contracts is considered to be critical. 
All the interviewees think that 100 The procedure needs to link with the overall 
financial and legal back-up is financial and legal framework similar to one that 
essential for the success of exists for the existing procurement procedures. This 
any new procedures. may be in the shape of the directive from their 
finance and legal department. The implication is 
unless that happens the things would not change. 
Community, contractors, and 89 Proper consultation is desired. Realization that one 
engineers need to be sided procedure will not work in the community 
consulted for the evolution of contracting is worth noting. 
the procedure for community 
contracting. 
5.5 
Statements Concurred Comments 
By % 
The majority(77%) of the 77** The key barriers or classes of barrier perceived 
interviewees consider the low were the procedural and capacity of community. 
skill of the community and the The perception is that the community will have 
procedural requirements to be difficulty in executing the work. The similar concerns 
the barriers for involving the were raised by the officials in interview who had not 
community as contractors. executed community contracts (see data base 
entries) 
The majority of the 67* The cost control is perceived to be tight. This could 
interviewees (67%) reported be comparison what happens in the completed 
that 0-10 % of the contracts contract. The quantitative performance related data 
exceeds the initially approved are presented in chapter eight. 
budget. None reported excess 
beyond 30%. 
All reported the range of a 100 Fairly small size contract. The concept of micro 
contract as 0-2 million rupees. contracts covers the bulk of contract used in the 
procurement of urban infrastructure. 
According to the 78% of the 78** The perception is that the public sector is a big 
interviewees 50 % of the local client in construction. 
contractors are involved in the 
government works. 
Contracts completed on time There is no clear message about the time 
0-30% 26.1 performance. The implication is that as many as 70 
70-90% 39.1 % of the contact may have time over runs. This 
indicates a very inferior time performance as 
compared to the cost performance. 
Source: Questionnaire Survey 
i*1 The calculated P-value is more than 0.05, hence it can not be statistically said that the 
difference in the percentage is not by chance 
(**) chi-square statistic is questionable here, cells have expected frequencies less than 5. 
5.6 
Key points 
" Competitive bidding is the main procurement strategy. 
" The works involved at tertiary level is generally of low risk. 
" Sub-contracting is practice in spite of being 'not allowed' in the procedures. 
The working relationship between the parties of the contract may not be I 
exactly in line with the legal contract between the parties. 
I* Contract clauses could be simplified and made in a way that the contractors I 
could understand them. 
" Community capacity to undertake the work is questioned. 
" Surety for the Client is perceived to be crucial. 
" Procedural barriers exist to the community involvement in the procurement. 
"A modified procurement process with a proper legal framework is required to 
involve community in the procurement process. 
It is important to note that the subcontracting is seen to be acceptable by the 
respondents. This reminds us of the existence of some relational contract (see 
chapter 2) in parallel with the legal contract. The overall attitude of the 
respondent is sympathetic towards the relationship or contacts between the 
public sector and community group. 
It is to be noted that the findings, in general, are in line with the issue discussed 
in chapter four in relation to the procurement process and constraints to the 
community involvement. The research will further explore the linkages in the 
findings presented in the chapter six especially the outcome of the focus group 
discussion. 
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5.3 Opinion of the public sector small scale contractor involved in the 
procurement process 
Twenty five micro-contractors in Karachi Municipal Corporations were surveyed. 
The forms were filled while speaking to the contractors. Two assistants were 
used in tracing and interviewing the contractors. In many cases the contractors 
do not have a permanent office. Basically the contact point was the office from 
where they get the work. The information provides a picture of the kind of 
organisations and people involved as micro-contractors in the procurement of 
infrastructure at tertiary level infrastructure procurement. It was quite difficult to 
get hold of the people as many of then had not permanent offices. Some of those 
proprietors were quite busy as they had to do many tasks like purchasing, hiring 
of labour, and organising site by themselves. There is no parallel of similar 
studies in the literature reviewed. The study also indicates the benchmarks or the 
requirements to become a micro-contractor in a local urban government 
department. The survey also provides an introduction of people acting as micro- 
contractors in the procurement of infrastructure in an urban local authority. Table 
5.3 provides a summary of the key finding of the survey. 
Table 5.3 Key finding of survey of public sector micro-contractors. 
Statements Concurred Comments 
By % 
The contractors have one or 84% The organization is very small. The chain of 
two levels of organization. The command does not go beyond two levels. The 
numbers of permanent reliance on permanent staff is very low. It seems of 
personnel, including be mainly one man show who hires people as and 
managerial Personnel, are 0-3. when required. This support the findings that the 
sub-contracting is at a large scale than is allowed 
theoraticaly. 
The contractors have no 96% The contractors can work wherever the work comes 
geographical preferences to up in the city. There are many divisions in a city and 
work. contractors have no preference for a particular 
division. The contractors are quite small but have 
capacities to go beyond one division. 
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Statements Concurred Comments 
By % 
Contractors do not own plant 84 This is quite interesting as on paper it is one of the and machinery but own tools factors or criteria of enlisting the contractor in a and equipment. department. But in practice it is not enforced. This 
also tells that some of the requirements could be 
met by many only as far as the papers are 
concerned. Tools and equipment are owned. The 
work is not of the nature which require 
mechanisation. 
Facilities of hiring tools and 100 It adds to the flexibility of the organisations. It lowers 
plants are available. the capital investments and overhead. The rental 
charges could be charged to the project directly. There is no facility for 100 The door of formal credit is closed on the micro- institutional loans contractor even if they are a registered contractor. 
The reliance on informal finance market or private 
resources is high. 
They have bank accounts 100 That is a necessary condition. A bank account 
would be required from the community group if they 
want to become a micro-contractor of the local 
public sector. 
They are registered 100 Same as above.. 
contractors and are enlisted 
with a governmental 
organisation. 
- The majority contractors ýa ve 60 The micro-contractors have experience of many 
experience of 4-6 years years of work. This again is something that would 
be expected from any new comer in the 
procurement process. 
The annual turnover of the 84 If a micro-contractor could get contracts of IRS 1.0 
micro-contractor does not million, assuming the profit margin of 20% the 
exceed IRS 1.0 million. monthly income comes out to be around IRS 16666. 
The most frequent range of This is fairly decent income for the micro-contractor. 
turnover is IRS 0.5 to 1.0 52 Micro-contracting is a good source of income. 
million [The exchange rate is 
approximately El = IRS 651. 
No verbal contracts were used 100 In informal sector and in many community groups 
All the contracts were written. there were no written contracts used, see Chapter 
six. This again in something required from the 
community groups. 
The contractors also act as a 64 The role of micro-contracting is not restricted to the 
sub-contractor. micro-contracts. The link to the larger contracts is 
through sub-contract. This also highlights the 
frequent use of sub-contracts and indirect entry of 
relatively smaller contractor in the process of large 
contracting. 
Getting private sector work is 96 This indicates that in public sector there may 
easier than public sector work. complex procedural requirements. 
The majority of contractors 60 This indicates the financial and managerial 
have the capacity to undertake capacities of the micro-contractors to handle the 
the works not exceeding IRS contracts. 
500000 at one time. 
The majority of contractors 80 This highlights the relative nature of the meaning of 
perceive the work costing than the term 'minor work. ' 
Rs. 25,000 as of minor nature. 
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Key Points 
9 Micro-contractor in the public sector know how to satisfy the procedurall 
requirements. 
Is In fact many of them are one man show. 
19 They do not have the plant and equipment as required by the procedure but I 
can arrange those. 
Ie They have bank accounts but no facility for institutional loans. 
They have experience in the kind to work they undertake. 
They act as sub-contractors as well. 
The interesting point is that the micro-contractors in the public sector are not very 
well equipped, but are well experienced. They have also demonstrated their 
capacities to meet the procedural requirements, and have good connections in 
the market to fill in the gaps as far as the logistics are concerned. They know 
how to; get registered, get enlisted in the department, open bank account and to 
deal with the public sector. They are, in short, small entrepreneurs. They could 
act as a model for any new comers in the contracting business including the 
community groups. 
5.3.1 Factor perceived to be important in becoming enlisted. 
As discussed in Chapter four, routine procurement of infrastructure requires 
certain conditions to be met by the potential contractors. This section explores 
the perception of the contractors who have gone through the enlistment process. 
The micro-contractors were asked in the questionnaire to identify the factors 
which they think were instrumental in getting them enlisted in the to public sector 
organisation. Some of the factors were quite sensitive and the contractors were 
assured of their anonymity. A set of factors was provided to them with an option 
to add any factor if they so wish. 
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The factors could provide a guide to new-comers. These also highlight that 
becoming enlisted in a public sector department is a complex process. It is not so 
simple as some of the official documents report it to be (data base entry 146). 
The factors are shown in Table 5.4. The factors were considered important in 
getting access to the pubic sector works were categorised by the respondents as 
gvery often I, I often', 'occasionally', 'never' important. 
Table 5.4 Factors perceived by the public sector micro-contractor to be 
important in getting them enlisted. 
Factors Response % Comments 
Reading the notices of very often 100 It triangulates with the documentary evidence 
tenders /pre that there is a set procedure for the 
qualifications. enlistment(see data base entries for example 
247 & 283) 
Technical competency of Very often 88 Very often by the majority to be of importance 
the contractors. and often 
Managerial competency very often 52 Fewer people perceived it be important as 
of the contractors and often compared to the technical competency. 
Legal status of the Very often 80 Important. Triangulate with the discussion 
contractor. and often presented in Chapter 4 
Political background. Occasionally 92 Only few perceived to be important. 
and never 
'Relations' with the Very often 100 It was not reported by anyone as 'never'. It is an 
officials. and important factor. 
occasionally. 
Experience of the Occasionally 96 Interestingly the contractors do not perceive 
contractor. and never experience as an important factor. The message 
is having experience is not a guarantee to get 
enlistment in the government sector. This view 
completely denied by the officials (for example 
base entry 247 ). 
Competency of the Often and 56 Again it is not the critical factor. 
contractor's staff. occasionally 
Bribery. very often or 100 No doubt about that! Bribery is the factor 
often perceived to be important by all. This tells us a 
lot about the working environment of the public 
sector. It is not just the factors which are written 
in the documents which govern the enlistment of 
the contracts but many of which are unwritten 
and may be more important. But this is the 
environment where the community group need 
to survive. Understanding what is not written is 
also important in understanding aspects of the 
procurement process. 
- 
It is noteworthy that how factors, which are not all mentioned in the any 
documents are perceived to be so influential, for example bribery, politics and 
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relationship with the officials. Reading the notice board for tender, technical 
competency and experience are all important. It could be envisaged that and 
organisation wishing to enter into a legal contract with the public sector in the 
study organisation under existing situation is expected to have the characteristics 
of the public sector micro-contractors mentioned above. How can we promote the 
community involvement in such situation? The direction would come from the 
study of the processes where the community did participate in the procurement. 
It is also noteworthy that the existing agency relationship between the micro- 
contractors and the public sector can hardly be classified as participatory or 
partnering (see section 2.12 & 2.13). 
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6.1 
Chapter 6 Initiatives-community participation in procurement. 
6.1 Introduction 
In previous chapter, it has been seen that there is apparently little scope for 
involving community groups in infrastructure procurement in terms of the routine 
processes adopted by urban government in the study countries. 
However, there are several examples of situations in which community groups 
have participated in the procurement process. As concluded in chapters four and 
five, it is important to review cases and to analyse the process which has been 
occurring in order ultimately to relate this to public sector procurement 
procedures. 
A series of text boxes is presented in this section to describe the processes, 
roles, relationship and opinions on performance of community participated 
procurement. 
In preparation of the boxes a variety of evidence was used. The evidences 
included interviews, documents and field notes. The evidences are listed in data 
base index. The text boxes are grouped together according to the focus of the 
description. The boxes represent a series of short stories with a common link-the 
community participated procurement process. In the Text Boxes both narration 
and commentary is provided. The sample of sources are listed at the bottom of 
each Text Box. 
6.2 
6.2 Community participated procurement 
6.2.1 Text boxes focusing on the variety of roles played in the procurement 
process. 
Text Box 6.1 Community and contractor: the community works with a 
private sector contractor. 
The use of local labour in a donor-funded programme implemented by urban 
government: Cochin, India. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Under a contract won by competitive tender, the 0 The contract was won in the normal way 
contractor has made use of some local unskilled labour through competitive bidding. 
for landfilling operations 0 The contractor is satisfied so far with the 
2. The contractor was specifically requested to do this by community labour supplied 
the Municipality 
3. Wages paid so far amounts to IRS 2,500 in total; it is 
low because machine-based methods are necessary 
for the much of filling work. 
4. Discussions are in hand about future work on formation 
of access ways amounting to IRS 33,500 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entry 3. 
Text Box 6.2 Community and urban government: the community as a 
labour-only contractor for government. 
A donor-funded programme implemented by urban government: Cochin, India 
Narrative Commentary 
1. In two separate communities, labour contracts between The use of negotiation is a key issue 
the Municipality and the Community Management here; the communities agreed to rates 
Group (CMG) have been used for the formation of below the current 'market rate', that is the 
lanes by placing gravel fill. Material was supplied by a rate at which unionised labour is 
government department (the Municipality). available. 
2. Initial efforts did not produce satisfactory quality work 
because of lack of technical support and supervision. 0 There is an important element of local 
3. The negotiated labour rates were lower than the capacity building, however small, which 
current market rates. cannot be neglected. 
4. A total of IRS 12,300 has gone into the communities in 0 This represents good value for money for 
the form of waged labour. the Municipality which is very important 
5. Negotiations with the community are underway for an for the officials responsible for promoting 
additional IRS 78,600 of work pertaining to cleaning these non-standard ways of working. 
and renovating the drainage system and concreting 
some lanes. 
Source: Interviews and documents, tor example data base entries 3,3U. 
6.3 
Text Box 6.3 Community and urban government: the Community manages a 
government contract. 
A donor-funded programme implemented by urban government: Cochin, India 
Narrative Commentary 
1. A contract has been awarded by the Municipality 
to one CMG for the construction of a new septic 
tank 
2. The contract was awarded through negotiation Negotiation plays an important role; the final 
with the CMG, following a general call for price was 10-20% lower than a typical 
tenders, whose purpose was 'market testing. contractor's tender. 
3. The CMG has taken responsibility for 
procurement of materials and construction. 
4. The value of the works is IRS 50,000. The CMG was unable to secure credit for 
5. The major problem was in obtaining credit for materials purchase; the problem was resolved 
materials purchase. by an official advancing a government loan 
6. A mason and a carpenter teamed up to provide taken out in his name. A commendable gesture, 
skilled labour and construction management but clearly a risky and unsustainable approach. 
inputs for the contract. This problem arose because government 
7. Work is in progress. Depending upon procedure operates on a cost reimbursement 
performance on this contract, work for the basis. 
remaining septic tanks will be negotiated with the The 'market testing' served the purpose of 
community. The value of the works will be IRS demonstrating value for money; however, 
385,000, with a further IRS 71,200 available for contractors are unlikely to tender if word gets 
drainage related works. round that it is the intention to offer the contract 
to the community. 
In addition to income generation, enterprise 
development is evident through the teaming up 
of a mason and a carpenter. 
Source: Interviews and documents, tor exampie aata i3ase entries j,. ju. 
6.4 
Text Box 6.4 Community as advisers: urban government, its contractors, 
councillors and the community. 
Over twenty years the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) has 
evolved a system which involves the communities in a variety of ways in the slum 
improvement schemes funded by government and donors. 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 1. Project formulation involves consultation between the The consultation involves the community, 
community, the CMDA and the Municipality about what key local politicians and the engineering 
facilities are to be provided within the budget. Clearly department. 
understood agreement is obtained before work starts 
2. The contractor is required to have a sample of his 
construction work (paving, pipe laying, concreting, 
etc. ) approved by both the engineer and 
representatives of the community together. This 
sample of work becomes the yardstick against which 
the quality of the rest of the work can be judged. All 
parties, that is the community, the engineer and the 
contractor therefore have a point of reference against 
which future disagreements can be discussed and 
resolved. CMDA places and enforces quite strict 
3. CMDA places great emphasis on completion testing, requirements on its contractors. Whilst 
for example of pipelines. Certificated testing is this will be reflected in tender prices, they 
incorporated into the contract and it is important that are getting added value in the form of 
the contractor knows that it will be carried out in every improved overall management of the jobs. 
case. Community representatives are invited to 0 The quality of work is excellent. 
witness the testing so that they can see that it has been 0 The community does not have a 
formal 
done contractual role. 
Source: Interviews and documents, Tor exampie aata L)a5U UI ILI lUb 4,14,1 U. 
6.5 
Text Box 6.5 Community as labour sub-contractor to private contractors-A 
contractor's perspective. SIP Context. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Many contractors have their own direct labour force 40 There is a two-way loyalty; the contractor 
that they keep on the books and pay even when there maintains a core work force, even during 
is no work available. lean times, which enables him to respond 
2. For the recruitment of additional unskilled labour, the rapidly using workers whom he can trust 
contractors turn to one of the many labour agents in the to deliver. Labourers who are retained in 
area. These agents recruit on a daily basis from this way are reluctant to take part in 
gatherings at known meeting places, that is, the community-based works which their 
traditional method of hiring casual labour. contractor might otherwise bid for. 
3. The rates paid for unskilled labour, known locally as 
'market rates', appear to be controlled by strong union 
activity and are always higher than the Schedule of 
Rates specifies. 
4. Contractors are ambivalent about being required to Good relations with the community are 
employ labour from the community. essential for completing work on time and 
5. On the positive side, they believe it helps in overcoming within budget. In extreme cases the 
potential and actual hostilities with the community. community may deny the contractor 
6. The downside for the contractors is a concern that they access to the site. 
cannot exercise sufficient control over the performance 
of the workers, "who get the job by right" especially if 
local organisations have strong political influence. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 3,4,5,6,7,8,9. 
Text Box 6.6 Community and government: the Community manages a 
government contract. 
The first time a contract was awarded by government to a community 
management group (CMG) in Cuttack was for the construction of a community 
latrine, an open drain and some paving. The finance was entirely from the 
government. A chronological series of exhibits have been abstracted from the 
project file which reveals how matters developed. 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 7/5/94: 
Letter signed jointly by the residents of Pattapol to the Collector Demand from the residents to start 
& District Magistrate requesting the municipality to do the things moving. 
improvement work. 
26/5/94 
Document entitled 'resolution no. 16', signed jointly by residents The CMG establishes itself as the 
formalising the CMG. means of communication between 
2/7/94 residents and the government. 
A letter from the secretary of the CMG; the two other signatures 0 The CMG is becoming much more 
are not clear, but a stamp pad is used by the secretary. The formal. 
letter is addressed to the Project Management Group (Footnote: 0 An indication that the work was to 
the Project Management Unit in Cuttack is responsible for be sub-let to the CMG on a labour 
implementing a city-wide slum improvement programme for the only basis. 
ODA). The letter 'allows' the 'persons sent by you'(i. e. your 
officers) to do the job. It also promises to provide labour. 
Undated: 
6.6 
A letter to the PMU from the CMG expressing interest in doing 
the work. 
14/9/94 
A letter from the CMG to the Director PMU, requesting an 
extraordinary meeting to discuss progress. The letter was typed 
in English on CMG-headed paper with the names and 
designations of 28 office bearers (six of whom are female), a 
phone number, and a reference number. Copies were sent to 
councillors, Municipal Health Officer, Project Officer, Community 
Organiser, Executive Officer of Cuttack Municipality and an 
Architect. 
23/8/95 
A letter from the CMG to the Collector, Mayor and the Director of 
the PMU regarding the problems of the area and referring to the 
previous correspondence. Alongside the Secretary's stamp is a 
larger stamp with a registration number on it. 
Hand written in English. 
18/9/95 
A formal letter to the Project Director PMU with proper 
references, signed by the president and stamped; a copy was 
sent to the Engineering Manager. The letter was concerning a 
call for tenders and indicates the interest of the CMG in the 
execution of the work in their area. There is a reference to the 
'unemployed youths of the area' as a justification to give them 
the construction work. 
22/9/95 
A letter from the CMG agreeing to execute the work; reference is 
made to a verbal discussion. A request is made to give details of 
the works, the Schedule of Rates and the contract agreement. 
This suggests that the matter has to be passed by the executive 
body. 
28/9/95: 
A letter from the CMG stating that the forms which were sent by 
the PMU were lacking some details. The CMG had been 
requested to fill in the form in type in a non-judicial paper. 
Apparently, the contract was also sent. 
7/10/95 
A letter from the CMG challenging the PMU on its decision to re 
advertise the tender for the work which they have already 
consented to carry out. There are some criticisms on the 
'Skeleton form' of the 'community contract'. It also states that the 
previously requested details were not sent. 
17/10/95 
A letter from the Engineering Manger to attend his office within 7 
days for the 'perusal of the relevant' and 'signing the agreement'. 
18/10/95 & 12/11/95 Letters showing the current impasse. 
15/11/95 
A letter from the CMG Secretary stating that they are starting the 
work. 
7/12/95 
A letter from the CMG requesting design changes. 
0 
0 
The CMG shows a surprisingly 
good understanding of 
bureaucratic needs and channels. 
Increasing formalities the CIVIG's 
dealings. 
Guidance may have been provided 
to the CIVIG. 
Tenders were invited from the 
conventional contractor as well. 
From the files it is not clear as to 
whether they actually received the 
bids or not. 
A verbal agreement is reached in 
principle without any 
documentation; this does not 
happen within conventional 
procedures. A relational contract is 
developing 
The CMG was sent the forms of 
contract to be signed without giving 
them any details. These they 
demanded. For them, dealing with 
the Government seems a serious 
business. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the 
contract was already agreed; the 
actual documents may be 
formalities. 
An indication of empowerment; the 
CMG is no longer just a passive 
receiver. 
Some discomfort on the part of the 
Engineering Manager, who is being 
questioned by the CMG. 
A verbal deal was struck to resolve 
the impasse. 
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14/12/95 
A letter from the CMG demanding confirmation of the changes. 
14/12/95 
A separate letter claiming for the resulting additional expenditure. 
Undated 
A note from the CMG on the number of the beneficiaries of the 
community latrines in terms of gender. The CMG is involved in some form 
of monitoring & evaluation. 
0ource. unumuwb anu uuuument5, ior exampie aaTa Dase entrieS 4,11,30. 
Text Box 6.7 Community and government: communities manage 150 
government contracts. 
During the late 1980's the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) of Sri 
Lanka pioneered a system known as community contracting. The NHDA 
promoted the development of Community Development Councils (CDC), through 
which the program operated. This remains one of the most important programs of 
its kind anywhere. 
The box is based on the published literature and interviews with the relevant 
officials. Further data is used to analyse the process and performance of 
community contracts in their present context. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The CDC identified community CDCs [Community Development Councils] have 
requirements with the NHDA and legal status, equivalent to that of an 'approved 
sometimes NGO support. registered society', to undertake specific works. 
2. Over a three year period 150 contracts Making such choices are themselves experiences 
were awarded. 65 were awarded to 27 in empowerment. 
communities; 32% of the contracts were 
awarded to two particularly active 
communities. 
3. Most of the work involved sanitation and 
water supply. 
4. Some communities provided labor 
themselves whilst others hired it in through 
informal subcontracts. It is not just the labor money that circulated but the 
5. 93 contracts between 1986-89 amounted to money used for the local purchase of the material. 
IRS 4.7 million, of which about IRS 1.7 That has an important impact on the local market 
million was for labor. for building materials. 
6. The quality of work was good; the cost was 0 The time performance was not as good as the 
about 20% less than conventional cost and the quality. There was no systematic 
contracting, with less than 10% of contracts method to determine the contract duration. 
overrunning their cost. 0 Questions were asked about the legality of the 
7. NHDA engineers and accountants had contracts and the lack of formal accountability in 
reservations about this approach. the process adopted. In some cases the CDC 
8. The CDC's experienced problems in managed to obtain finance privately; the officials 
obtaining advance payment. also co-operated in advancing the money before J 
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9. The Municipal Council is officially 
responsible for maintenance. 
10.1t is not clear to what extent the NHDA 
schemes are actually having maintenance 
works carried out or by whom. 
the work was completed. This was a risk, as cost 
reimbursement is made on certification of 
completion. 
The Municipal council has not adopted the system 
of community contracting. 
Source: interviews and documents, tor example data base entries 218,308,363,366. Information 
also taken form Pathirana and Sheng (1992). 
Text Box 6.8 Conventional contractor working for the NGO and supervised 
by CBO. The context of Sevanathe. 
The following is based on the review of the contract and semi-structured 
interviews with the NGO's representative. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. External donor agency provided the funds to NGO 0 Funding direct to the NGO. 
2. The estimates were provided informally to the NGO by the 0 Informal relations existed as the 
government authority. NGO official was an ex-public 
sector official. 
3. The provision of funds took a long time and the price of 0 The longer the procedures the 
construction increased. larger the risk of the price 
escalation 
4. The donor refused to pay the escalated cost. 
5. The community paid the difference. The difference came to Community as partial financiers and 
about 20% of the contract value. client. 
6. NGO negotiated the contract with the conventional NGO as partial Engineer along with 
contractors with the assistance of the government authority. the public sector. 
The community was consulted at every stage. 
7. The conditions of contract used were similar to the one in the 
community contract. The process was transparent. 
8. A copy of the contract document was provided to the 
community. CBO as partial Engineer. 
9. Community participated in the supervision of the work. 
Review of the contract between the NGO and the 
conventional contractor. The authority as the partial 
1O. The parties to the contacts were the NGO and the Engineer. 
contractors. Reference to the authority to provide the plans. 
1 1I. The contractor to complete the works for a certain amount. 
The work to be started within a certain time period. 12 Emphasis on quality. . 13.1f part of the work is found to be of inferior quality the 
ments would be suspended for the whole section. pa The risk to be transferred away y 
14. The contractor to take the third party risk. from the NGO. 
The contract is of ameasure and pay' kind. 15 Standard government attitude . 16.10% security deposit is to be released after the end of the six adopted by the NGO. 
month defect liability period. 9 Standard provision. 
uidated damages would be charged at the rate of Rupees Li 17 0 The contractor may encounter cash q . 100 per day. flow problems. 
Ic 
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18. No claim for the price escalation. 
19. Extension of contact to be mutually agreed in case of 
unavoidable circumstances. 
20. Changes to the instructions are to be in writing. 
21. First bill to be submitted after 20% of the work is completed. 
22. Sub-contracting is possible with the consent of the client. 
23. Un-satisfactory workers to be removed from the site. 
24. Reference is made to labour law for payment to the labourers. 
25. The contractor to provide the labourers employer provident 
fund payments. 
26. The contractor to obtain the workmen's compensation policy. 
It can be noted the there is a strong 
influence of the government 
conditions of contract. It seems that 
the NGO had also adopted the 
typical role of a conventional client. 
One main difference here is that 
although the procurement process 
is apparently the same, there is no 
requirement for registration and 
enlistment. This has provided an 
access to the micro-contractors to 
work under the supervision of CBO. 
Source: Interviews and documents, tor example data base entries 213,214,234,321,361. 
Text Box 6.9 Working without government: community, NGO and artisans. 
The context of Orangi Pilot Project internal works. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Residents collected money and paid in full for sewers along A genuine demand for the service 
their lanes. At first this was done without any technical already exists. 
support from professionals. 
2. Later on an NGO came and provided technical assistance in 
terms of cost estimation, supervision and provision of some 
formwork. Training was provided for masons 
3. Some of these trained masons started lobbying for more Evidence of enterprise development 
works in the neighbouring lanes and started specialising in 
similar works. They formed their work-gangs and did a lot of 
lane sanitation work. A system of estimation and 
4. The rates were negotiated on the basis of the estimation breakdown of rates which suits its 
provided by the NGO, which was based on the prevailing purpose; see Box G6. 
market rates 
5. The estimation gives a breakdown of the labour and material 
for ease of ordering. 
6. The material was purchased by the community. In urban communities the 
7. For excavation work, specialist labourers were usually hired; assumption that the user will supply 
in some cases the work was done by the people. the labour may not hold good. 
8. For concrete work, a mason is generally hired on either a Contracting specialisation is 
lump sum or item rate-basis. evident. 
This leads to problems; urban 
9. Maintenance was done by the people themselves if the government is unwilling to adopt 
problems were simple. In the case of major problems they infrastructure which it has had no 
lobby and seek help. part in supplying. 
'Private Ordering' as compared to 
10. There was no written contract involved. Disputes were 'Court Ordering' is the preferred 
resolved through 'social pressure. mechanism of dispute resolution. 
Source: Interviews and documents, tor exampie aata Dase entries zu i- 
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Text Box 6.10 Community and NGO: monitoring a large Government 
contract: 
A loan from an international lending bank was used by urban government, who 
hired a well known national consultant to prepare the design and plans for slum 
improvement. The context of KMC/ADB project. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. At an early stage, the city Mayor instigated negotiations with a The political dimension is important. 
well-known NGO already active in the area, who were offered The Mayor of the city was shrewd 
a contract for monitoring the works. A contract was signed by enough to realise that, if the local 
the government department, the Consultant and the NGO. people were not involved then, the 
2. The Contractor signed a contract for construction with the contractor would receive no co- 
government department. operation from the residents. 
3. The contractor was not a resident of the area; local people 0 Contractors have mixed views on 
were not hired by the contractor who brought his own team of using local labour; see Figure 6.5 
workers. 
4. NGO provided technical assistance to the people at lane level 0 NGO to be technically competent. 
construction. 
5. Details of the work were provided to the NGO. 0 NGO managed to get the relevant 
information. 
6. The NGO held a meeting at which community based The NGO was very effective in 
organisations (CBOs) and local people agreed to assist; this developing a network to achieve its 
ensured adequate coverage, with people monitoring work in objectives. 
their own area. 
7. The NGO provided zonal managers, with area managers from 
the CBOs under them. Lane residents reported to the C130s- 
8. Some lane residents received daily wages from the NGO. 
9. The main contractor offered inducements to government This is a standard practice. 
officials so that they did not create problems on the job. 
The work was sub-contracted out into 56 contracts, with many 1O This is normally prohibited under . 
more sub-contracts. the terms of the contracts used, but 
1 1. When the work started it was soon realised that the people commonly occurs. 
were watching and were aware of the basic scope and the The works involved are clearly well 
specification of the work. Their input prevented the contractor within the community's 
taking short cuts. comprehension. 
12. The NGO had good connections at senior levels in The political dimension was 
government that they used if there were problems with junior important; a CBO does not have 
officials. this sort of entr6e, unless there is a 
particularly active councillor. 
13. The finished work was of good quality. 
14. The completion of the contract was slightly delayed; some 
claims were made by the contractor for the cost of delays 
caused by stoppage of the work. 
15. After the work is completed the CBO hired local people to e A sense of ownership is there. 
clean the drains and do minor repairs on a regular basis. 
16. During the process, people benefited from informal training in 0 Increased networking at the 
the supervision of the works. Subsequently, residents from community level, resulting 
from 
other area contacted them for help. improved skills and confidence. A AAA e%fl A r%t- A rinn PI-7n 
Source: Interviews and ciocuments, Tor example 
UdLd Udbt:: IVI ILI ICO U-t, III, F-%J I, Z-V-T, Z-%a%j, -I r-- 
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Text Box 6.11 Community, NGO and State Government facilitator: changing 
places - no role for urban government. 
The context of SKAA internal works. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The state government department with responsibility to Public sector department at provincial 
regularise and upgrade slums initially entrusted level deals with the regularisation and 
implementation to urban government. upgrading of 'Katchi abadies'. 
2. Progress was slow, the quality of the work was poor 
and there were problems with cost escalation. 
3. A new, dynamic leader changes the way the 
government department works. 
4. All the lane level work is now done by the local people This is a rare instance of a public sector 
themselves with technical assistance from a NGO. The department experimenting with 
people finance the improvements themselves. procurement procedures. 
5. The NGO is paid by the government department for It has formally contracted an NGO in the 
community organisation and technical guidance. For capacity of similar to engineering 
internal (lane-level work) works that is the only consultant. 
contribution from the state. 
Source: Interviews ana (locuments, Tor exampie ciataUdbU Ul ILI It:, -b :)I, OV, -W, 4-t I, C-U 1, L-9 1, e-%Jv. 
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Text Box 6.12 Community, NGO, State government: community 
involvement in external works: 
Most of the cases relate to communities contributing to internal works, that is, to 
improvements to the infrastructure within the neighbourhood, lane or cluster. This 
case concerns external works, that is, the infrastructure outside the 
neighbourhood that is necessary to support the internal infrastructure. State 
government pays the full cost of the external works. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Initially, the conventional tender-contract procedure was 
adopted. 
2. The contractors were not performing to the satisfaction of the 
NGO who was appointed to monitor the works. 
3. The state government then opted to use the departmental 41 The staff of the authority are 
works procedure (see Figure 4.3). unhappy as they now have to do 
4. Materials were purchased by the department and labour work which was originally done by 
contracts were agreed through negotiation. the contractor: e. g. purchase of 
5. Small contractors and some local artisans obtained work. material & delivery to the site on 
6. All the contracts were signed in the presence of NGO and a time; responsibility for security of 
CBO representative. materials; responsibility for quality 
7. The contract is best described as a memorandum of of the work; management of 
understanding; no standard forms or conditions were used workforce. 
and documents were written in the local language. 0 The overall responsibility for 
8. The final bill was not released unless the CBO and NGO was performance and maintenance of 
satisfied with the work. the works is being disputed among 
9. The resulting quality of work was superior. the different stakeholders. 
The cost was lower than that of the conventional contracting, 1O 0 Using PWD-based enlistment of . 
as the profit of the main contractor was eliminated. contractors and tender process. 
1 1. After construction of these external works, local people have 0 Despite the good quality of the work 
started installing internal works. and the low final cost, officials are 
12. The work is on-going. concerned about possible a udit 
objections as there was no 
demonstrable competition. 
--I--- ^^A '%^A ^ ff f% 
Source: Interviews and documents, Tor exampie aaia oase enuieb ot, ozi, -tu, e--+,, 4u i, c-, jv. 
Text Box 6.13 Community and government facilitated by a private 
consultant: community action using joint funding. 
A project management unit (PMU) was set up in the Faisalabad Development 
Authority (FDA) to implement an integrated development project known as the 
Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project (FAUP). The local PMU staff were supported 
by expatriate consultants appointed by the donor agency. 
Narrative 
1. Local infrastructure improvements are funded 
50% by the residents and 50% through the PMU, 
using donor agency funds. 
2. A project to construct lane sewers was identified 
through community meetings; community 
mappinq was carried out. 
Co 
A conventional survey was also done as the 
information collected in the mapping exercise 
'was not considered proper' for Engineering 
purposes. 
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3. Committees were formed at area and lane 
levels, and for the implementation of the project. 
The lane (about 20-40 households) is an 
important unit and the lane committee typically 
involves 3-6. people. 
4. The PMU staff designed the works partly to 
government standards. 
5. The design was discussed with the lane 
committee. The main problem was the high cost; 
residents could not afford the specification for 
reinforced concrete pipes required by 
government. Cheaper pipes having a lower 
standard of reinforcement were obtained from 
the local market place. 
6. The PMU have negotiated with the local 
manufacturers to try to ensure certain minimum 
standards in their pipe production. Modifications 
were made to improve the standard of manholes. 
7. Cost estimates were prepared by the PMU 
according to both the SoR and market rates. The 
rates reported for the approval purposes were 
the rates based on the government schedule. 
8. The PMU established a Project Approval 
Committee that has to approve all FAUP 
expenditure on project activities. A document 
entitled 'activity proposal' was put forward for 
approval by the committee. 
9. This proposal document gives the background, 
cost estimates, sketches of design, and the 
mechanism for implementation. It also states 
what the project is aiming to achieve. 
10. lncluded on the Project Approval Committee 
were the Municipal Engineer and officials from 
FDA. They expressed concern about the 
authority of the committee and what exactly it 
was empowered to do. 
1 1. A memorandum of understanding 'agreement' is 
signed by the PMU, the lane committee and the 
project implementation committee. Another 
committee comprising one PMU social organiser 
and one person nominated by the lane 
committee is proposed. 
12. The project activity proposal indicates that the 
increase of cost is to be borne by the community 
but the contract indicates that the increase will 
be proportionately shared. 
13. The actual contract duration was about one 
month. 
14. A joint account was opened to operate the cash 
requirements; this is a joint account of the PMU 
Social Organiser and a member of community 
acting in their individual capacities. 
15. The cash flow and management of the account 
is not recorded. 
16. The labour arrangements were varied; work was 
done both by lane residents and (mainly) by sub- 
contracted labour. 
17. TVDical lane sewers cost IRS 12,000 to 18,000; 
" The committees are informal and are not 
registered societies; there is no formal 
mechanism for the creation and the operation of 
such committees. 
" The OPP has lane groups of a similar size. 
" The residents were adamant that the high 
standards were unaffordable; an interesting 
stand-off arose when, in effect, the residents 
said that if the officials insisted on using 
government standards there would be no project 
i. e. no lane sewer at all. A balance of cost and 
quality was the prime concern for the community; 
they saw the importance of marginally increasing 
the standards for manhole covers. 
" Rather surprisingly, the cost estimate based on 
market rates was found to be cheaper than the 
SoR. It seems to be good practice to use more 
than one basis for cost estimation; the market 
rate gives a better idea of what the work will 
actually cost 
" The activity proposal document could be 
interpreted as consolidated file notes, equivalent 
to the technical sanction of the conventional 
government process (see Figure 4.2). 
" The benefits in terms of the employment, income 
generation and enterprise development were not 
explicitly mentioned in the objectives of the 
project. 
According to government procedure, the 
authority for sanction and approval is vested with 
individual officers of a particular rank. Their 
question about the legality of the committee to 
grant approval is well founded. 
The agreement is reviewed in Box P6 
No estimate was made for the duration of 
project. 
This is not an official account of FDA; in fact 
peoples' reaction to putting their money into a 
joint FDA account was extremely hostile. For all 
practical purposes public money did not reach 
the community group directly, as PMU staff 
acted as intermediaries. 
Urban communities do not do all the labour work 
themselves. 
This iMDlies that from all the contracts about IRS 
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approximately 25 % of the cost is labour and 
75% materials, which were purchased from the 
local market. 
18. There were deviations in the cost even for such 
small projects. The ratio of contract cost and 
actual cost was in the range of 1.06 to 0.94. 
19. The project progress is reported to the Senior 
Engineer and the Finance and the Admin. 
section as well. 
10,000 for labour and IRS 29,000 for materials is 
circulating in the local economy; this is a 
significant benefit on top of those claimed in the 
project proposal. 
There is inherent risk involved in construction; 
the main reason here reflects the problem of 
accurate cost estimation. 
At the project level the process is transparent. 
,. )ource-. inierviews ana aocuments, Tor example clata base entries 82,112,113,253,256,257. 
6.2.2 Text boxes focusing on the contracting issues in procurement 
process . 
Text Box 6.14 The community contract. 
The following is based on the review of the simple contract used in Cuttack. SIP 
context. 
Narrative 
1. The signatories are the secretary of the CMG and the Engineering manager of PMU. 
2. The title of the work was given and reference was made to the drawings, specifications and 
the conditions of contract. 
3. Stamped paper was used; there is a stamp of 'stamp vendor, D. S. R office, Cuttack' on the 
back of the agreement form. 
4. The CMG supplies the materials, executes the work and maintains the work for a required 
period. 
5. The payment is based on the item rates calculated from the Schedule of Rates. 
6. A witness also signed the documents. 
7. A Purchase committee is constituted by the PMU to buy materials; the President/secretary of 
the CMG are to be the members. 
8. The quantity of the work done is to be measured. 
9. Security money of up to 10% of the value of the work may be deducted at the discretion of the 
officer-in-charge of PMU. 
1O. The maintenance or the defect liability period is three months; the defects are to be rectified 
by the CMG or the security money will be forfeited. 
11. Employment of persons less that 12 years of age and giving wages less than the government 
minimum is prohibited. 
12. The officer in-charge of PMU can enquire and decide in case of complaints related to the 
payment. of wages, quality of work and other related matters. His decision is binding and 
there is no reference to arbitration. 
13. The CMG must furnish proper accounts. 
14. A Schedule of Rates and some sketches are attached. 
Source: Interviews and documents, torexampie aata r)ase entries 
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Text Box 6.15 NHDA Guidelines 
The NHDA has issued the following Guidelines for assigning small contracts to 
community organisations. They were written in Sinhala for NHDA District 
Managers for use in the '100 Homes Programme', which is a new low profile 
initiative for delivery of shelter on the basis of electoral area. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Reference is made to Financial Circulars of 1987 and 1993. The basis of the procedures is 
Further details can be obtained from the Deputy General clearly mentioned. 
Manager (DGM) Engineering Services. 
2. Before assigning the contract, plans and estimates must be Equivalent to Administrative 
approved by the DGM and the Officer for Financial Grants. Approval and Technical Sanction 
(Figure 4.2). 
3. Construction should be on 'land legally undertaken by the Equivalent to planning permission. 
Housing Authority' and should be 'technically certified for 
suitability for consumption [i. e. usage]'. 
4. Priority is given to the registered society of the colony. If no There is a clear requirement for the 
such organisation is available then some other outside area society to register in order to 
can be selected by the regional tender board. acquire the legal status necessary 
to enter into a contract. This 
clarifies the legal status of the CDC 
5. The society should show written consent to accept to contract Emphasis is on written acceptance 
according to the respective plans, conditions and estimated with clear reference to the 
cost. nominated office-bearers of the 
6. The document should be signed by the President, Secretary CDC. 
and Treasurer of the society, and then by NHDA District 
Manager. 
7. A sample letter for the award of a contract is shown. 
8. The letter assigning the contract (i. e. the work order) must 
have: 
" Contract number. 
" Name of contract. 
" Value of contract. 
" Required date of completion. 
" District Manager signatures on behalf of NHDA. It is not clear who is offering and 
9. The Society has to give its written consent to undertake the who is accepting. It appears that 
contract. the work order is accepted once 
1 O. The contract has to be signed before the start of the work. the CDC formally agrees internally. 
1 1. There is a provision for damages due to delays equivalent to 
1/1600 the of the value of the work daily. 
12.15% is allowed in the estimates as institutional expenses or 0 The profit element is formalised. 
profit for the community council. 
13. The original of the signed contract is kept by the NHDA 
District Manager. 
a postage stamp should be attached On the contract original 14 0 This serves the function of a , . & signed. The value of the stamp should be proportional to revenue stamp; there is no 
the contract value; 1 rupee for every 100 of the contract distinction made between the 
value. A 10 rupees stamp should be used for the contractor's revenue and the postage stamp. 
copy. 
15. Copies are provided to the Contractor, DGM NHDA, Auditor 0 These are the 'concerned persons'. 
General, District Accountant and the District Engineer. 
16. Each copy of the contract agreement should have the * The requirements are very formal in 
following attached: I nature. 
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Appendix of the agreement. 
Letter awarding the contract. 
Letter of consent from the Society. 
Estimates signed by officials of the society. 
17. Every contract assigned by the district officer must be listed in 
a general ledger. 
ouurue. mterview5 ana aocumenis, Tor exampie ciata t)ase entries 187,218,308,363,366. 
Text Box 6.16 Conditions of contract for community construction contract- 
NHDA. 
Based on a review of the translated conditions of contract. 
_Narrative 
Commentary 
1. The contract is in local language. 0 Use of local language to increase 
the communication. 
2. Parties to the contract are mentioned along with their 0 Standard drafting practice. 
addresses. 
3. The President/Chairman, Secretary and the Treasurer are 0 Three officials signs on behalf of the 
signatories on behalf of the community development council. contractor. 
The General Manager is signatory on behalf of NHDA. 
4. There are spaces for two witnesses to sign. 0 Standard practice. Involvement of 
other people as well. 
0 Useful way to provide in an abstract 
5. A summary sheet provides the following details. with relevant details on one page. 
* compensation for delays. 
0 Work to be started within 14 days of the contract. 
0 Defect liability period. 
0 10 %security deposit from the running bill but limited to 5% of 0 Security deposit remains in the 
the contract sum. The 50% of the security to be released at process. 
the time of completion of work and the remainder at the end 
of the defect liability period. 
0 Period for completion of contract. 0 Contract period is specifically 
mentioned. 
Type of contract is 'measure and pay. 
The time limit for certificate of payment is 28 days. 0 To expedite the payments and 
programme the cash flow. 
* Very concise with minimum of 
6. There are in total 12 clauses. details. 
7. The scope of works and obligation of the contractors is 0 Standard drafting practice 
mentioned in the first paragraph. 
8. Clausel- Obligations of NHDA includes; funding, provision of 0 Clear definition of the client's tasks. 
plans, provision of technical advice and assistance to the 
construction committee for implementation. 0 Contract based on the negotiated 
9. Clause 2- refers to the agreed estimates and states the rates. Disbursement is quite similar 
commitment from the contractor to complete proposed work to the other conventional contracts. 
accordingly. Payments to be made on the basis of bill. The 
method of payment would be'measure and pay'. 0 Keeping good records is important 
10. Clause 3-Records to made by the committee which then from, management transparency 
keeps them accessible to the client. and accountability points of view. 
9 Role of instruction and personal 
11 . Clause 4-Plans and 
instructions given as the basis of communication is important and 
implementation. documents do not replace such 
forms of communication. 
0 Clear definition of the tasks of the 
12 . Clause 
5-Purchasing material, storing them and keeping contractor. 
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store records is the construction committee responsibility. The 
records to be accessible to the client. 
13. Clause 6-The committee to employ trained and suitable 
workers and keep the record of the workers and their wages. 
14. Clause 7-Duration of the contract. 
15. Clause 8- The committee to follow the instruction of the client. 
16. Clause 9- The president/chairman, treasurer and two other 
members[construction committees] would be held liable for ; 
loss of funds or materials, stoppage of work, delays and such 
events. If the project is not completed the supply of funds and 
other services would be stopped to the area. 
17. Clause 10-The third party insurance and workmen 
compensation insurance to be provided. The cost of 
insurance to be reimbursed to the contractor. 
18. Clause 11-Breach of contract would result in termination of 
contract. 
19. Clause 12-Clarification that the agreement is ex-officio 
" Emphasis on quality and 
accountability. 
" The contract is for a specified 
period. 
" Importance of the instructions 
emphasised. 
" Point of liability is defined. This is in 
between the purely personal liability 
and the organisational liability. If 
read in conjunction with clause 12, it 
seems the liabilities are on 
organisations and not on persons 
involved. 
" Insurance is required and paid by 
the client. The option could be for 
the insurance to be arranged 
directly by the client. 
" The contract is like a 'self -enforcing 
contract'. Breach simply terminates 
the contract. 
" The agreement is between the 
organisation and the persons 
involved. 
The legal implications are that the 
contract is between the organisations 
represented by the signatories. The 
contract will not be affected if an official 
is replaced by another official for 
example during when transferred to 
another post or department. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 152,192,194,187,218,308, 
363,366. 
Text Box 6.17 Process of contracting and billing in the community contracts 
system of the NHDA prevailing in 1996. 
The findings are based on the review of 31 files and interviews with the 
concerned officials. Review of one file is shown as an example. 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 1. Review of the files for the contract 596/95 and 
description by the Engineer and Administration 
person reveals the following steps. 
Contracting process 
Drawings approved by the DGM[Deputy General Equivalent to the technical sanction in works 
Manager], Engineering services, generally signed procedure of PWD. 
on the Drawing. 
Estimates approved by the Manger Quantity Same as above. 
surveying. Community development council is selected in 
On query from Divisional secretary, list of consultation with NHDA. The implication is that 
potential community contractors provided. a list is available of the potential community 
Recommendation is also provided about the contractors. 
potential community contractor. It was explained later that, in case the 
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Quotation and consent called from the 
recommended community contractors. 
Contractor is selected. 
Approval for the contract award is taken from the 
Chairman. 
Letter of award. 
Contract is signed. 
2. It was said that, generally, it takes 3 months from 
the drawing preparation to the signing of the 
contract. 
Billing process 
3. 
Technical officer helps the contractors to prepare 
the bill and measurement sheets. 
Measurement sheet signed by the technical 
officer and the Contractor's representative 
" Engineer checks, signs and sends to the Q. S 
[Quantity surveyor]. 
" Q. S checks and sends back to the Engineer. 
" Engineer recommends and send to DGM. 
" DGM recommends and send to the DGM 
Finance. 
41 DGM Finance processed and payment made 
4. It is reported that, in general, it takes one month 
from the Techn-ical officer preparing the bill before 
the payment is made. 
Some comments by the officials. 
5. There is now not much difference in the 
supervision time for the conventional contractor 
and the community contractor. 
6. The problem the community contractor has is that 
of cash flow and they wait for the payment before 
they proceed for the next stage 
7. The work is in some cases sub-contracted out. 
The labourers are, in general, from the community 
but skilled workers come from outside. The 
unskilled person earned about 150-200 rupees 
per day and the skilled person earned about 250 
rupees per day. 
8. Generally the material is bought from the local 
area but in case of shortage the material may be 
issued from the government stores. 
Officials think that CDC makes more than 15 % 
vrofit and invest in some businesses. 
contractor is from outside, quotations are 
called. 
" Highest office bearer approves the contract 
award. This may be because the lower level 
officials are not confident about the legality of 
the procedure they are adopting. 
" Very similar to the PWD procedures. The main 
difference is in the selection of bidder and the 
contractor, non-conventional contractors and 
negotiation. 
" Lead time for signing the community contract. 
This may be due to the involvement of the 
Chairperson as the approving authority. 
Bill is prepared effectively under the supervision 
of the officials. This could reduce the checking 
of bill time. 
Joint measurement. Measure and pay. 
For payment the bill does not go higher than 
DGM[ approximately five steps]. 
e Bill processing time. 
Initially there was a difference but now it is 
getting under control. There is not a significant 
difference in the management of conventional 
contracts and the community contract once the 
system is set. 
Bill processing time is an important 
consideration for payment to the small 
contractors, including the community 
contractors as they do not have much working 
capital. 
Income generation. 
* Circulation of money in the local area. 
Enterprise development and making profit for 
sustaining the activities. 
6.19 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 187,194,218,308,363,366 
Text Box 6.18 What is the contracting and billing processes in CSPU [Clean 
settlement project Unit]? Community as partial Client and Contractors. NGO 
as partial Engineer. 
The following is based on a review of files and the semi-structured interviews of 
the officials. 
Narrative 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Applications come from Divisional Secretary, 
which is a part of the state government to CSPU. 
Feasibility study is done by the CSPU. 
Site is selected. 
Inform the applicant and copy to Divisional 
Secretary. 
Select SO [Support organisation] list of SOs 
includes about 300 names but 6 were selected for 
phase 1 pilot projects. 
Agreement signed with the SO. 
SO starts mobilisation and makes assessment of 
the capacity of the community. This helps in 
evaluating how much involvement would be 
required. 
Parallel to the selection of site a CAP[community 
action planning] workshop is organised by SO and 
CSPU to work out the needs of the community. 
Commentary 
4P The community has go through the Divisional 
Secretary for the development works. 
There is no mention of involvement of CDC to 
this point. It is assumed that the application has 
come as a result of such involvement. 
SOs are not just the NGOs but all sort of 
organisations from where the resources could 
be taken. 
The contract is between the SO and the CSPU. 
Signing contract with SO and site selection is 
concurrent activities. Community action 
planning is used. 
Emphasis on use of workshops. 
9. SO prepares plans for relevant activities to be This is one of the first documents in the 
included in the project proposal. payment files of the assignments. This is 
10. CSPU made initial estimates. 
11. CSPU, through SO initiated advocacy, to start 
collecting the contribution from the community. 
12. At the same time the other project components 
like health, education, social development starts. 
13-Detailed estimates are prepared with details and 
design. 
14. People ready with their 20% contribution by 
showing that they have collected it in their bank 
account. 
15. On receipt of money the assignment[Contract] is 
signed by the three parties. 
16. Award letter to CBO issued. 
17. Mobilisation advance, if required, 20 percent of 
the estimated cost. SO may arrange the bank's 
parallel to the project activities proposal in 
FAUP. The difference here is that, apparently, it 
is the NGO who is doing the workshops instead 
of the officials. In the NHDA programme they 
had gained experience in such techniques. 
Many activities starting at the same time. 
9 Equivalent to the technical sanction. 
CBOs like CDCs have to have the bank 
account. It is in the formal sector. CDCs have 
experience in such practices from previous 
programmes. 
The documents are prepared but signed only 
when the money is received. 
Parallel to the public works procedures. 
9 Is this what is supposed to happen? Is NGO 
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guarantee. In most of the cases they want it 
18. Work starts. 
19. Technical officers of the NGO supervise and 
assist in arranging the material and assist in 
preparation of bills and day to day management. 
20. CSPU staff provide top level supervision and 
problem resolution. They also lay out the work 
and provide the levels. 
21. CBO have not so far subcontracted but they can. 
They provide the labour from communities. Skilled 
people are hired even from outside. 
22. CBO submits the bill, checked and signed by the 
so. 
23. CSPU Engineer staff go and verify, check the 
measurement sheets and 'measure and pay'. 
24. A percent retention is kept but the amount is not 
to be exceeded 5% of the contract amounts. 
25. Completion is not certified They are planning to 
issue certificates for future works. 
26. Hand over to the CBO. 
27. Maintenance period starts, it is generally six 
months but it depends. The defects identified to 
be rectified in this period. 
28. End of defect liability period and release of 
retention money. 
capable and willing to arrange the bank 
guarantee for CBO? Note the barrier is not 
removed. Still the emphasis is on the bank 
guarantee. From interview it was clarified that 
the NGO did not provided the bank guarantee 
but a note of reference. The advance given by 
the community was taken as the cash 
guarantee as well. 
This role is para Ilel to that played by the officials 
and OPP in the case of SKAA direct labour. 
The officials also played a similar role in 
community contracting in NHDA. The role of the 
NGO is that of partial Engineer and partial 
Contractor. 
Not all the technical functions could be 
performed by the NGO. The NGO is not 
capable to undertake the full role of officials of 
the NHDA programme. Note the laying out of 
work and the levels are to be done by the 
officials. Another tier of supervision and at what 
cost and benefits? 
No restriction on sub-contracting. It is the 
decision of the CBO and SO. Empowering. 
Role of NGO is that of engineer certifying the 
bills. 
" Checking of the SO's checking. Is this 
excessive? If the SO is not trustworthy or 
capable why give it the role? The basis of 
payment is'measure and pay. 
" Very similar to the conventional contracts. 
Retention money is also retained. The bills are 
paid in arrears and on top of it the deposit is 
also retained. 
" Completion certificates are not yet issued but 
would be done in the future. 
This implies that the handing over is not done to 
some other government agencies. It also 
implied that the CIBO is responsible for 
maintenance. Are they capable of it? Is the 
assumption that the CBO would be able to 
maintain it completely reasonable. CBO acts as 
contractor. 
Retention money of the CIBO would be retained 
until the maintenance period is finished. It also 
shows that the CBO or the CDCs have now 
attained the capacity to survive the 
conventional barriers of procurement. This 
shows the enterprise development. The next 
stage would be to bid against the conventional 
contractors. 
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29. Maintenance to be done by the CBO but no such 
agreement. There is no schedule of maintenance 
provided. 
An official explained that the formal contract for 
the maintenance was not made due to the 
temporary nature of the CSPU. They are not 
entering into any long duration agreement. The 
implications are that for a maintenance 
contract, if any, has to be between permanent 
or semi-permanent organisations. This implies 
that the project's organisations are not suitable 
to handle such tasks as they will be dismantled 
once the project is completed. This also points 
out the importance of having exit or completion 
procedures in the project design. There needs 
to be clear understanding as to which 
organisation is going to inherit the liabilities of 
the project. The organisation responsible for 
maintenance must exist for the whole life cycle 
of infrastructure or delegate such functions to 
some other organisations which could. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 196,308,363,366. 
Text Box 6.19 Is the client getting the value for money from NGOs? Process 
of selection and dealing with the NGO. Context of CSPU. 
The CBO/Community as Partial Client and Partial contractor. NGO and CSPU as 
Engineer. The following is based on the review of files and Semi-structured 
interviews with the officials. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Preliminary stage identifies some SO. NGO was *A data base of potential SOs was created. 
prepared in consultation with the social services 
agencies 
2. NGOs were invited by letter.. 
3. Through the NGO consultation, criteria for 9 Process of screening of the SO and the criteria 
selection of SO were prepared. NGOs were used is prepared in consultation with the NGOs. 
briefed about the CSPU. SO assessment form Similar to pre-qualification of consultants and 
was developed to include experiences, financial contractors. 
standing registration and constitution. 
4. Offices of SO visited to 'get the feel'. 
5. Best six were selected out of 12-15 Cautious approach as the interaction with NGO 
is new. Fifty percent rejection rate. 
6. SO chooses the settlement to work in. Choice was made by the SO regarding the area 
to work in. The choice is restricted to the pilot 
project areas. There may be some area where 
the NGOs will be working for the first time. 
7. Service agreement was signed. Parallel to the consultancy services. 
Consultancy agreement with non-professionals 
organisations. 
8. Three phases of project; project development, Contracts are based on the phase of the project 
implementation, consolidation. For each phase a and separate contracts are signed for the 
different contract was signed. The initial period stages with the same SO and for the same 
was six months which was subsequently area. 
increased to one year. 
9. The CSPU and SO's functions are mentioned in Parallel with the consulting services. NGO as 
the agreement. There are two components for consultant. 
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payments one is staffing and other is outcome- 
based. Costs are provided for both. 
1O. Two month advance was provided without any 
guarantee. 
1 1. The SO submits reports monthly and gets paid. 
10 % overhead charges were agreed with the SO 
to start with. 
Review of some project Res. 
12. SO was national forum for people's organisation. 
It is environmental and community development 
NGO. 
13. Here also there are two kinds of files, one is 
contract and the other is payment. The contract 
deals with the stages of up to the signing of the 
contact. 
14. The contract was in Sinhala. 
Advance without the guarantee is possible to 
the NGO or in service contract with the NGO. 
This includes the profit as well. 
Similar filing system as in the conventional 
contracts. 
Use of local language even dealing with the 
NGO. 
15. The period of contract was six months. 
16. The value of contract for the implementation 
phase is Rs. 158,070. 
17. A bill dated 21-05-96 show break down according 
to staffing and outputs. The staffing includes; 
Staffing, travelling and SO management. The 
output includes; office rent, site office 
maintenance, monitoring and documentation, and 
SO management. The SO management is at the 
rate of 10 %. 
The contract for the project development phase 
was that of Rs. 183,070 and for six months. There 
is no contract for the consolidation yet. 
0 
Quite high in relation to that of the infrastructure 
value. The consulting cost is 1.79 times that of 
the contract cost. Is this sustainable good value 
for money and with what addition benefits as 
the officials are also playing role in the 
projects? The activities related to the 
community development have been paid 
separately to the NGO. The argument could be 
that the NGO may be providing some additional 
value other than what is generally provided by 
the consultants. Regardless of whether the cost 
is high or not, it illustrate that the NGO cost 
associated with the implementation of contract 
is an important consideration. 
Quite high rate for management from non- 
professional managers. 
The value of contract was 2.03 times that of the 
contract amount for infrastructure. The issue of 
value for money is also relevant for the 
contracts with the consultants. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 185,309,359,365. 
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Text Box 6.20 Contracting and billing processes in CSPU. Trail of events. 
The following is based on the review of the files and semi-structured interviews 
with the officials 
Narrative Commentary 
File I 
1. File has note sheets similar to that of other * Link to PWD procedures and filing system. 
regional countries. 
2. Project report by SO, Report of Activities, * Details equivalent to the technical sanction. 
included: 
" Plans, 
" Schedule 
" Estimates. 
3. The estimates, as informed, are based on 0 No deviations from the basis of the estimates. 
government schedule of rates. 
4. The report comes under the covering letter head 0 CBOs are using the letter heads. They wanted 
of CBO. The CBO letter head includes the to show that they are registered. 
registration number, the name of the CBO and the The document was produced in consultation 
office bearers. The report signed by the with the SO/NGO. The key players from CBO 
chairperson and secretary of the CBO and the are the chairperson and the secretary. 
technical officer of the SO. 
5. Copy of receipts showing that amount deposited Note the period in which the money was raised. 
in bank account of the CBO[CDC]. Account It seems that the first deposit was not very 
number was 233 recent and it was before the report submitted on 
" 16-8-95-Rs. 9,000 deposited. 19-11-95. Rs. 9,450 were deposited in two days. 
" 27-11-95-Rs. 3,650 deposited. The CBO must be quite capable of raising the 
28-11-95-Rs. 5,800 deposited. money. It not clear from the documents that all 
the people participated or some wealthy person 
made the deposit or some loan was arranged. It 
is a good chance for community finance 
initiative, equivalent to the Public Finance 
8-12-95 Initiatives for the larger projects. 
Hand written letter, in local language, asking the Within 10 days of collection of money the letter 
Director CSPU to deposit the money in CSPU reached the CSPU. Transaction is in cheque. 
account with the cheque. The letter is signed by Treasurer is also involved in money matters. 
the treasurer, secretary and the chairperson of the CBO gave their share and request the CSPU to 
CBO. deposit their share in the bank account. 
Community demanded the share from the 
8-12-95 government. 
The assignment signed. Signatories were Director * CBO, NGO and CSPU were signatories. The 
CSPU, chairperson and secretary of CBO and same day as the money was deposited by CBO 
so. the assignment was signed. 
11-12-95 
Letter by CBO for 20 % mobilisation. The advance 0 Effectively within the three days the money was 
given against their contribution without the demanded back as the advance. A very 
guarantee. professional dealing by the community group. 
Communication is in writing. Bypassing the 
barrier of the guarantee for the advance. It is 
not the SO who provided the guarantee. But the 
money from the community is considered as the 
13-12-95 guarantee for the advance. 
Letter by CBO noting the changes in the design It shows that they are acting very 
with the cost impact. One item reduces from RS. professionally. Empowerment. Within the 
5 
39,150 to RS. 32,040 due to changes. days the variation notice was issued with the 
cost imoact. This triangulates with the 
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2-1-96 
First bill submitted under the covering letter of 
CBO signed by the chairperson, secretary and the 
treasurer. The bill recommended by Technical 
Officer of SO. Bill is based on item rate schedule. 
The bill amounted to IRS. 34,024.95. The bill had 
an abstract looked as if some forms were 
provided as they looked quite standard 
government bills. 
8-1-96 
The Engineer CSPU checked and forwarded to 
Deputy Director. 
9-1-96 
The Deputy Director recommended and 
forwarded to Director 
The Director approved and forward to finance. 
11-1-96 
The bill paid. 
6-1-96 
A letter by the CBO asking for the extension of 
time for ten days to the Director of CSPU. The 
reason for the extension given was non- 
availability of the concrete rings in case 
1-2-96 
The Director approved the extension. 
16-1-96 
A letter by CBO for another variation dated. 
22-1-96 
Second and final bill submitted under the covering 
letter of CBO signed by the chairperson, secretary 
and the treasurer. The bill recommended by 
Technical officer of SO. The bill amount to 
40590.75. 
30-1-96 
The Engineer CSPU checked and forwarded to 
Deputy Director. 
2-2-96 
The Deputy Director recommended and 
forwarded to Director. 
2-2-96 
The Director approved and forwarded to finance. 
7-2-96 
The bill paid. 
6. Minutes by the Deputy Director show that the 
quality was satisfactory. 
7. A summarv of the project was also provided. The 
experience of the CMG in India. The CBO acts 
in a very professional manner. Their dealings 
depict the power they had assumed. There may 
be some informal link with the official to fulfil the 
requirement of the procedures. 
Bill was raised within a month, 25 days. This 
also show that with less capital, the cash flow 
management is critical. CBO did manage for a 
month with the 20 percent mobilisation 
advance. 
The work of IRS. 34,024 was done in 25 days. 
This implied disbursement of Rs. 1,361 per day. 
CBO is buying the material as well. The 
contract is not only for the labour component. 
It was informed by officials that they provided 
the standard forms for the bill that are used by 
the government. They have used the 
government approved forms for bills and their 
rates. Six days taken by the engineer and one 
day by the Deputy Director, Director. Finance 
took 2 days. The time taken from the bill BEING 
submitted to payment is nine days. This is quite 
good as there is a margin of 14 days for 
payment as informed. Official informed that she 
used to take it by hand to the relevant offices. 
The implication is that, had the file not been 
taken by hand the bill would not have been paid 
so quickly. Can this be sustained in the case of 
large numbers of contracts and without 
personal efforts? 
Again business-like working of CBO- 
Community learns fast if supported. 
It took 26 days to give the extension of time for 
10 days. 
Note the variation for time in such a small scale 
job. 
For such a small job two bills were involved. 
CBO is depending on the cash flow 
management. 
9 Engineer took eight days to check. 
0 Director and Deputy Director took 3 days. 
Finance took 5 days for billing. 
Note the frequency of billing, seems to be good 
cash management. It took 16 days to clear the 
bill. The first took 9 days. The target was 14 
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information about the project is as follows 
" Estimated cost = IRS. 89,834 
" Contract cost = IRS. 89,834 
" Actual cost = IRS. 85,742 
" Contract time = 30 days 
" Actual time = 40 days. 
days. Is this increase in the process time for 
payment going to be a trend? 
Quality was in line with the other findings of the 
other community participated works. 
File 2 
1-3-96. 
" Similar project report as in example above. 
" Letter by CBO with cheque for their contribution 
" Assignment signed. 
4-1-96 
Letter by CBO for mobilisation advance. 
11-1-96 
Mobilisation advance given. 
15-1-96 
First bill amounted to IRS. 34,502.27. 
23-1-96 
The Engineer CSPU checked and forwarded to 
Deputy Director. 
23-1-96 
The Deputy Director recommended and 
forwarded to Director. 
23-1-96 
The Director approved and forwarded to finance. 
25-1-96 
The bill was paid. 
Three steps in one day. All the concerned 
parties are becoming conversant with the 
process. 
It is becoming routine to deposit the 20% and 
then ask for it back as the advance. 
Took seven days to get the mobilisation 
advance. 
The bill amount to around IRS. 30,000 and 
much of the work would have been handled by 
the advance. Good cash management. 
Engineer took 8 days to check. 
e Director and Deputy Director took one day. 
e Finance took two days. Bill paid in 10 days. 
26-1-96 
Second bill amounted to IRS. 17,185.35. 
1-2-96 
The Engineer CSPU checked and forwarded to 
Deputy Director. 
2-2-96 
The Deputy Director recommended and 
forwarded to Director. 
2-2-96 
The Director approved and forwarded to finance. 
6-2-96 
The bill paid. 
15-2-96 
Letter by CBO for extension of 16 days. 
21-2-96 
Approval given. 
20-2-96 
Third and final bill amounted to IRS. 65,425. 
26-2-96 
The Engineer CSPU checked and forwarded to 
Deputy Director. 
8-3-96 
The Director approved and forwarded to finance. 
8-3-96 
The bill was paid. 
0 Engineer took six days to check. 
s Deputy Director and Director took one day. 
Finance took four days. The over all process 
took eleven days. 
0 Regularisation of extension. 
Engineer took six days to check. Deputy 
Director and Director took eleven days. Finance 
paid the same day. In all, it took eleven days to 
clear the bill. 
For an amount of approximately Rs. 135,000 
three bills were submitted. This again shows 
sensible cash management. 
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8. Information related to the contract 
" Contract cost= Rs. 135,843 
" Actual cost = IRS. 133,105.25 
" Contract time = 40 days 
" Actual time = 56 days 
OUUJUU. IIILUIVIUWb dIlU UUL; UITIUF]Lb, IUf exarupie uata Dase entries I bb, W9,342,359,365. 
Text Box 6.21 Details of the contract among the three parties. NGO as the 
partial Consultant and partial Contractor. 
The following is based on the review of the agreement for community participated 
works. CSPU context. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The contract is in English. 0 The contract may have been 
translated later. 
2. The term used is'agreement for community assignment'. 0 This is a deliberate attempt to make 
it apparently different from a 
conventional contract and a NHDA 
community contract. 
3. Parties to the contract are mentioned along with the 0 Standard drafting practice. 
addresses. 
4. There are three parties in the contract, CSPU, CBO and SO. 0 Each signatory is representing the 
The CSPU is the first party, CBO is second and SO is third. organisations. This is not a personal 
contract. 
5. As an annexe the list of activities of the third party is included. 0 In short the Third party is to act as 
The activities included the identification of the staff of the an agent of the First party to control 
second party, supervision, assisting the community, acting as the second party. The lists of the 
guarantor, keeping in contact with CSPU to solve problems, activities are in such a form that it is 
preparation of proposal and, later on, entering in to the very hard to cost them. The 
agreement, providing technical advice on behalf of the first relationship between the first and 
party and 'other duties and functions'. the third party in only referred to 
here and is to be governed by 
another contract. One wonders 
what advantage is gained by writing 
an agreement with three parties? 
0 Two representatives signed on 
6. The President/Chairman, and the Treasurer are signatories behalf of the contractor. 
on behalf of the Community Development Council. The 
Director is signatory on behalf of CSPU 0 Standard practice. Involvement of 
7. There are spaces for two witnesses to sign. other people as well. 
0 Slightly more clauses than in the 
8. There are, in total, 19 clauses. NHDA contract for community 
contracting. 
0 Standard drafting practice. 
9. The name and addresses of the parties are mentioned. 
Reference is made to the project, community proposal and 
'assistance' of the third party. 0 Scope of the contact between the 
10. Clause 1- Obligations of first and second party, the first and the second party. 
remuneration for work and duration were mentioned. The 
clause relates to the remuneration for and completion of 
assignment by the second party. In this clause the 
relationship is between the first and the second party only. 
6.27 
The date of completion is also mentioned. 0 Inputs from the first party through 11. Clause 2-. There is a reference that, for billing, the third party the third party. The contract is will help the second party. Reference is again made to the 'measure and pay' in nature. community proposal. However, it is clarified that the payment 0 There is no mention whether the would be based on measurement. second party would be 12. Clause 3-Billing is to be done by the second party and the first compensated in terms of a fixed party is to pay 'within fortnight'. rate for delays in payments. 
0 The barrier is there. This could 
effect the cash flow of the small 13. Clause 4-Standard clause for the retention of security and contractors. 
release of it. 10% from the running bill but not exceeding 5% 
of the total. Fifty percent of security to be released upon 0 This may be against the spirit of the construction completion. three party contract. The 14. Clause 5- There is a reference to the other contract for arrangement is similar to that of 
payment of services to the third party by the first party. There conventional contracting with the is no mention of such payments in this contract. NGO as Engineer. 
0 This is quite adventurous as in none 
of the previous small scale 15. Clause 6-Provides mechanisms for price escalation. The contracts was this facility provided. 
price escalation is qualified by 'exceeding 5%'. The reference This could be taken as influence of date is the date of contract signature and the evidence ICTAID and international practices. 
required are that of the receipts for the materials. It is implied The evidence required is receipts 
that the labour escalation is not covered. and not the official gazette as 
required in large scale contracts. 
The question could be the 
acceptability of receipts. Would any 
retail receipt be valid of only those 
of government stores/corporations. 
So far no claims have arisen in this 
regard. 
0 Options included the bond from 
assurance and arrangement from 
16. Clause 7- The 20% advance payment could be made against; NGO on behalf of the CBO. Later 
a security bond from commercial bank, insurance agency or on it was informed by NGO 
similar security bonds provided through the third party on representative that arranging such 
behalf of the second party. bonds are beyond their capacity. 
This shows that the requirements of 
the contracts need to be in line with 
the existing capacity of the parties 
and not one wishes them to be. 
17. Clause 8- Recovery of the advance is made in instalments 0 Gradual recovery would help the 
starting when 30% of the work cost is complete. But the constructor in cash flow 
recovery to be completed before 90% of the work is complete. management. It is a sort of interest 
18. Clause 9 &10- Maintenance period is mentioned and the free loan to the contractor. 
obligations of the first party. No involvement of the third party. 0 There is no description as to the 
It is mentioned that 2.5% of the retained security, would be kind of maintenance or rectification 
released at the end of the period. However, if the second required. 
party defaulted in not fulfilling the requirement then the first 0 This could be seen as a redundant 
party may get the fault rectified at the expense of the second clause and a barrier if actually 
party. The criterion to be fulfilled is the 'satisfaction of the first imposed. It seems that the NHDA 
party'. practice of putting a clause and not 
intending to practise it is followed 
19. Clause 11&12-The clock starts from the letter of acceptance here. 
and the work to be completed in the time prescribed. In case 0 Similar to NHDA project 
the second party could not get the extension to the contract organisation with an addition of the 
the first party could impose the liquidated damages on the NGO to be formed by the contract. 
second party at the prescribed rate. The limit of the damages 
is 5% of the total value. 
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20. Clause 13-Described the project organisation. The 
construction sub-committee to be formed with members from 
CSPU, CBO AND SO. Technical advice to be provided by the 
first party. The option is to provide such advice through the 
third party. 
21. Clause 14-Appropriate insurance covers to be provided by 
the second party. The cost of insurance is to be reimbursed 
by the first party. The first and the third party to be fully 
indemnified. 
22. Clause 15-The second party is to maintain transparency. 
They are held responsible to consult the community by this 
clause of the contract. 
23. Clause 16- the second party is responsible to 'duly maintain 
daily accounts, inventories, stock books, attendance registers 
and reports'. These would be accessible to the first party. 
24. Clause 17- Termination of the contract could be made with 
the 'consent of all the three parties' or in case of breach by 
the second party, the first party could terminate the contract 
and pay for the work completed 'only'. 
25. Clause 18- In case of disagreement the in the interpretation of 
the contract, the Secretary of the Ministry would be the final 
authority. 
26. Clause 19- ICTAD conditions are to be inferred where 'this 
agreement is silent' 
The cost is ultimately borne by the 
client. The risk is transferred to the 
insurance by the first party. No 
much detail is provided regarding 
the kind of insurance. 
There is a difference implied 
between the community and the 
CBO. It is a contractual obligation of 
the CBO to consult the community. 
The importance of transparency 
and accountability. The form of 
consultation for examples number 
of meetings or the desired result for 
example participation is not 
specified. It would be very hard to 
monitor where the contractor met 
the requirement or not. 
41 The power rests with the first party 
or all the parties to terminate. 
No provision for in dependent 
arbitration or conciliation. 
The condition to be read in 
conjunction of the ICTAD conditions 
of contract. These are a two party 
contract. It is made unnecessarily 
complicated by defining the SO as a 
party to the contract and using the 
framework of two party contract. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries itsi, i t6, 
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Text Box 6.22 The contract used in the departmental works of SKAA in Zia- 
ul-Haq Colony in Karachi, Pakistan. 
An example of a simple contract. 
The following is based on the review of the contract between MR Behram and the 
Executive Engineer, SKAA. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The name of the person is mentioned with the name of the e Some formality is introduced. 
father and the national identity number. 
2. The paper is plain. There is no stamp paper. 
3. The contract is hand-written and in local language. 0 The contract is like a simple 
memorandum of understanding. 
4. The scope of work is mentioned; excavation, laying of pipe, 0 No separate conditions or 
jointing and testing. specifications were provided or 
referred to. 
5. The rates were in 'per running foot'. 0 Use of item rates. 
6. There are separate rates for valves and bends. 
7. The payments would be in stages. The stages related to the The payment is related to the 
percentage of the work completed. A fixed payment, in this physical progress benchmarks. 
case IRS. 7,000, is mentioned when a quarter of the work is 
completed. Importance of the testing. Now it is 
8. A separate item is mentioned for the testing. a separate line item. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entry 46. 
Text Box 6.23 The contract used in the FAUP lane sewer projects. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. This particular agreement is typical of 0 This contrasts with the 'stamp papers' used in India 
several used. and Sri Lanka. 
2. The date of contract is 29-11-94; it is 0 It is more like a mutual understanding between 
written on plain paper. different individuals. 
3. The implementation committee is 0 No standard wordings or structure was used. 
responsible for supervision of the work. However, there is a close similarity among the 
The responsibility of 'running the project' agreements used with regards to the issues 
rests with the PMU social organiser and discussed. 
one other member of the committee. There seems to be a very flexible atmosphere in the 
4. The signatures were made without signing of the agreement. The message is quite clear 
mentioning designations. that it is not intended to be used in the court of law. 
5. The national identification of the It is not clear who are the parties to the contract; 
signatories was mentioned. neither are the procedural steps of 'offer' and 
6. Stamp of FAUP is on both pages. 'acceptance' clear. 
7. Out of six names mentioned as the There is overlapping responsibility with the PMU sub- 
neighbourhood committee only three engineer, who in the eyes of the government would 
signatures were there. There was no appear to retain responsibility. 
signature against the names of the There was no mention about the duration of the 
'supervisory committee'. project. 
8. The signatures are generally not dated. There is no clarity in the 'agreement' on what is to be 
done and for how much. It does describe what the 
different groups of people are supposed to do. 
It is not clear whether the agreement is supposed to 
serve any managerial purpose. 
Source: Interviews and documents, Tor exampie aata Dase entries oz, -i i /-, i io, zoo, t- 
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Text Box 6.24 Modified process of using conventional contractors with NGO 
as consultants. 
OPP is the name of the NGO and SKAA is the local authority. Community as an 
agent of the NGO involved in supervision. The context of SKAA procuring 
external works through routine procedure. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. Plans are given to OPP for verifying the existing situation. 0 Involvement of NGO. As the official 
records may be out of date or not 
even existing as the areas were not 
regularised. 
2. OPP involves students to do the identification. They are paid 0 This makes them competitive and 
daily stipends. provides a good link with the 
academic institutes. 
0 Is this because of OPP's speciality 
3. OPP talks to community to get the input from them as to the in the field or the genuine need? But 
most critical needs of the community. Usually the outcome is the process of consultation with the 
water and sanitation. Mainly sewerage. community is done by the NGO. 
This is even in the areas where they 
are not based. 
0 Role of NGO as that of the 
4. OPP then talks to SKAA and makes estimates for the external consultant in collaboration with the 
works. in-house technical persons.? Are 
they as much professionally liable 
as a conventional consultant would 
be? 
5. SKAA technically verifies the designs and estimates. Does that mean that the liability 
6. Appropriate design strategy is adopted to lower the cost in transfers to the department? 
terms of depth, thickness of the manhole etc. Deviation from the standard 
specifications. Is this 
institutionalised? 
Tender is then invited for the external works. 7 0 Conventional tendering procedure is . 8. Open competition apparently. Reasonableness and used. 
workability of rates are checked by the officials. 0 No deviation from the estimation 
9. Public Health Engineering Department's schedule of rates is practice. 
used for estimation. 0 Joint effort. 
SKAA, and OPP go contractor the Before starting the work 10 * This may create the sense of , , , . to the community. The contractor is introduced. Drawings and ownership and may urge them to 
plans are posted on walls in Urdu (local language). The look after the work. 
community is told that the work is being done using their own 
money. 
1 1. The supervision is jointly done by SKAA, OPP, and the 4, Partnering in supervision. 
Community. 
12. The work is tested and, if required, dismantled to force the 
contractor to achieve the required standards of workmanship. 
AA -7 ^^A n^A 
source: interviews ana ciocumenTs, Tor example- UdLd Udbt:: I-, [ ILI 1=1 %) 1, OV, -tV, I V, 4. -r I, If-NJ 1, L. %O 1, 
250. 
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Text Box 6.25 Modified process of Departmental works in SKAA with NGO 
as consultants. 
OPP is the name of the NGO and SKAA is the local authority. Community acts as 
an agent of the NGO in supervising the works. In some cases they also act as 
contractor. 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 1. Departmental work is used for the procurement 0 An alternative to the competitive 
2. The estimation is made on the basis of market rates by the bidding. 
SKAA using rates jointly developed by SKAA and OPP. 0 This is a deviation as the rates used 
are not the government approved 
schedule rates. 
3. The language of the items has been simplified. 0 The line items in the B. O. Q have 
been simplified. 
4. The petty contractors are consulted by SKAA for the * The rates were developed using 
estimation of rates. After consultation the rates are fixed. consultation of the contractor as 
well. Negotiation started. 
5. The work is identified in consultation with the community and 0 Plans are made with the 
the NGO. The scope is restricted to the external works. concurrence of the community. 
6. A plan is made. After this, either the Department or OPP 0 Close working of NGO and 
makes a plan and exchanges with each the other party. department. 
7. Estimates are prepared in consultation with the NGO. The 0 Estimates are approved by the 
NGO checks the design and estimates. NGO. Role of the NGO as 
consultant. Empowerment of NGO 
in public sector. 
A note sheet is prepared by the Executive Engineer writing 8 0 'Note sheet' is the tool of . that the identification was done, estimates were prepared, communication between the 
and NGO was consulted and asked for the approval. The officials. 
money was requested as an advance. The note was send to 
G through DKFO. D 0 The movement of the project file. . 9. The D. G. approved. The D. G approves. This is a 
10. The file then goes to the Director of Finance. safeguard. 
1 1. The Director of Finance then provides the money asked for as 
an advance. The departmental work can not proceed without 0 Finance provides money as an 
the money. advance to the Executive Engineer. 
There is a critical need of advance 
money in the departmental work. In 
this way the payment is made 
before the work is done. This is 
unlike the contracting system where 
the work is done before the 
payment is made. However, the 
advance is internal. But for all the 
further disbursements the Engineer 
is responsible. 
Then officials and the NGO go to the community and ask if they Community was given the option 
to 
know someone in the community who could do the work. If do the work themselves or 
to 
there is no one then they find some petty contractors who arrange the contractor. 
Role of 
could do the work. Officials then negotiate the work and community contractor as partial 
explain the scope to the contractor. contractor and partial consultant or 
management contractor. 
14. In the agreement the mode of payment to the contractor is Personal verbal communication 
is 
mentioned. For example after one third or one fourth of work important. Negotiation 
is the method 
is complete, corresponding payment is made. The payment is used. 
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made in stages. * Payment is an important topic to be 15. The material is supplied by the department. The material is included in the contract. delivered to site. 
16. The payment for the material is made through the bank draft. 
17. Once the material reached the site, the contractor starts the 
work. 
18. After the work is completed and tested the final payment is 
made to the contractor. 
Procuring material is a departmental 
responsibility. This may cause 
problems in the co-ordination. This 
may also involve costs in terms of 
time and money to the people. This 
in effect is labour-only contract. 
The payment to the manufacturer is 
through the bank draft. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 37,39,40,46,78,247,261, 
291,250. 
Text Box 6.26 Opinion on performance of the Departmental work in SKAA. 
The following is based on an account of an official. The official was quite critical 
about the legality of the new process but admits the benefits as well. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The work done through direct labour is 30% cheaper than that The contractor's profit was in-built in 
of contracting. 20% is the contractor profit as no agency will the rates. 
do work on less than 20% margin as they can get 10-16 % by What is the cost of extra tasks that 
putting capital in the banks. Our rates of schedules are also the client is performing now? What 
made in such a way, with some less and some more, that the functions were performed by the 
contractor can save some money. contractor to justify the profits The 
capacity of the client is also to be 
considered. How much concurrent 
work can the department handle 
whilst ensuring the high standards 
of departmental works? 
2. One factor is that the cost is lower and the other is that the Departmental work is superior in 
time is less. When we give work to the contractor we keep time and cost performance. 
some margin to allow for as for the delay of payments, 
shortage of materials etc. For example, for the work of one 
month we keep one month margin. Even then the, _contractor 
The contractors take three times the 
takes three instead of two months. Time estimates are not[in estimated time. This linked the 
departmental work] made but we can judge that the work[for quantitative data. 
example] of one month is completed in less than one month. No formal time period is given in the 
departmental work. 
3. The third factor is quality. Our quality is better than the Even quality is also superior. 
contractor. The reason is that if we are not there the Conventional contractors need full 
contractor can do something[cheating]. We can not be there policing as they are not trust- 
for twenty four hours. We depute people but they can go for worthy. The people who do the 
drinking tea and they can also do some cheating. The other policing cannot be there all the time 
thing is that not all our people are angels, if contractor offers and some time deals could be 
tea then some will accept. Now here[departmental made. 
works]when we are supplying the materials the petty The incentives or the benefits of 
contractor do not have any incentive to steal materials There cheating are controlled in the 
is no benefit to the petty contractor. departmental works. 
4. The other thing is that we have to stand there too as that is Sense of ownership of the work in 
our own work. Our visits are more frequent and OPP also the Government officials. This is no 
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comes. But the most important factor is the presence of 
community. Since the contractors were provided by the 
community, they[community] tell them[contractor] that it is 
their work and money, so it must be done correctly. 
0 
5. In the other case[conventional contracting] the contractor 
does not let the community go near the work. 
6. The local people are not only satisfied with the work but are 
very happy. The community thinks that the work is very good, 
it is according to their wishes and has been done after their 
consent. In other departments if someone[community] asks 
what is happening[work] the officials will not tell 
them[community]. They will say 'jao jao apna kam karo 
(Urdu)- 'Go away and do your work'. 
7. The petty contractors used so far are very small businesses 
which could not get the enlistment in the department 
otherwise[in normal enlistment]. The petty contractors do not 
receive cheques. 
8. They1contractor] say that they want cash. They do not have a 
bank account. They do not have any letter head. The 
agreement is made on simple paper[typical conditions of 
small contractor]. They can not even sign their name properly. 
They can not read or write. They write their name in Urdu [like 
a child-showed shaky signature]. They ask somebody to read 
it for them and then they sign the agreement. 
0 
0 
longer the contractor's work. More 
supervision time. But here the 
nature of supervision is different. 
Here they are supervising their own 
work as compared to the 
contractor's work. 
NGO is also present but the critical 
factor is that of the end user and the 
sense of the ownership. Even if the 
community is not doing the work 
they own it as they provided or 
participated in the procurement 
process. The contractors also know 
that the community has power as it 
is through them that the contractor 
was hired. Though the money is not 
going to the community directly the 
role of consultant has empowered 
them. 
In conventional contracting the 
community does not have any 
power, even to 'go near the work'. 
Access is denied. 
End user satisfaction. 
In the conventional setting even the 
information is not shared with the 
community, telling them that the 
work does not belong to the 
community. 
Through departmental works the 
access of the non-registered and 
non-enlisted contractors is possible. 
The contractors do not have a bank 
account. The payment is made in 
the cash. They do not have the 
normal formal communication. The 
communication is personal. 
They can barely sign their name. 
The factor of literacy is important. 
Again the personal verbal 
communication is important. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries ; 31,3U, 4U, tb, Z4t, M1, ZOO, 
269,291,250. 
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6.2.3 Text boxes 
procurement. 
tracing the assimilation of community participated 
Text Box 6.27 How and why the versatile Community development council 
was created. This story narrated by the official involved in the process for 
the last 17 years. 
The following is based on the account of Chief Medical Officer Colombo 
Municipal Council which triangulated with other sources. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. In 1979, Community Development Councils were introduced The organisation lasted for 
by Colombo Municipal Council. Earlier there were no approximately 17 years. The 
community organisations in the slums and shanties. community organisations started by 
the support of the municipality and 
the donors. 
2. Most of the shanties garden belongs to the private owners. Assets belonged to private 
3. Through the Housing Ceiling Act in 1974, most of the houses individuals. 
were acquired by the government and handed over to the 
residents. 
4. With the Housing Ceiling Act the houses belong to the Houses were nationalised and given 
residents but the common area and common facilities did not to the residents. 
belong to them. These are owned by the National Housing Issue of ownership of the common 
Development Authority or Urban Development Authority areas. 
(UDA) 0A set-up was created to provided 
5. . During that time the government suggested a new set-up, the facilities to the slum people. 
called Common Amenities Board. CIVIC was not used. 
6. The facilities were provided but it was not owned by the Though the facilities were provided 
municipality. It was assumed that the people would take care it was not maintained as it was not 
of the common amenities but they did not. owned by the municipality and the 
community did not have the 
organisation to do the maintenance. 
It is not a new realisation that the 
7. The government realised that it is useless to provide these community needs organisation. The 
types of facilities to slum people without community organisation to be purpose specific 
organisation. and not just for the sake of it. In this 
case it is taking care of the 
infrastructure. 
" Donor with the municipal agency. A 
8. An initiative was taken with a donor agency to organise and direct link with the municipalities 
improve the conditions of the slum people. Then we was used during that time. 
organised the people and that organisation we called the 
Community Development Council. In 1979 we formed the first 
community development council. 
" The emphasis of the first, perhaps, 
9. 'The first phase of the UNICEF assisted project was called was on slums, in the second phase 
Environmental and Community Development Project[on the emphasis was on shanties. 
slums]. It started in 1979 and ended in 1983. Then second 
phase, 1984-1988, in which we gave concern to the 
conditions of shanties in particular then slum people. Then we 
organised the shanty people to form the Community 
Development Council. The third phase of UNICEF project 
was from 1989 to 1994 and now they are, little-by-little, 
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withdrawing. Now their main concern is outside the Colombo 
like Galle, Kandy. 
In those days it was very difficult to organise as the people 
were not willing to organise. Even the other people like the 
local leaders and the politician did not know and we faced so 
many difficulties to mobilise the communities. Now people 
themselves suggest us to register their organisation. 
Implying that now it is easier. 
Pioneering work is difficult but 
gradually it became easier. 
bource: interviews ana clocuments, Tor example data base entries 346,353. 
Text Box 6.28 How the CDC gets registered, What is the process of 
registering CDCs in CMC?. What is the legal status of the CDC? 
People are capable of fulfilling the procedural requirements if they are made 
accessible and simple for them. 
Narrative Commentary 
_ 1. Grass root officers of the health department of CIVIC visit the 
community and mobilise and community and decide the day 
and the time for the formation of the Community Development 
Council. It is a democratic process. The 
2. The officer visited and we allowed the community to elect leaders are not imposed. Presence 
their leaders on the same day. People elect their office of the CIVIC at the time of election. 
bearers and a small report is prepared. The report is basically Importance of base data. The 
base data of the area including the number of households, accumulation of such data could be 
existing facilities, and problems. as asset in the long term for any 
programme. 
3. Along with the report there are few forms to be filled in by the Officers deputed to the area help to 
officers in consultation with the community. fulfil the procedural requirement. 
Documentation is handled by the 
officer with the help of the 
community. Documents are 
functional and simple. 
4. The Medical Officer of Health, Assistant Chief Health Officer Involvement of many people in an 
and the newly elected Chairperson and the particular Health open environment. Transparency. 
Inspector sign the forms and bring them to the Chief Medical 
Health Officer with the report. 
5. The documents are checked and, if found adequate, the CDC 
is registered. A register is maintained in the office and on 
completion of the process the name of the CDC in entered in 
the register The concerned parties are informed 
6. . Letter posted to the secretary [of CDC] and copies to the area about the formation of any new 
MOs[medical officers]. CDC. 
7. Legal status of the CDCs 
Municipal by-law. 
8 A bylaw is passed to cover the CDC. Use of constitution similar to that . 9. A constitution is developed with the consultation of the CDC used in registration of companies or 
office bearers. societies. Increasing normalisation 
10 . District representatives of 
the CDC are sought in preparation after 17 years of less formal 
of constitution. For example there may be 100 CDCs in a practises and experience. 
particular district. So those 100 CDC leaders elect one leader. 
While preparing the constitution, we involved the six leaders 
as there are six districts in Colombo. There is a range of degrees of legal 
L' 1 . The constitution was passed 
by the Mayor at the Housing and status, ranging from the registration 
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Community Development Council meeting[HCDC]. The 
constitution was passed by the Mayor and the members of 
the meeting. They have some legal status and they are not 
registered outside here. 
made under companies act or co- 
operative societies act to people 
acting in personal capacities. The 
registration under some national act 
is perceived to be 'more legal' as 
compared to registration under 
municipal by-laws. 
CDCs are not outside the legal 
boundary. Their registration is 
under municipal by-laws. Outside 
municipal legal boundary they may 
not be as strong an existence. 
c, uuiuu- mwiviuw. 5 anu ciacurnems, Tor exampie ciata uase entries 155,346,353. 
Text Box 6.29 Treasury Circulars relating to Community-based works 
Based on a review of the following sources. 
Treasury circular letter No. Finance 227 dated 1984. 
Treasury circular letter No. Finance 255 dated 1988. 
Treasury circular letter No. Finance 322 dated 1993. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The subject of the correspondence is the award of small scale 0 The circulars were signed by the 
contracts to: Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, 
" rural development societies and Gramodaya mandalayas who is a very senior civil servant. 
" Rural development societies and similar societies 0 Provisions are made to enter into 
" approved societies contracts with legally approved 
2. The government had also approved some societies to societies. 
undertake work; examples are School Development Boards 
(up to RS 1 million) and youth clubs affiliated with Youth 
Services Councils (up to RS 37,500) 
3. The scope of 'approved societies' has been broadened in 
practice by the use of the terms 'rural development societies 
and similar societies'. 
4. An exemption is granted to approved societies, which can 0 This is a crucially important waiver 
award small scale construction work on a negotiated basis offered to approved societies 
without resorting to public tender procedures. 
5. The Committee on Public Accounts noted that in order to 0 This emphasises that the use of 
enable approved societies to take on as much as possible, public money is open to scrutiny, 
major jobs had been split into smaller parcels in order not to and that there are 'watchdogs' 
exceed the upper financial limit. The Ministry communicated whose duty it is to draw attention to 
its concern on this matter. procedural irregularity of any sort. 
6. The approved societies must 'provide all necessary The underlying assumption is that 
superintendence during execution'. 'unpackaging' of contracts is not 
7. The numbers of contracts per society are restricted to 5 and appropriate; conventional wisdom is 
the total expenditure to RS 750,000. that there are economies in 
8. There is a strong emphasis of reporting on the physical and procurement if the opposite occurs, 
financial targets of the works. i. e. packaging of many small 
contracts into one larger one 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 184,190,191,193,24,241. 
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Text Box 6.30 Treasury Circulars relating to Community-based works 
Based on a review of the following source. 
Treasury circular letter No. Finance 345 dated 1996. 
In 1996 the financial regulations were revised. This is to be read in continuations 
of the Figure 6.17. 
This box along with the Figure 6.17 show how the community contacting was 
expanded and institutionalised. 
Narrative 
1. The subject of the correspondence is the award of small scale 
contracts to: 
" approved societies 
" The government had approved some societies to undertake 
work; 
" Registered with Samurdhi. 
" Multi-purpose co-operative societies. 
" Co-operative labour societies. 
" Rural development societies. 
" Former organisations in major irrigation schemes 
2. An exemption is granted to approved societies, which can 
award small scale construction work on a negotiated basis 
without resorting to public tender procedures. 
3. Number of contracts is restricted to four per society and the 
total cost is 1.0 Million rupees. 
Commenta 
The circular was signed by the 
Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, 
as before. 
Provisions are made to enter into 
contracts with legally approved 
societies. Samurdhi is present 
government programme. A degree 
of interpretation is left for the 
practitioners to exercise. 
The crucial waiver offered to 
approved societies is maintained. 
0 
4. The work is not awarded to the society for works 'outside the 
area of authority'. 'Where the area of authority is not defined 
the Divisional Secretary of area should be regarded'. 
5. 'Concession .... does not dispense with the requirement of the 
executing agencies having to enter into a formal contract'. 
6. 'Undertaking of negotiated contracts ..... does not debar any 
approved societies from tendering for other projects' 
The confidence in the societies has 
increased. Previously the limit was 
750,000 rupees. 
Note that the society is not 
restricted to the locality where it 
exists. In some cases it may be the 
whole division. The societies are not 
restricted to the slums and poor 
areas but they act in a defined 
jurisdiction. 
Importance of entering into a formal 
contract. 
There is a difference in how the 
contractor is selected, here by 
negotiation, and the way the 
contract is formed, here it remains a 
formal contract. 
This effectively permits the societies 
becoming the conventional 
contractors. On the other hand the 
conventional contractors may also 
get the society approved and get 
the work without tendering. There is 
no mention that the provisions are 
only for poor areas. Negotiated 
contracts with the approved 
societies are supported by the 
circular. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 184,190,191,193. 
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Text Box 6.31 Assimilation process of the initiatives. 
Based on a review of the following source; 
Letter from Ministry of Finance to Secretary Ministry of Housing, construction and 
Public Utilities dated 21-6-95. 
Joint letter from Ministry of Housing, construction and Public Utilities to NHDA, 
ICTAD, Director of Buildings and National water supply and Drainage Board 
(NWS & DB) dated 26-6-95. 
Letter from Secretary Ministry of Housing construction and Public Utilities to 
Ministry of Finance dated 6-7-95. 
_Narrative 
Commentary 
1. A large scale enquiry by the treasury was held to 'review the The enquiries could be seen as 
entire system[negotiated contracts to the societies]' The positive. The Government is not 
concern was; seeking to abandon the practice but 
" 'the public funds are squandered by the interested parties'. to overcome its shortcomings. The 
" Lack of transparency concerns are quite standard. 
2. The suggestions from all the authorities who have used the The will is there from the top to 
system were asked for: assimilate the on going process but 
The upper value of the limit of contracts to mould it in to a shape which fits 
Type of suitable work. the Public Processes. 
Defining the capability of the societies. 
3. NHDA rebuttal was based on; 
" The system is effective in utilisation of local and foreign funds. 0 Better performance as defence. 
" The community contract is a key tool for community 0 Mean to the wider objectives. This 
participation. is not available in the conventional 
" The system was acclaimed internationally. contracting option. 
0 Good reputation is used as a 
" The system has been audited and 'have not revealed any defence. 
adverse comments'. 0 Getting the initiatives audited may 
" The benefits are; speed, quality, user satisfaction and the turn out to be an advantage. 
'benefits of profits being passed to the user communities'. The 0 Clear understanding of the benefits 
shorter delivery time was also emphasised. of the system. It is not only the 
construction time but the time 
including the preparation time for 
4. The proposed action to improve the situation is to register the the contract that is to be counted. 
societies taking into consideration their capability. 0 Capacity of the community is an 
important consideration. Mechanism 
is required to evaluate the 
5. A committee of technical and administrative staff was community capacity. 
appointed to recommend to the Divisional Secretary the 0 Equivalent to the registration of the 
societies to be enlisted. contractors. 
6. The list of the registered societies is to be made available to 0 There is no need to do the 
all the Government institutions. enlistment by each institution. 
Societies could undertake the work 
from more than one institution. 
Source: Interviews and documents, tor example data base entries 164,1 W, -1 ýVi, -1 VO, . 300. 
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Text Box 6.32 Audit observation on the community contracts and replies. 
Based on the audited files, audit observations and conversation with GM NHDA. 
Note it is the Engineering services, who were not considered to be in favour of 
the community contracting, who justified the actions before the auditors' 
meticulous scrutiny. The auditors were reasonable and in principle accepted the 
use of the system. There were no objection to the use of negotiations and non- 
registered contractors as the backing of the financial circulars was available. 
Narrative Commentary 
1. The community contracts have been audited. Passing the audit is one of the 
difficult but crucial step for the 
innovation to be assimilated in the 
mainstream process of 
procurement. 
2. The auditors were informally told by the previous * The auditors were avoided as they 
Govern ment[Du ring 1986-1989] not to audit. were considered as an opponent 
not as a helper. 
3. There are two kinds of audits. One is the internal audit and 0 The contracts are not only internally 
the other is the government audit. The files reviewed were audited but by the government 
audited by the government auditors. auditors as well. 
4. GM mentioned that the main cause of many observations 
related to the community contracts is the misconception and The main defence was to make the 
wrong ideology of the auditors that the 'community contracts community contractor 
are also a conventional contractor'. 'They do not realise that distinguishable from the 
the objective of the community contracts is to make the conventional contractors. 
community act together for their betterment'. Community contracting as 
explained to the auditor is for the 
wider objective of the development 
and that they should not be treated 
as conventional contracts. The line 
of defence worked. The auditors are 
reasonable if the communication is 
open and relations good. 
Issue of authorisation of the 
The issues raised by the auditors are as follows. contract. The letter of award is the 
5. The work starts before signing the contract. authority for the work to start. 
Thrust of reply 
The signing of contract requires procedure to be followed like 
signing by the G. M, that take time. Since the award letter was Recourse to the objective of the 
given the signing of the contract was only a formality. community works. They are 
different from the conventional 
6. Excessive delays and the liquidated damages not charged contractors and no use of liquidated 
Thrust of reply. damages in such situations. 
The 
Community contact is not to victimise the community. The clause of the liquidated damages, 
if 
community contractors are weak financially and the liquidated removed, could have avoided 
the 
damages will not serve the objective of the community objection but changing 
the 
contacting, which is to strengthen the community for their conditions may have raised more 
betterment. Furthermore, they are different from the objections as compared to justifying 
commercial contractors as they are basically non-profit the actions within the conditions. 
I making. I Time performance related. 
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It is quite debatable whether in fact 
the community contractors are 
different from the commercial 
contractors and why should they 
be? 
7. In Kirulapure the work is being going on FOR the last 2 years. 
Why were no actions taken? 
Thrust of reply. 
There are some practical reasons for the delays. The main 
thing is the capability of the community. The community is still 
motivated and working and any action against them would be 
to de-motivate them. 
8. Delay in submission of the insurance certificate. 
Thrust of reply. 
The work was started only when the certificate was received. 
9. In timber shed, the specification was not clear in the B. O. Q. 
Thrust of reply. 
The specifications were for the temporary structures and they 
were clarified at the site. 
10. Award letter given on 9-5-94 and the agreement signed on a 
later date. No insurance provided. 
Thrust of reply. 
The community is about 50 Km away from office and after the 
award letter they went back and came after completion of the 
work. There was no reason to ask for insurance. 
11. Final payment exceeds the contract value. 
Thrust of reply 
The contract is based on measurement and pay. The 
variations were under the reasonable limits. 
12. GM also mentioned that there were no allegations of fraud 
and nepotism. However, he mentioned in some remote areas 
the contractor, local administration and local politicians joined 
together to channel government money into their own 
pockets. 
Capacity of the community. 
Towards the open ended contracts, 
process oriented. 
*Insurance was provided before 
work started. 
Related to the clarification of the 
specification. 
The work was completed before the 
contract was signed and they came 
after finishing the work. No risk to 
cover hence no insurance. 
Variations within the limits and 
justified. 
No objection on the cost escalation 
and the quality. The time 
performance was noticeably bad. 
No allegation on the accountability 
and transparency issues. 
Some allegations of misuse of 
money but in general the whole 
affair was cleared by the audit. 
Source: Interviews and documents, for example data base entries 184,188,189,190,191,193, 
355,358. 
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6.3 Extemal Validation of the direction of findings. 
As has been described in chapter three that external validation of the findings 
was sought from the expert panels of officials. Text box 6.33 presents the 
outcome of the focus group discussion in relation to the procurement process. 
Text Box 6.33 Outcome of the focused group discussion 
Summary of the framework for the procurement procedure to promote the 
community role in the procurement of urban infrastructure. 
Narrative 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
The role of the community could be that of 
contractor. It could also be partial or full client, 
Engineer or contractor. There could be a 
combination of the roles. 
Clearly define the role, responsibilities and tasks 
of stakeholders. 
Widen the objectives of procurement. Emphasise 
the factors like sustainable development. 
The factors of transparency and accountability are 
of prime importance. 
Clear guidelines to the officials to be provided in 
terms of the contractual, account and financial 
rules and codes for community-partnered 
approaches. 
A certain quota of work related to the 
infrastructure can be reserved for the community 
groups. The quota could be 10-20 % of the 
number of contracts awarded in a year. 
Other stakeholders like CBO, NGO and Politicians 
are also important and may be recognised in the 
process. 
8. No need for pre qualification 
9. Item-rate or percentage rate contract to be 
continued. 
10. Procurement process to be in local language. The 
tendering document and the conditions of contract 
to be in local language. 
11. Legislation to enlist the community groups as the 
contractor. 
12-Community groups are to be registered in the 
registrar's office. They should work through the 
elected body and should have the bye laws. Each 
slum should have one community group. Officials 
deal with authorised representatives only. 
13. Enlistment of community should be made on 
appropriate and flexible terms. 
Commentary 
e Roles of community could be many. 
" Implication is that the roles and responsibilities 
of the stakeholders in community-partnered 
approaches are not clearly defined. 
" Wider consideration than that of time, cost and 
quality. 
" Money belongs to public. 
An authenticated procedure so that the 
individuals are not blamed for irregularities. 
Like that of the Engineers' Co-operatives and 
Labour Co-operatives in India. Societies 
provide popular hinges for innovations. 
Realisation of other stakeholders in the 
community-partnered approach. 
Pre-qualification is perceived to be a barrier and 
redundant in the situation under consideration. 
Preference for the on-going practices. 
Language that the contractors can understand 
easily to be used. 
o Legislative backup is required. 
Some kind of formal registration is considered 
useful. Well-defined contact point with the 
community is important. 
The enlistment of the community contractors 
may be on a different basis. The factors 
considered for the enlistment needs changing. 
The idea of enlistment is considered useful. 
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Positive actions as compared to the negative 
ones like threat of penalties. 
14. Incentives to be provided for the early and timely 
completion of the project. Bonus to be considered 
for better performance. 
15. Incentive for the officials and the required logistic 
work-force supports to be provided. 
16. Micro contracts are suitable for the community 
groups. If they are successful then the Minor 
Works could be given to them. 
17. Community group capacity to be assessed on the 
following factors: 
" availability of the skilled labours. 
" occupation of the community. 
" greediness of the community. 
" integrity among the community. 
" managerial capacity of the community. 
" Financial status of the community. 
" Behaviour of the community. 
18. Conventional contractors may be used as trainers 
if community is the sub-contractor. 
Stakes of officials are also important. Some 
forms of incentives are to be provided to 
officials to undertake such works. 
The use of community is to be gradual. If they 
are successful in a particular size of work only 
then may they be given work of larger size. 
Risk management. 
Capacity evaluation of the community is 
important. It is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a successful 
procurement to give the work to community 
without consideration of the capacity of the 
community. 
It is not the intent to demolish the conventional 
contractors. Their role could be utilised in 
favour of small contractors. One such role is 
that of trainer. On-the-job training from the 
people who are in the field. 
e Role of community as Engineer. 
19. Community to monitor the works. 
20. Technical Support to community is important. 
21. Sub-contracting may be allowed through the 
community. 
22. Negotiation, on the basis of market competitive 
rates, is the mechanism to select the contractor. 
23. Discussion and negotiation are the main tools as 
the recourse to the legal route will not be 
appropriate. Legality is to be used as the last 
resort. 
24. Regular meetings between the officials and the 
community groups and the related parties like 
trade unions. 
25. Delegation of powers is important to run such 
contracts. 
26. Attitudes and perceptions of the stakeholders are 
important and will need adjustment as the practice 
community partnered approaches develops. 
27. Earnest money is not required from the 
community groups if they are bidding. 
Importance of technical support to the 
community. It is not mentioned that the support 
is to be from the Government. Implications are 
that this could be from other stakeholders like 
NGO or CBO as the case may be. 
Role of community could be that of Managers 
as well as partial Engineer and partial Client. 
Use of multiple basis of pricing the work. 
Negotiation as compared to routine tendering. 
Value for money could be achieved by 
negotiations as well. 
Private ordering of the contract as compared to 
the court ordering. Emphasis is not on the 
potential legal actions. Similar to the concept of 
'self-enforcing contract'. 
Frequent use of conversation is an important 
tool. 
* Delegation and empowerment. 
The present attitudes towards each other and 
the role that they themselves play needs 
changing. 
Barrier which needs to be removed. 
e Same as above. 
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28. Security deposit may be reduced to a token level 
and this be released as now i. e. at the end of the 
defect liability period. 
29.1n lieu of the bank guarantee, personal or 
community guarantee to be considered. 
30. A large numbers of small contracts packages to 
encourage the small contractors. 
31. Administrative approval and the technical sanction 
to be left as they are now. 
32. The lowest bidder to be awarded the work. 
33. Simplified and flexible conditions of the contract 
are required. 
34. Monitoring and trouble-shooting team, including 
adjudicator, to be introduced. 
35. No need for the performance bond. 
36. No need for insurance in the contract. 
37. No place for penal action and damages to be 
claimed from the community. 
38. Clear instruction and procedure to be provided to 
the officials in dealing with the community groups. 
Relaxation in the existing rules to be provided. 
39. Categories of main conditions of contract to 
remain the same; dealing with the time of 
completion and payment. Some conditions of 
contract to be relaxed. 
40.1-ogistic support to the officials like that of proper 
transportation allowance as it is likely that their 
additional time and resources will be required. 
41. Officials are a stakeholder in the process and they 
should not be exposed to any more personal risks 
than they are exposed to now. 
42. There is a need for training in the changing roles 
and relationships. 
Concept of the guarantor is to be retained but 
the form may be different. 
Shift in packaging. Implications are that more 
management resources would be required. 
Structure of the approval system to be retained. 
Best deal for the client is the main criteria. 
Lowest bid is apparently such a deal. 
Self explanatory. 
* Specialist provision in time of trouble. 
Barriers are to be removed. Procedural barriers 
are not justified in the interaction with the 
community. 
" Threat of liquidated damages and penalties are 
to be removed. 
" This is important. It is not good enough to 
demand community participation from the 
officials without telling them clearly what is 
required from them. Procedure of similar 
authority and details such as works procedure 
is desired. 
" Changes required in the conditions but the 
basic structure to be retained. 
" Stakes of the officials are important. 
Implications of the changed procurement 
strategy to be implemented if the proper 
support is also provided. 
" Why should an official take any personal risk? 
For sustainability of the process it is important 
to see what extra efforts are required and how 
this will affect the personal risks of the 
stakeholders. 
" It is not sufficient to desire the changes but the 
stakeholders need to be trained for their 
changed role in changed relationships. 
" So that there is some flexibility in the 
implementation. The implication is that, beyond 
the 10%, the contract to be re-negotiated. 
" There is no difference in the goals of the 
community as contractor or as the end user. 
43. Additional work up to 10 percent of the cost of the 
contact to be executed at the same rate. 
44. Befter quality of work is likely to be achieved as 
compared to the conventional contractor by the 
involvement of the community groups. There is no 
incentive for the community groups to go for cut 
throat profits at the expense of quality. 
45. Community participation in procurement will 
generate employment and facilitate enterprise 
development thus leading to poverty alleviation. 
46. Community partnering will generate the sense of 
ownership and this will help in community 
The feeling based on the experience of 
community- partnered procurement. 
Ease for the departments in the maintenance of 
the infrastructure. But there may be some tasks 
which could be beyond the capacity of the 
community and for that the department will 
have to play the role. In any case the 
involvement of the departments in maintenance 
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participation in maintenance of the infrastructure. may be reduced. 
" The financial capacity 
assumed to be weak. 
" Advance against material 
47. Mobilisation advance to be provided suggested 
figure is about 100,000 rupees. 
48. An advance to be given for material at site of up to 
80%. 
491abour intensive technologies more suitable. 
50. Officials to provide the technical and managerial 
support. 
51. The work to be given to the community should not 
be of high risk and complexity. 
52. Grace period of 1-2 months to be provided for the 
completion period. 
53. The time estimation for the community partnered 
contracts to be realistic. 
54. Payments to be made immediately and part 
payment be made on the basis of the item rates. 
55. Community groups to be established and 
gradually introduced in the community in 
contractor roles. 
56. Partnering as compared to adversarial 
relationships. Partnering is to empower the 
community. 
of the community is 
Standard practice. 
But in some cases the mechanical or 
automated means may more appropriate and 
efficient. 
Managerial support is also important 
Risk as criteria for selection of the work to be 
given to community. Not all local infrastructure 
work is suitable for the community to perform. 
The feeling is that the time performance may 
not be so great. The reasonable esti mate is an 
important factor. 
" Implication is that current practice does not give 
a realistic estimation. 
" Payments are crucial for the financial 
management of small contracts. 
" It is a gradual process and patience to be 
exercised. 
Importance of the partnering relationship as 
compared to relationships resulting from 
conventional contracting. 
Source: Focus group discussion. 
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7.1 
Chapter 7 Lessons from experience in community participated 
procurement. 
7.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
One of the most interesting findings is the wide variety of ways (see chapter six) 
in which community groups become involved in the development of local 
infrastructure and service provision. They take on and adapt to many differing 
roles, ranging from informal advisers (see for example Text Boxes 6.4 & 6.10), 
through to formally appointed micro-contractors with legally binding contracts to 
construct the works, for which they receive cash payment (see for example Text 
Box 6.7). The research had found examples of community groups participating in 
all of the roles within the contractual triangle described in chapter two (refer Table 
2.1 & section. 2.2) 
Table 7.1 summarises the roles played by the community which parallel that of 
Promoter, Engineer and Contractor (see chapter two). This shows that 
communities have a range of capacity and that they could play different roles 
accordingly. 
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Table 7.1 Role Matrix of community participation in some contract contexts 
Project context Stakeholder Roles 
Promoter Contractor Engineer/Ad 
visor/Super 
visor 
1 OPP-Internal works 1 Community/CBO 
_2 
Public sector 
3 NGO 
2 SKAA-Internal works 1 Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
3-SKAA External works 1 Community/CIBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
4 FAUP Internal works 1 Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
KMC/ADB 1 Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
1 NHDA 1 Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
2 Clean settlement 1 Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
SIP community partnered 
projects 
Community/CBO 
2 Public sector 
3 NGO 
In some cases the relationship is between organisations (Text box 6.7), in some 
cases it is between individuals (Text Box 6.9) and in more complex cases 
between an organisation and an individual (Text Box 6.22). However, a principal- 
agent relationship governs all the cases (sections 2.4 & 2.5). The nature of the 
relationship differs in terms of the organisations involved and in terms of the 
delegated work. In case of OPP internal works (Text Box 6.9) the principal and 
agent were both from the community. The delegated work was construction of 
drains. In case of the KMC/ADB (Text Box 6.10) the principal was a Municipal 
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Authority and the agent was the community group. The delegated work was 
supervision of construction. 
In some cases their role is easily identifiable and in other cases it is more 
complex. For example in Sri Lanka (Text Box 6.7), Pakistan (Text Box 6.25) and 
India (Text Box 6.6) we have situations where community groups act as 
contractors who are paid agreed rates for carrying out items of work; in the case 
of Sri Lanka, this led to the term community contracting (see chapter three) being 
used to describe that particular part of the Million Houses Programme. In 
Pakistan (Text Box 6.9 & 6.11), there are cases where for a particular scheme 
both the promoters and the contractors are community-based. In India (Text Box 
6.4), Sri-Lanka (Text Box 6.8) and Pakistan (Text Boxes 6.10 & 6.11) community 
groups perform the supervisory role of the engineer. The tasks associated with 
the roles are hard to distribute neatly among the stakeholders in terms of the 
clear distinction of roles which characterised formal contracts. There is an 
overlapping in the tasks performed. 
Another important finding is that it cannot be assumed as a matter of course that 
urban low income communities will do the construction labouring work 
themselves (Text box 6.8). These approaches, often favoured in the rural context 
cannot automatically be lifted into the urban milieu. The research has found 
evidence of community groups engaging in sophisticated sub contracting. For 
example: specialist trenching work in Pakistan (Text Boxes 6.9 & 6.13); major 
sub contracting of management and labour in Sri Lanka (Text Box 6.7). On the 
other hand, some communities are mainly interested in the opportunities for 
waged employment as a means of boosting their very low incomes. 
To be able to decide which role a stakeholder would take in a procurement 
process assumes power. It is generally the promoter who decided the outline 
about the work and the agents that would be used to achieve the project 
objectives. As was noted in chapter five, sections 5.2.2 and 5.3 a micro- 
contractor constitutes a very simple organisation. It is not likely that such 
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contractors would have any significant power over the running of government 
departments (see section 2.2.1). 
The perceived power relationship among the stakeholders (community groups 
and urban government) about roles is that power rests in descending order with 
Promoter, Engineer and then the contractor. The community perceived itself to be 
the most powerful as it moved nearer to the role of the client (Text Box 6.10). On 
the other hand, if the existing relationship is changed so that more power is given 
to the contractor Is role, greater benefits of empowering and partnering could be 
achieved (see sections 2.12.1,2.13.1). 
In summary, with respect to community groups adopting the roles and 
responsibilities within the contractual triangle of promoter/engineer/contractor, the 
developments observed are: (Text Box 4.2). 
e Participation in the identification, planning and design of improvements. 
Involvement in the supervision and quality control of works undertaken by a 
government contractor appointed through the standard tendering procedures. 
Use of waged local labour in Departmental Works; materials are procured 
either by the community or by the government department. 
Use of community labour engaged and paid through labour-only contracts. 
Community-based labour employed by a private sector contractor appointed 
under the tender-contract system. 
* Entrustment of works by negotiation, where the community group has 
management control of the construction and chooses whether it uses local 
labour or hires in labour from outside. 
Formation of local societies with the view to undertaking work in a number of 
slum communities. 
Capacity building and skills upgrading of micro-contractors and community 
groups with the assistance of NGOs. 
o Improvements financed partly by the community and partly by government. 
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Improvements which are fully financed internally by the community who 
develop procedures specific to their needs without any government 
involvement but with NGO support. 
7.2 Community Partnering 
All the indications (for example see section 5.2.2 and 5.3) are that urban 
infrastructure at the local (tertiary) level is not 'too complicated' for ordinary 
people and local artisans to get to grips with (see section 6.2.1). Urban 
infrastructure is complex, but nevertheless community groups in different 
situations demonstrate their ability to play a positive role. They are neither well- 
equipped with constrcution plant nor are they large organisations. Associated 
risks are not high (section 2.9 and section 5.2.2). 
The key point to emerge is that there is no single identifiable role model for 
participation in urban infrastructure procurement. The reason is inherent in the 
varied nature of community organisation and their varied capacity. Sometimes 
they are formed for very short duration (for example lane organisations in OPP, 
Text Box 6.9) and in some case they live longer (Text Box 6.27). In some case 
they have a single objective and in some cases they have multi-objectives 
(section 2.2). 
The issue of complexity is quite serious in situations where the public sector 
enters into a formal relationship with a community to participate in procurement 
(section 2.1.2 & 4.2). Such relationships are effectively non-existent outside the 
remit of donor funded projects where the normal regulations are waived formally 
or informally. 
Using the framework of Partnering, Agency Theory, and Participation the term 
Community Partnering is proposed to embrace this variety of roles and 
responsibilities in a relationship or contract (sections, 2.1,2.3 2.4,2.12,2.13 & 
6.2). In its broadest sense, it reflects both the continued involvement of people 
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with the planning, implementation and sustenance of local infrastructure and 
service improvements, and with income generation, enterprise development and 
skills training. A key aspect in the community participated procurement was the 
achievement of 'goal alignment' thus producing the efficient contracts (see 
section 2.4 and 6.2) of promoter and the contractor. If an organisation is 
constructing or monitoring infrastructure for its own use, there is no reason for 
them to produce a lower quality, high cost and longer duration work. However, it 
is possible that some factors other than the intentions of the community may 
effect the work, for example lack of skill and management. The performance of 
micro-contacts is the subject of chapter eight. 
The underlying implications of the community partnering are: 
* Full acceptance of the urban poor as primary stakeholders in local 
infrastructure provision. 
The development of longer term more open-ended relationships, 
encompassing joint financing, planning, design, implementation, hand-over 
and maintenance. 
,* Promoting co-operation both formally and informally with government agencies 
and NGOs. 
* The potential to target groups of the urban poor, rather than solely area-based 
dwellers in specific slums. This is relevant because local inhabitants do not 
necessarily carry out improvement works themselves because of lack of both 
time and relevant skills. 
7.3 Transparency and Accountability: Whose Money Is It? 
Transparency in decision making and accountability in the spending of money are 
crucially important to any process for infrastructure procurement, whether it 
involves urban government, community groups, or both. Three different situations 
regarding sources of finance were encountered. 
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1. Government money is used to finance the works; community groups are paid 
for services which they provide. This injects money into the local economy 
(see for example Text Box 6.7). 
2. Government money is not involved; the finance is raised internally by 
community groups and existing money re-circulates in the local economy (see 
for example Text Box 6.9). The matter is explored further in chapter eight. 
3. Split funding with contributions from government and community groups (see 
for example (Text Box 6.13) 
The source of finance is the single most important factor in relation to the 
procedures and rules which are adopted for infrastructure procurement. If 
government finance is involved, whether in full or in part, its rules and procedures 
must be adhered to. This includes money from other sources such as bilateral 
agencies which is channelled through government. It has a powerful influence on 
the behaviour and attitudes of officials, particularly engineers, who have a pivotal 
role in community partnering schemes (Text Box 6.33). If the finance is raised by 
the community, then they [community] are at liberty to define and use whatever 
mechanisms they feel confident with; relatively little reliance is placed on the 
written word. 
The procurement of infrastructure is complex and expensive regardless of how or 
by whom it is done; yet the means by which the twin goals of transparency and 
accountability are achieved could not be more diverse. On the one hand, 
government has its rules and procedures which run into volumes of written 
words; (Text Boxes 4.1 & 4.2). On the other hand, community groups who 
finance their own infrastructure (Text Boxes 6.9 & 6.11) develop systems which 
have minimal written documentation and are enforceable by social pressure. 
In Faisalabad, Pakistan (Text Box 6.13) a hybrid situation had arisen where the 
FAUP, which is an arm of urban government, provides 50% of the financing 
(which originates from a bilateral donor agency) for internal works, thereby 
matching the 50% contribution from residents. The present method of the FAUP 
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is part way between a NGO and a government department. The difficulty which is 
immediately apparent is that within the same project, the community groups on 
the one hand and government agencies on the other are going to require 
completely different procedures to satisfy their own perceptions of transparency 
and accountability. For example, a problem arose from the outset with residents 
being hostile to the idea of depositing money in a joint account with government. 
No formal contracts are on file for the construction of the lane sewers. The FAUP 
has set up its own project approval committee, whose purpose is to grant 
sanction to specific project activities. Its membership includes officials from other 
urban government agencies. These members have (quite appropriately) 
questioned the legitimacy of the actions of the committee. However, the FAUP 
procurement strategy for lane sewers has been successful as measured by cost 
and quality, which are themselves key objectives for govemment procurement. 
The irony is that if the FAUP system were subject to scrutiny by the government's 
Central Audit and Account Organisation, in all probability questions would be 
raised about the procedures used to demonstrate value for money. Here, then, is 
the archetypal problem whereby successful community partnering develops away 
from the mechanisms of urban government; yet looming on the horizon is the 
apparent inability of government to assimilate these successful processes and 
procedures 
Government rules are creating barriers and problems for community based 
activities; ideally, this can be avoided if community groups are able to finance the 
work themselves (Text Box 6.9) and the Government intentionally or 
unintentionally lets the activities happen. Permitting 'irregular' activities to 
continue very closely resembles the kind of relationship described by informal 
partnering (section 2.12.1) and relational contracts (section 2.3). However, in the 
broader context of South Asia, the extent to which these works can be fully 
financed internally is limited and there are many situations in which government 
financing is essential. 
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7.4 Transparency and Accountability: How are Decisions Reached? 
In the routine tender-contract procedures, the relationships between promoter, 
engineer and contractor are clearly defined and understood by the parties 
involved (sections 2.1 & 4.2). Everything is set out in the contract and its 
accompanying documentation (section 4.4). When problems arise, formal 
mechanisms specified in the contract for dispute resolution are invoked. The 
formal contracts which are run by the engineers of urban government have a high 
standard of documentation and record keeping. The researcher had access to 
many working project files and, almost without fail, all of the procedural stages 
are clearly identifiable (Text Boxes 6.2,4.8 & 4.9). In these files are the records 
which demonstrate that the concerned officials have followed the rules and 
procedures; some day, they might have to answer to procedural queries raised 
by the Central Audit and Accounts Department and, by these files, will be called 
to account for their actions. This happened in Sri-Lanka (Text Box 6.29). 
The cases in which community groups are involved, continuous negotiation (for 
example Text Box 6.7 and 6.8) and dialogue are more in evidence. In a number 
of cases this is because the parties are working in a genuinely experimental 
situation in which there are no hard and fast rules. Informal negotiation emerges 
as a key element in successful initiatives involving community groups; it provides 
mechanisms for agreeing costs and resolving disputes. There was an element of 
trust and respect unlike the adversarial relationship of routine procurement 
(section 6.2). The trust and avoidance of the adversarial relationship are the key 
themes of Partnering (section 2.12.1). 
The case of Cuttack, India (Text Box 6.6) is instructive; for both the community 
group and urban government it was the first attempt at a partnering approach. A 
verbal agreement for carrying out the work was struck between the Project 
Management Unit of urban government and the community group. An impasse 
arose when the work was subsequently readvertised even though the community 
group was under the impression the work had already been awarded to them. 
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This situation (which would be most serious in the context of a conventional 
procurement contract) was sorted out by negotiation. The real business was done 
by negotiation; some of the actual documents and file notes have the appearance 
of 'after the event' formalities. The 'relational contact'(section 2.3) supercedes the 
written contract. 
Although negotiation was the principal means of reaching agreement, the 
community group was clearly affected by its transactions with government. The 
file reveals an increasingly formal tone to their communications; for example, the 
appearance of headed note paper, the copying of correspondence to all and 
sundry, and use of the English language. More importantly, they developed 
sufficient confidence to question the actions of government through the official 
channels. This instance highlights the intricacies and complication of the 
relationship between public sector and community (see section 2.2) and the 
ability of the community group to learn how to handle the government. The 
community is developing into a state closer to that of the public sector micro- 
contractors (see section 5.3). 
In India (Text Box 6.2 & 6.3), Pakistan (Text Box 6.30) and Sri-Lanka (Text Box 
6.7), negotiation was carried out between urban government and the community 
group to agree a price for the work. This again shows a degree of teamwork and 
trust, which are the common themes of Partnering, among the parties involved. 
(section 2.12.1). This resulted in a lower price than conventional tendering would 
have produced, a fact which is very important for the officials of urban 
government. 
An interesting contrast is provided by a case in Pakistan (Text Box 6.9) where 
people get on with things themselves, with the support of a NGO, but without the 
involvement of urban government. Agreements between residents and micro- 
contractors are negotiated; there is no written contract because it would serve no 
useful purpose. The system is well established, and disputes are resolved 
through negotiation without recourse to any written agreement. A cost estimate is 
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prepared on the basis of market rates and in a form which is useful to the 
residents in managing the work; this contrasts with standard government 
procedure (Text Box 4.4) where even for a formal contractor the methods are not 
helpful in managing the work. 
This draws attention to the importance of the local micro-contractors who play a 
crucial role, but who are rarely the focus of discussion. These masons, 
carpenters and plumbers provide the skilled labour input and often manage the 
micro-contracts for local improvement works. Their importance has emerged in 
Pakistan (Text Boxes 6.9,6.12,6.13 and data base entries 263,268), in Sri 
Lanka (Text Box 6.7) and in India (Text Box. 6.3). The ability and experience of 
the micro-contractors provide a crucial link in the chain leading to a successful 
outcome. They are key players in any negotiations about price, and their ability 
and skills are important determinants of the quality of the work produced. The 
other aspect is that these stakeholder are able to deal successfully with the risks 
involved in procurement (section 2.9). 
7.5 Government Procedures: a surprising amount of scope 
In response to these difficulties it is necessary to explore in detail exactly what 
scope exists within the confines of government procedure to see if the chances of 
an impasse can be avoided, or at least minimised. Local government 
procurement procedures are described in Text Boxes 4.1 & 4.2; whilst these vary 
in detail between and within the individual countries, they broadly represent the 
way things work. Text Box 4.10 presented some alternatives available in 
procurement in the existing procedural framework. 
The most significant finding (Text Box 4.2) is that some of these procedures allow 
a surprising degree of flexibility. Negotiation is acceptable, and it is even possible 
to offer works at a discount to certain registered societies and co-operatives. 
Section 6.3 presented a situation where such options were used to accommodate 
the community in the procurement of urban infrastructure. 
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It is noteworthy that a distinction needs to be drawn between what is done as a 
matter of routine and what could be done within existing procedures. The routine 
is to use competitive tender (section 4-2) to award the contract to the lowest 
bidder. The procedures even allow for the lowest tender not to be accepted; 
however, it appears that few engineers are willing to subject themselves to the 
consequent need for justifying such a decision and the possibility of litigation 
against the government, even though they know that the quality of work and 
value obtained would be better if this were done (section 4.6). 
The officials of urban government negotiated satisfactory arrangements with the 
community along the lines of the systems operating in Orangi (Text Box 6.9). The 
outcome is of mutual benefit firstly to the community through empowerment 
(section 2.12) and income generation and secondly to urban government who get 
better value for money and better quality work (Text Box 6.26). Yet these officials 
are struggling to provide file notes and documentary support which mirror the 
formally sanctioned procedures, but which in themselves are of little significance 
to the success of the partnership with the community. An important issue for 
these officials is not the cost or the quality per se, but an ability to prove in 
accordance with procedure that the cost was advantageous to government; this 
is essential to protect themselves from the unwelcome attention of the Central 
Audit and Account Organisation (section 5.2.2 & Text Box 6.33). 
The reluctance to do anything other than accept the lowest tender (see section 
4.6), regardless the appropriateness or likely outcome, is due in no small part to 
the system of financial auditing which has developed. The following points are 
central to this vexing problem: 
The money flowing in and out of government departments at all levels is 
controlled by the Central Audit and Account Organisation; this is a powerful 
organisation in terms of the power and influence it wields (Text Box 6.32). 
e It can (and sometimes does) act in a malign way; officials can be called to 
account for the minutest deviation from arcane rules. Government Engineers 
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are vested with the authority of sanctioning different stages of the procurement 
process. They can subsequently be held personally liable for over-spending, 
and in extreme cases face the possibility of personal ruin (data base entries 
283 & 284). 
* The key concern is to demonstrate value for money and that rules have been 
followed to the letter. This does not necessarily equate with probity and 
efficiency in the spending of public money. 
9 Audit requirements, or more accurately fear of the audit, can be taken as the 
governing factor in the use of what this thesis describes as 'non routine' 
procedure in the public sector. The Engineer remains a key actor in community 
partnered works undertaken with public money and any changes to the means 
of procurement to promote community partnering must not increase their 
personal risk (data base entries 247 & 260). 
The problem is that procedures designed to try to eliminate malpractice also stifle 
genuine innovation; without high level backing (Text Box 6.6), relatively few of the 
middle ranking engineers interviewed would be prepared to adopt anything other 
than the competitive tender (Text Box 6.33) , as this provides them with a solid 
alibi against potential audit questions. Competitive tendering is automatically 
assumed to guarantee value for money (section 4.5 & 4.6). If any other 
procedure is adopted, the engineer may have to explain how he or she has 
ensured equal value for money. Deviations from the norm have to be justified, 
and for many officials the risks are not worth taking. 
It was observed that in India (Text Boxes 6.3 & 6.6) situations where officials who 
adopted procedures other than competitive tender, in order to develop 
community partnering, spend time trying to provide documentary proof of value 
for money. Problems arose from an advert which called for tenders when the 
community believed the work had already been entrusted to them. Other calls for 
tenders were made without any intention of awarding the work to the contractors 
who bid, which clearly did not please them. Such moves appear puzzling, 
because they hinder negotiations and other relationships, but it appears that they 
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are necessary precautions against potential audit questions. The actions taken 
by the government engineer also highlighted that fact that compared with the 
contractor, the promoter has in the end more power. Yet within the existing 
procedures we have mechanisms which can afford at least some of the flexibility 
necessary to develop community partnering. In Pakistan (Text Box. 6.11 & 6.12) 
we have a case where Departmental Works Procedure (Text Box 4.2) has been 
adopted on a large scale with the involvement of a NGO. External works have 
been procured in this way, with the subsequent result that community groups 
financed and installed internal lane-level works. The motivation for this comes 
from the leader of the organisation in response to problems with poor quality, cost 
overruns and time overruns which plagued work carried out under the routine 
tender contract system. This is one of many indications of an inherent danger in 
the way the tender-contract system is used, whereby it offers cheapness as 
opposed to value for money. 
7.6 Assimilation of Community participated procurement 
One of the most important innovations the research has found in government 
procedures is contained in the Treasury Circulars of the Sri Lankan Government 
which relate to community based work (Text Boxes 6.29 & 6.30). They have 
assimilated lessons of the 'community contracting' experience, in particular the 
crucial role which negotiation plays; it specifically grants an exemption for 
awarding work to 'approved societies' through negotiation without resorting to 
public tender. The regulations are in fact an endorsement of the Partnering 
(section 2.12.1) approach in public sector procurement in Sri Lanka. This 
recognises the fact that very advantageous cost terms can be obtained -by 
negotiation with community groups. The findings support this conclusion, which is 
discussed in more detail in a later section. This exemption should free officials 
from the continual worry about how to demonstrate value for money without a call 
for tenders, and should give them more opportunity to concentrate on issues 
central to community partnering negotiations. 
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The NHDA of Sri Lanka has issued supporting guidelines for assigning small 
contracts to community groups (Text Box 6.15). These are important not only in 
themselves, but because they advertise the fact that assigning work to 
community groups is part of the standard procedure of the organisation. This is 
crucial to the way in which officials behave and should increase their confidence 
in adopting new approaches. Much of the experience reported from within 
government concerns small groups or individuals who have to some extent gone 
out on a limb in order to promote community partnering; there is a distinct sense 
of struggling against the prevailing flow. The existence of clear procedural rules 
and guidelines indicates the commitment of the organisation to these new 
approaches. 
The audited community contacts of Sri-Lanka provided the evidence that the 
initiatives along with the other benefits can also survive the central audit (Text 
Boxes 6.31 & 6.32). An organisational culture is developing which is making 
positive efforts to include these alternative ways of working into the mainstream 
(Text Box 6.29,6.30 & 6.31). 
In Pakistan, SKAA started using Departmental work (Text Box 4.10) as a mean to 
involve the community in the procurement of i nfrastru ctu re (Text Box 6.25). The 
approach was supported personally by the Director General of the Organisation 
(data base entries 247,250,259 and 260). No separate procedural framework 
was provided for the community involvement. When the Director General was 
transferred from the organisation for a short period of time the concerned 
Engineer stopped the innovative approach and reverted back to the routine 
procurement. It so happens that the same person was re-appointed as the 
Director General. He confronted the Engineer and asked the reason why the 
innovative practice was stopped. The Engineer replied that there was no legal 
framework for such practice and he could not have continued the practice in the 
absence of the Director General. The Authority had to issue an amendment to 
their official Gazette to incorporate the change (personal communication dated 
10/4/97 & data entry 147). 
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It noteworthy that assimilation of community initiatives in the public procurement 
process is essential if such practices are to be sustained. 
7.7 Benefits of Community Partnering: addressing the poverty agenda 
The provision of basic infrastructure benefits residents in a number of ways, 
including improved environmental conditions, lower environmental health risks, 
and convenience afforded by better access to services. These traditional benefits 
are essentially independent of the mode of procurement of the infrastructure i. e. 
through the tender contract system or by community partnering. However, with 
community partnering we have -observed 
(some benefits would be further 
discussed in chapter eight) additional benefits stemming from 
9 the participation process as a means of offering empowerment and greater 
control to households and community groups; 
e actual and potential income generation for low income groups who are paid for 
undertaking work associated with government funded infrastructure 
improvements; 
,* enterprise development as local micro-contractors develop and exploit the 
niches created; 
* other benefits to the local micro-economy such as increased business for 
building materials suppliers. 
The Sri Lankan experience Text Box 6.7 offers the main evidence for 
demonstrating the way in which community partnering can be used to inject 
substantial amounts of new money into the local economy of low income 
communities in a way which is not welfare-orientated. Different community 
groups respond in different ways, and micro-contracting enterprises develop; two 
community groups undertook 32% of the work in the NHDA community contracts 
in Sri Lanka. The pilot projects in SIP, India (Text Box 6.1,6.2 and 6.3) are 
showing good potential. In these cases, government is either providing or acting 
as a channel for the funding. In situations where communities themselves fund 
the work internally (Text Box 6.9 & 6.11), existing money is recirculating. 
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However, whilst direct income generation is not a benefit here, there is evidence 
of sustainable enterprise development through the strengthening of local micro- 
contractors. 
There is evidence of greater empowerment and control in the cases reviewed. As 
noted in section 2.13, transfer of power and delegation of authority are the 
common themes of empowerment. The community took greater control and 
exercised greater authority in the community participated procurement as 
compared to the routine procurement (Text Box 6.26). This is particularly 
noticeable where there has been the involvement of a strong NGO (Text Box. 
6.9,6.10,6.11 & 6.12). There are also a number of relatively minor instances 
which are nevertheless important indicators of future potential. For example in 
Cuttack, India, (Text Box 6.6) the community management group soon ceases to 
be a mere passive receiver of ideas and instructions from the project 
management unit of government. 
Some of these additional benefits, in particular income generation and enterprise 
development, are not necessarily area-based; experience from Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka supports this, although a more detailed impact analysis which is beyond 
the scope of the current work is desirable. 
7.8 Costs of Community Partnering: the Problems 
Two distinct situations exist in the cases explored 
1. Community based actions outside of government which are supported by 
NGOs 
2. Community based actions within the framework of a government programme 
Both have similar problems in terms of developing a participation process. 
However, in the first case, there is more or less total freedom in terms of 
subsequent processes and procedures to move ahead with actions (in our cases, 
infrastructure initiatives) which are outcomes of the participation process (Text 
Box 6.9). In the second case, an additional set of problems stems from attempts 
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to develop these subsequent actions within the context of urban government, 
whose procedures and ways of working are not conducive to change. This 
creates problems for community groups and government officials alike, and the 
following discussion focuses on these problems. A recurrent difficulty is the actual 
and potential lack of capacity of the middle ranking engineers within urban 
government, who have a central role in community partnering schemes. 
There are likely to be considerable costs involved. Community groups invest a lot 
of their resources including time during the development of the participation 
process, and in gaining sufficient confidence to become involved in infrastructure 
procurement. This has been recognised by earlier work; what has been less 
clearly stated is that during the early stages of implementation, a lot of effort also 
has to be put in by government officials, in complete disproportion to the 
engineering work in hand. 
The processes of explaining the concepts, assessing the capacity of community 
groups, entering into negotiations and providing technical support during 
construction, are all resource consuming activities. This is evident in Cochin and 
Cuttack, India and NHDA, Sri-Lanka (Text Boxes 6.1,6.2,6.3,6.6 & 6.7). Once 
the initial stages are over and the programme develops further, serious time 
constraints arise for the officials (Text Box 6.12). This is particularly important for 
government engineers who usually have a quota of work (in financial terms) 
which they are expected to handle in a particular year 
However, using the framework of Agency Theory (section 2.5), it can be argued 
that in the case of community participated procurement the monitoring cost 
(policing cost), bonding cost and residual loss would be much less due to 'goal 
alignment' and some or all of the initial increase in cost associated with resource 
requirements of community partnering may be compensated. The other aspect is 
that the initial high cost of community is not going to be constant. Experience in 
Sri-Lanka has indicated that once the process is understood by all the 
stakeholders there would be less inputs required from the officials (data base 
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entries 363), hence the additional resource requirements would diminish if 
community partnering becomes an established procurement strategy. 
The cost of enforcing the relational contracts would be less than the legal 
contracts in case of disputes. The benefits associated with socio-economic 
aspects like enterprise development is also not accounted for in our normal 
analysis. 
An important benefit of the tender contract system is that urban government buys 
in the management capacity of the contractor as well as his construction 
capacity. In Calcutta, the CMDA specifies uncommonly strict requirements on its 
contractors as a means of buying in additional management to ensure better 
quality control. Under Departmental Works Procedure (Text Boxes 4.2 & 6.12), 
engineers and technicians experience difficulties in devoting time to the 
supervision of labour and in ensuring that the correct materials are available 
when required. 
The financial capacity of the contractor is also important because government 
operates on a cost reimbursement basis; this means that any group acting in the 
capacity of a contractor must have access to 'money up front' in order to 
purchase materials and pay the labour force. This created problems in Sri Lanka 
and in India, where there were cases of government officials taking out advances 
in their own name in order to provide pre-financing to community groups. This 
situation is neither sustainable nor desirable. 
The quality of work resulting from community partnering arrangements is 
generally perceived to be better than using conventional contractors. However, 
good quality work is not an automatic outcome; community groups and micro- 
contractors alike need some form of on-the-job training and skills upgrading. The 
apparently simple task of placing earth fill to form access ways initially failed 
because of lack of experience and inadequate supervision (Text Box 6.1). It is 
not reasonable to entrust community groups (or anybody else for that matter) with 
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tasks of which they have no previous experience, and expect a quality product. In 
Pakistan (Text Box 6.9 & 6.10) NGO support for the capacity building of 
community groups and micro contractors has been a very important component 
of success. Cost effective methods for community and client development are 
needed to sustain the community participated practices. 
The problem of levels of service and standards has been discussed in relation to 
Faisalabad in Pakistan; community initiatives at the lane level, particularly 
sewerage and drainage, need to link into the secondary and trunk infrastructure 
of the city. There is a strong tendency for government engineering departments 
to refuse to adopt any infrastructure which has not been constructed by 
themselves. The unique situation in Faisalabad (Text Box 6.13) meant that 
problems were eventually resolved through dialogue between the project and the 
engineering departments. Partnering helps in dispute resolution. 
Community partnering initiatives are relatively new experiences for urban 
government. It involves doing things in a non-routine way, which clearly creates 
problems for the officials involved. Evidence of their discomfort and concern, 
largely as a result of fear of the audit and account organisation were noted during 
the research. 
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8.1 
Chapter 8 Micro-contracts in procurement of urban 
infrastructure for urban poor in developing countries. 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter two benchmarking was described as 'the practice of being humble 
enough to admit that someone is better at something and being wise enough to 
learn how to match and even surpass them at it. A benchmark is a measured 
'best-in-class' achievement recognised as the standard excellence for those 
business practices' (after Anderson and Peterson 1996). The main approach 
described is reported again for easy reference 
Study and understand one's own process 
Find the best benchmarking partners 
Study the partner's process 
Analyse the difference between own and partner's process. 
Implement improvements based on what is learned from the benchmarking 
partner. 
The concept of benchmarking is used to analyse the performance of community 
participated (section 2.12.2) and non-community participated micro-contracts. The 
main difficulty was that there were no indicators defined related to the process of 
procurement in developing countries. The concept of benchmarking deals with 
the improvement of the process and the product. The emphasis is on 
understanding and improving the process and if someone is performing better, 
learn from that experience. In dealing with the assimilation of one process 
(community participated procurement) into another (routine procurement 
process), it is pertinent to define the performance indicators and then compare 
the performance on such indicators. In the absence of any ready made 
benchmarks, the indicator developed could be used to develop benchmarks for 
further studies. 
8.2 
8.2 Process of procurement in public sector. 
The processes involved in the procurement of infrastructure through micro- 
contract in the contexts of the community participated contracts and conventional 
public procurement have been described in chapters four and six. The 
community participated process has not yet been standardised, however, a 
parallel process can be developed for the comparison purposes. The routine 
procurement process has the defined milestones (Text boxes 4.9,6.17 & 6.20) in 
the procedures and practices as follows: 
1. Administrative approval: Approval authorising initiating the work. 
2. Technical sanctions: Technical and financial feasibility authorisation 
3. Notice inviting tender: A notice to the potential contractors to give offer for the 
notified work. 
4. Tender opening: Offers are opened in the presence of a committee. 
5. Work order: This signifies that start of the contract. 
6. Actual start of the work: The work start on site. 
7. Completion of the work. 
8. Start of use of facility. 
9. End of defect liability period. 
The associated costs are: 
* Technical sanction cost is the cost on which the approvals of the project are 
based. 
,* Engineer's estimate is the cost on which the tenders are called and later 
evaluated. 
e TenderjContract letting cost is the cost on which the contract was awarded. 
Completion cost is the final cost of the contract including variations and 
changes 
Executive officials consider quality control their responsibility. The criterion is 
either acceptable or unacceptable. If the work is not rejected it is perceived to be 
of acceptable quality. 
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8.2.1 Pre-Contract Preparation Period 
The clients' performance (that is urban local government in the countries 
concerned) in the procurement has generally been neglected. The underlying 
reason may be that the self evaluation or evaluation by ones' contractor is a 
difficult task. 
It is important to consider the time taken for contract award along with the 
contract duration. For the end user, the importance is of the prompt delivery of 
infrastructure. It is not just the contract period that matters but the time taken in 
preparation for the contract and relevant approvals as well. 
8.3 Analysis of the Micro-contracts 
A total of three hundred and ninety(390) contracts was analysed. These were 
divided into two main categories: community participated and routine 
procurement. Each category was subdivided on the basis of the organisational 
context as shown in Table 8.1. The contexts of NHIDA, SKAA, KIVIC and SIP had 
contracts both of community and routinely procured categories. 
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Table 8.1 A summary of the contracts studies 
Categories Contexts Number 
of 
contracts 
Roles of community Country 
Client Engineer 
/advisor 
Constructor 
Routine SKAA. 53 None None None Pakistan 
KIVIC. 30 None None None Pakistan 
NHDA. 54 None None None Sri Lanka 
_ 
CIVIC Drainage. 42 None None None Sri Lanka 
CIVIC Project. 42 None _ None _ None Sri Lanka 
SIP. 37 India 
Community 
Participated 
OPP. 32 V/ Pakistan 
_ 
FAUP 2* Pakistan 
KMC/ADB. 56 Pakistan 
SIP community 
contracts. 
7 India 
CSPU 4 V/ Sri Lanka 
Departmental 
works in SKAA. 
10 V Pakistan 
NHDA 
community 
contracts. 
42 Sri Lanka 
* Not included in the quantitative analysis 
8.3.1 Description of the contracts studied. 
The contracts studied were used for the procurement of urban infrastructure. The 
majority of contracts were awarded from 1991 to 1996. 
SPSS for Windows was used for statistical analysis: a description of its main 
feature and output is given in Nourusis (1993). SPSS outputs are provided in 
Appendix 4. Table 8.2 shows selected statistics related to the average contract 
cost and duration. 
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Table 8.2 Some selected statistics related to contract cost and duration in 
different contexts. 
Contract contexts Numbers Mean Equivalent Mean 
of Local UK Pounds Calendar 
Contracts currencies days 
1. Routine Procurement 
SKAA Conventional. 53 404,724 5782 93 
(PkRupelmel 
KMC SMALL contracts. 30 21,930 313 NS 
(Pk. Rupees) 
NHDA Conventional. 54 10,254,182 128,177 22-9 
(Sr. Rupees) 
CIVIC drainage division. 42 15,259 190 9 
(Sr. Rupees) 
CIVIC projects. 23 553,796 6922 76 
(Sr. Rupees) 
SIP conventional. 37 557,550 8578 161 
(Ind. Rupees) 
Sub-Total 239 
2. Community participated 
OPP. 32 8,308 119 NS 
(Pk. Rupees) 
KMC/ADB. 56 3,761,196 53731 228 
(Pk. Rupees) 
SIP community contracts. 7 48,500 746 39 
(Ind. Rupees) 
CSPU contracts. 4 390,669 4883 62 
(Sr. Rupees) 
SKAA Departmental works. 10 250,790 3583 NS 
(Pk. Rupees) 
NHDA Community contracts. 42 347,794 4347 77 
(Sr-Rupees) 
Sub-Total 151 
Total 390 
NS The value is not specified 
Notes: For conversion: 
1E = 80 Sri Lankan Rupees 
= 65 Indian Rupees 
= 70 Pakistani Rupees 
Some observations 
e The routinely procured contracts include the works ranging from Sr. RS 15259 
[E190] to Sr. RS 10,254,182 [F-128,177]. On the other hand the range for 
community participated contract is; from Pk. RS 8308 [El 191 to Pk RS 
3761196[E537311. 
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e The mean cost of the contract context where the community was playing the 
role of Engineer (E53731) was larger than the maximum mean where the 
community played the role of the Contractor(E4883) or the Client(El 19). 
e The largest mean cost of the contracts where the community was the 
contractor was E4883. In the other contexts where the community played the 
role of the contractor, the mean cost remains less than E5000. 
The community has played the role of the Client where the contract size was 
quite small, less than f- 120. 
* The largest mean duration of the contracts in the routine procurement does 
not exceed one year. Since the work is of shorter duration there is relatively 
less exposure to the uncertainties of the market like inflation. 
* The contracts in routine procurement also include very short duration contracts 
like the case of CIVIC contracts, where the contract is of only nine days on 
average. There is a precedence of contracting out very short duration 
contracts in routine procurement. 
* In some of the very small contracts, the duration of the contracts is not 
mentioned at the time of the award. The intention is that the work is to be 
completed as 'soon as possible I. 
e The contexts where the community played the role of the Engineer, the 
contract duration was relatively longer, 228 days. 
* The contexts where the community played the role of the client the duration of 
the contract was not specifically mentioned. Again the intention was to 
complete as soon as possible. 
* Where the community played the role of the construction contractor the 
average duration was varies from 39 to 228 Calendar days. This indicates the 
community contacts are on average less than one year. 
* Overall the contracts involved work which was to be completed within one 
year. 
The question arises as to whether there is any statistically significant difference 
between the community contract and non-community contracts cost and duration 
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or are due to chance. To answer that question, more detailed statistical tests 
were used. 
8.3.1.1 Is there any statistically significant difference between contact cost 
and duration of the routinely procured and community participated 
contracts? 
T-test (see appendix 3) for independent samples were performed on the contract 
cost and duration of the community and non-community contracts in NHDA and 
SIP contexts. In both the contexts the community played the role of the 
contractor. 
The results are provided in the Appendix 5. The key results are reported in 
Tables 8.3,8.41 8.5 and 8.6. 
Table 8.3 T-test for contract costs in routinely procured and community 
participated contract-SIP context. 
Mean Difference = 509049.0355 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 11.293 P= 0.002 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 3.15 41 0.003 161510.037 (182797.7,835300.3) 
Unequal 7.78 38.12 0.000 65416.704 (376589.2,641508.9) 
Table 8.4 T-test for contract duration in routinely procured and community 
participated contract-SIP context 
Mean Difference = 122.4685 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 6.793 P= 0.013 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff 
Equal 2.82 41 0.007 43.386 (34.829,210.108) 
Unequal 5.74 27.49 0.000 21.346 (78.661,166.276) 
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Table 8.5 T-test for contract cost in routinely procured and community 
participated contract-NHDA context 
Mean Difference = 9921863.9019 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 22.606 P= 0.000 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 3.81 94 0.000 2601390.964 (4755582,15088146) 
Unequal 4.33 53.03 0.000 2291648.049 (5324352,14519376) 
Table 8.6 T-test for contract duration in routinely procured and community 
participated contract-NHDA context 
Mean Difference = 151.7643 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 47.705 P= 0.000 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value, df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff 
Equal 5.76 83 0.000 26.346 (99.352,204.176) 
Unequal 6.23 62.25 0.000 24.347 (103.083,200.445) 
Some observations 
* In all case the significance reported was less than 0.05, therefore, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. On further consideration on one-tailed 
significance it can be concluded that the mean cost and duration of routinely 
procured contract is greater than mean cost and duration of community 
participated contracts(P< 0.05). 
* The result of Levene's test presented (P=O. 13) in the Table 8.4 indicated that 
the assumption of uniformity of variance may be violated. The t-test was 
based on the assumption of equality of variance. To corroborate the results a 
non-parametric test, Mann-Whitney U- Test, was used. The results are 
presented in Appendix 5. The non-parametric test also confirms the results 
that the mean contract cost and duration are greater in routinely procured 
contracts as compared to the community participated contracts. 
8.9 
* In both the SIP and NHIDA the community played the role of constructors. It 
seems that the within the micro-contracts the size of contracts where the 
community act as constructor is relatively smaller. However, the average cost 
of community contracts reported by Pathirana and Sheng (1992) was IRS. 
49,663 [E 621] based on the contracts awarded to that date. In the sample for 
this research the majority of contracts are from later period (1992 to 1996). 
Now the average contract cost for community contracts is IRS 347794 [E 
4347]. If we also consider the average cost of community participated 
contracts used in CSPU context, E 4883 (Table 8.2), it can be s een that the 
communities are becoming involv ed in relatively larger contracts in NHIDA. It 
also ties with the government permission to increase the ceiling for 
community participated contracts from IRS 0.75 to 1.0 million (please see 
chapter six). 
8.4 Petformance Indicators 
A number of performance indicators were proposed and validated through the 
focused group discussions as described in section 3.6. The purpose of these 
indicators is to provide a measure of common ground to compare the community 
and routinely procured micro-contracts' performance. 
8.4.1 Time lags between the procedural steps 
The performance of the process can be measured in terms of time. The basic 
enquiry was to investigate the time taken to complete different tasks. The time 
lags are defined as the time taken to reach one event from the another event. 
The time lags are defined in Figure 8.1 
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Figure 8ATime lags in procurement process. 
Time lags Description 
TI-1 The time in days, from Administrative approval to notice inviting tender (N. I. T). This 
indicator is intended to provide the measure of time taken to reach to the NIT stage 
TL1A The time in days from Technical sanction to and notice inviting tender (N. I. T). This 
indicator also intended to provide the measure of time taken to reach to the NIT 
stage. 
TI-2 Time lag in getting the tender approval from the date of NIT. 
TI-3 Time lag from tender opening to issue work order. 
TI-4 How long it takes to actually start the physical work after the issuance of the work 
order? 
TI-5 Time lag between the work order and the actual completion of contract. 
TI-6 Time lag between Administrative approval and the work order. 
TL6A Time lag between Technical sanction and the work order. 
TI-7 Time lag between physical start and actual completion 
TI-8 Time lag between the Actual start and work order. 
TI-9 Time lags between end of defect liability period and formal take-over. 
TL1 1 Time lag between tender opening and tender approval. 
TL12 Time lag between tender opening and work order. 
TL13 Time lag between Work order and N. I. T. 
TL14 Time lag between tender opening and Technical sanction 
TI-1 5 Time lag between the Actual completion and the technical sanction. 
TL16 Time lag between tender opening and NIT. 
8.4.2 Time performance of procurement process 
Different time lags for the contract contexts of SKAA and SIP, as defined above 
are presented in Table 8.7. The calculations presented below are based on data 
in the engineering files of the government department. The factual information 
obtained from the interviews was cross-checked during review of the files as well. 
The mean contract duration for SKAA and SIP contexts was 93 and 161 calendar 
days respectively. 
The data was analysed using SPSS for windows using the 'explore command. 
The output is shown in Appendix 6. The mean values of the time lags are 
provided in Table 8.7. 
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Table 8.7 Time lags in procedural steps in the contexts of contracts 
Time lags SKAA (Routine) 
n=53 
SIP (Routine) 
n= 37 
Mean Mean 
TI-1 N. C 125.19 
TUA -27.90 N. C 
TI-2 41.58 101.43 
TL3 6.10 6.6 
TI-4 8.64 -2.4 
TI-5 165.39 300.94 
TI-6 N. C 250.30 
TI-6A 13.15 N. C 
TI-7 164.67 366.91 
TI-8 10.93 N. C 
TI-9 N. C 33.74 
TI-1 1 32.23 N. C 
TL12 39.35 N. C 
TI-1 3 48.60 108.17 
TL14 -7.67 N. C 
TI-1 5 198.52 N. C 
TL16 7.4 N. C 
N. C Not calculated. 
Observations 
* The negative values indicate that in some case the sequence of activities that 
was assumed in the definitions of time lags has not been followed. For 
example in TL1 negative values indicate that on average the notices for tender 
were issued before or congruent to the approval process. 
e It could take as many as 125 days from the administrative approval to reach 
the stage of tender invitation. The duration of contract was on average 161. 
This also highlights the importance of monitoring the pre-contract period in 
relation to the contact duration if the improvement is to be targeted for the 
overall delivery time. There is a need for considerable reduction of this time if 
the overall delivery of the infrastructure time is to be improved. 
9 Time to get the approval of the tender from invitation could be as long as 10 1 
days. 
* The issuance of the work order is quite efficient as the it takes on average only 
6 days after approval. 
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9 Overall time for administrative approval to the issuance of work order could be 
as long as 250 days. 
9 On average it took 10 days to start the physical work on site after issuance of 
work order. 
9 It is noted that in the contexts of SKAA the practice was to invite the tender 
before the technical sanction. That may be procedurally irregular but it had on 
average saved 27 days in the process. The Engineer in-charge used to take 
verbal assurance and proceed to the tendering (see data base entries). Such 
informal practices could be streamlined to save the time in procurement. 
There is a need to improve the overall delivery time of the urban infrastructure. 
The improvements are particularly required to improve the efficiency of the 
process of converting the established need into a work order. 
8.4.3 Quality 
It was discussed in section 2.1 that the three main objectives in procurement are 
time, cost and quality. Within the contexts of the public sector, the quality criteria 
are assumed to have met if the work is not rejected. The other measure was the 
perception of the officials regarding the quality of the works in the micro- 
contracts. Unanimously, the officials interviewed and who had the experience of 
community participated works expressed the opinion that community participated 
contracts were superior in quality as compared to the routinely procured 
contracts (for example Text Box 6.7,6.26 & data base entries 308 & 309) 
It is difficult to measure quality of work in a quantitative way. However, some of 
Text Boxes presented in Chapter six also indicates the importance of quality 
performance. For example Text Box 6.11 describes how poor quality of work was 
a key contributing factor in abandoning the tender contract system in favour of 
Departmental Works. Supervision of work by community groups is reported to be 
successful (Text Boxes 6.4,6.18 & 6.10); this benefited from setting down a clear 
structure for their involvement. The Sri Lankan experience reports improved 
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quality. One of the reasons for such results could be explained within the 
framework of principal-agent theory (sections 2.4 & 2-5). The goals of principal 
and agents were aligned. There was no difference in the goal of obtaining the 
good quality as the work was managed by the users. Conversely, it can be 
argued that the only goal of the conventional contractor is to maximise its profit, 
and this may be done at the expense of quality of work. There are no reported 
cases of the quality of the work being worse with community partnering. It can 
also be conjectured that the monitoring cost would be lower as compared to the 
routinely procured contracts because of the goal alignment(section 7.9). 
One indication related to the perceived quality by the user is their satisfaction 
with the services and the products. The community partnered contacts produced 
better satisfied end users (Text Box 6.26) Clearly, cost and quality are closely 
inter-related. 
8.4.4 Dimensionless performance Indicators of micro-contracts related to 
the cost and time. 
In order to simplify cross comparison between cost in different currencies, 
dimensionless indicators are proposed and defined in Table 8.8. Based on the 
work described in section 8.4.2 dimensionless indicators for time performance 
are also described. Time is measured in Calendar days as that was used in the 
award of the contact. Contract cost is the award cost. 
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Table 8.8 Dimensionless indicators of time and cost performance. 
Indicators Comments 
R1 =Actual cost /contract cost The ratio will reflect on the cost control used in the 
project. There may be many reasons for the high or 
low cost growth like political situation, inflation, 
climate but here we are focusing on the magnitude 
and not the reason. 
R2=Actual duration contract This indicates the control of time schedule. Again the 
duration reasons for delays are not explored. 
R3=TL6 or TI-6A contract This provides the time required to award the contract 
duration as a proportion of contract duration. The lead time is 
important in the overall delivery time of infrastructure. 
This indicator along with the time lags indicates the 
performance of the procurement. 
R4=Technical sanctions This reflects on how good or bad is the preliminary 
cost/Engineer's estimates estimates. This estimate is important as this dictates 
the approved cost of the project. 
R5=Estimated cost /contract The ratio tells how close or otherwise is the estimate 
cost from tender price. This government approved 
schedule of rates is the basis of the Engineer's 
estimates. This in turns also reflects how relevant is 
the government rates with the market rates. 
R6=Estimated cost/ completion The ratio intends to reflect the accuracy of the 
cost estimates regarding the completion cost. This 
complement the idea of cost growth and ratio defined 
in five above. 
Suggested indicator and benchmarks related to the socio-economic impact are 
reported in section 8.5. 
8.4.5 Time and cost performance indicators of micro-contracts 
Indicators R1 and R2, deal with the performance during the implementation stage 
of the contract. The remaining deal with the pre-implementation stage. R3 gives 
the lead time to contract award as a proportion of the contract duration. The 
indicators R4, R5 and R6 relate to the accuracy or otherwise of the estimation at 
feasibility and contract stages. The statistics like mean, median, minimum and 
maximum values and standard deviation were calculated. The detailed results of 
the data analysis are presented in Appendix 7. The mean of the indicators for 
different contract contexts are given in Table 8.9. Other statistics are referred to 
where required. All the values are dimensionless. 
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Table 8.9 Performance indicators of different contexts of contracts 
Contract contexts 
Indicators 
Means 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
1. Non community 
participated 
SKAA Conventional 1.07 1.58 0.12 1.24 0.78 0.77 
KMC SMALL contracts. 0.94 N. C N. C N. C 0.91 0.96 
NHDA Conventional. N. C N. C N. C N. C N. C N. C 
CIVIC drainage division. 1 0.60 N. C N. C N. C N. C 
CIVIC projects. N. C N. C N. C N. C 1.67 N. C 
SIP conventional. 1.05 2.35 1.96 1.00 1.07 1.08 
2. Community 
participated 
- 
OPP. 1.08 N. C N. C N. C N. C 1.01 
KMC/ADB. N. C N. C N. C N. C 0.87 N. C 
SIP community contracts. 0.97 2.06 2.40 1.00 0.98 1.02 
CSPU contracts. 0.97 1.37 N. C N. C N. C N. C 
SKAA Departmental works 0.67 N. C N. C N. C 1 1.49 
NHDA Community 
contracts. 
0.88 1.89 N. C N. C N. C N. C 
N. C Not calculated. 
Observations 
In routine procurement 
* The lowest mean R1 , ratio of actual cost 
to contract award cost, in the 
routinely procured contracts was 0.94 and the highest was 1.07. The best 
average performance related to cost control comes from KMC small contracts 
with ratio equal to 0.94 and the worst was from SKAA contracts with ratio of 
1.07. However, the lowest individual R1 value was from one SIP contract with 
ratio of 0.43. 
e The lowest mean R2, ratio of actual duration and contract duration, in this 
category was from CIVIC drainage division with a value of 0.6. The largest R2 
was 2.35 from the SIP. That seems to be the worst schedule control 
performance in the category. In SKAA the ratio was 1.58 indicating that on 
average the contracts exceed the contract duration by 58%, not a very 
desirable situation but better than the delays of 235% in SIP. 
* In terms of time to reach the contract award stage, the best performance came 
from SKAA with value of 0.12. This may be due to the informal practices the 
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officials adopted to speed up the process (please see section 7.4.2). The 
worst case was 1.96 in SIP. That indicates the on average it takes 96% of the 
contract duration to reach to the stage of contract award. For example, for a 
contract duration of 90 calendar days it may take 86 days to award the work. 
Assuming that the contract is completed on time (that is, keeping R1 constant 
at 1), the delivery time would be 176 calendar days. If somehow the 
performance of SKAA is introduced in the SIP context the delivery time could 
be reduced by 75 calendar days [1 76-(90+0.12*90)=75]. The implication is that 
the urban infrastructure would reach to the poor 75 days earlier. This is an 
example of how performance benchmarking could be used to demonstrate 
that a better level of performance is achievable. 
It is indicated that the cost estimates at the feasibility stage could out by as 
much as 24 % from the Engineer's final estimate. That was the case in SKAA 
with R4 at 1.24. The difference between the Engineer's estimate and contract 
award figure could be as large as 67% as was the case in CIVIC projects with 
R5 on 1.67. In terms of anticipating what the completion cost of the contract 
would be, performance varies from only 4% to as much as 23 %. That was the 
case with KMC small contractors at R6 of 0.96 and SKAA with R6 of 0.77. 
Community participated contexts. 
" SKKA performed best in cost control performance with R1 at 0.67. 
" CSPU even with the delays of 37% came as the best schedule control 
performer with R2 at 1.37. SIP performed the worst with R2 at 2.05. Even in 
the NHDA context the average delay of 89% was indicated with R2 at 1.89. ' 
Only one figure of 2.4 was available for the R3. That was the case of SIP. It 
indicates that even if the community acts as contractors during the 
implementation stage, the overall delivery time could be as large 240% of the 
contract duration. The delivery time for our hypothetical example of 90 
calendar day's contract would still be 306 calendar days. The key here is the 
improvements in the pre-implementation stages of the procurement process. It 
is important to note that these delays were due to the fact that the cases 
reported were the first attempts at community partnering in the SlPs. This 
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meant that the procedures were being explored and developed, in addition to 
time spent on community mobilisation. 
* The community contracts were based on negotiation. The negotiated contracts 
are closer to the estimates. In CSPU the estimated cost is the contract cost 
with R5 on 1. In community contracts the scheduled and market rates were 
often used as the basis of the negotiation (see chapter six). The client 
benefited in terms of more accurate estimates and cheaper cost. 
An overview. 
9 Cost performance of the micro-contracts studies is very good with a value of 
1.07. 
* In cost related performance the best performance was from the community 
context. That was SKAA departmental works with R1 at 0.67. The best 
schedule control performance was from routinely procured contract contexts 
that is from CIVIC with R2 at 0.6. However, the remaining contexts in the 
routinely procured contexts were worse than the community participated 
contexts. 
* Comparison of lowest and the highest in the non-community and community 
contract indicate that the cost control is a lot better than the time control. The 
worst case scenario of the contract exceeding the contract price was by only 
7%. The contracts exceed the contract duration by as much as 235%. The 
reason could be the fault and slow work of the parties to the contract or the 
unrealistic estimation of the contract duration. The research reveals (for 
example Text box 6.13) that there was no systematic method of the duration 
estimates adopted in the current procurement practises of the micro-contracts. 
The other reason could be that there is a strict requirement to keep the 
contract cost within the stipulated margins and in the case of going beyond 
such limits, fresh approvals are required. This can be difficult and time 
consuming. However, justifying the variation in the duration of the contact 
does not require any special action. 
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9 The key area of improvement in the procurement process for micro-contracts 
seems to be in the estimation of cost, estimation of contract duration, pre- 
implementation stage and schedule control. 
An interesting question is whether there is any difference in the overall mean 
of the R1 and R2 in the routinely procured contracts and community 
participated ones. 
8.4.6 Comparison of Rl and R2 for the micro contracts where community 
acted as contractor. 
A more detailed enquiry was conducted in the overall R1 and R2 of the 
community and non-community contracts. A Clustered bar chart is shown as 
Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 Mean Rl and R2 of Micro-contracts 
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R1 , which 
indicates the cost control for community and non-community contracts 
are within 10 %. The scheduled control in the community contracts seems to be 
less effective. The difference is approximately 22%. But it is hard to say whether 
the high R2 in the community contract is due to the relatively inferior performance 
of the community contractor or unrealistic estimates of the contract duration. The 
procurement process were also different. 
The question arises as to whether the difference in the mean R1 and R2 of the 
community and non-community contracts are statistically significant, or are due to 
chance. A Non- parametric, Mann-Whitney U, test was used to see whether the 
difference in the R1 and R2 of the community and non-community contract are 
statistically significant. The SPSS output is reproduced as Tables 8.10 and 8.11 
Table 8.10 Difference between R1 of community and non-community 
participated contracts 
Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
R01 -Ratio of contract completion and contract 
by T. CON Type of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
69.88 41 T. CON = 1.00 community 
107.24 157 T. CON = 2.00 non-community 
198 Total 
Corrected for ties 
uwz 2-Tailed P 
2004.0 2865.0 -3.7294 0.0002 
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Table 8.11 Difference between R2 of community and non-community 
participated contracts 
Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
R02-Ratio of actual duration to contract duration 
by Type of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
93.69 31 T. CON = 1.00 community 
73.42 123 T. CON = 2.00 non-community 
154 Total 
Corrected for ties 
uwz 2-Tailed P 
1404.5 2904.5 -2.2637 0.0236 
Observations 
9 The tables indicate that the difference between the community and non- 
community R1 and R2 (section 8.4.4) is significant at significance level of 0.05. 
e The question to ask is whether the statistically significant difference has any 
practical significance as well. If we refer to the Table 8.9 it could be noted that 
comparing the worst cases in respective categories; 2.35 and 2.06, practically 
they are similar. However, if we compare the best cases; 0.6 and 1.37, the 
best in routine procurement is better than the best in community participated 
context. 
9 Similarly, for all practical purposes, the performance in terms of cost control for 
both the community and non-community contracts is similar 
8.4.7 Variations of RI and R2 within the contexts of community and non- 
community micro-contracts. 
Do R1 and R2 vary within the category of community and non-community 
contracts. To answer the question non- parametric Analysis of Variance(ANOVA) 
was used. Analysis of variance is a suitable tool when the samples are three or 
more. The SPSS output is reproduced as Tables 8.12 and Table 8.13. 
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Table 8.12 Kruskal Wallis One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of R1 by 
contract contexts for community and non-community participated 
contracts. 
Community 
Kruskal-Wallis 1 -Way Anova 
R01 
by Contexts of contracts 
I Mean Rank Cases 
28.67 6 CONTEXTS = 
25.67 6 CONTEXTS = 
25-00 2 CONTEXTS = 
6.00 4 CONTEXTS = 
. 
20.04 23 CONTEXTS = 
41 Total 
Chi-Square 
10.0096 
1 OPP 
2 sip community 
3 cspu 
4 dw skaa 
5 nhda community 
Corrected for ties 
D. F. Significance Chi-Square D. F. Significance 
4 0.0403 10.0131 4 0.0402 
Non-Community 
Kruskal-Wallis 1 -Way Anova 
R01 
by Contexts of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
95.03 
31.83 
78.30 
97.31 
49 CONTEXTS = 
30 CONTEXTS = 
42 CONTEXTS = 
36 CONTEXTS = 
157 Total 
Chi-Square D. F. 
44.2233 3 
Observations 
6 skaa non-community 
7 kmc small contracts 
8 cmc drainage 
9 sip non-community 
Significance 
0.0000 
Corrected for ties 
Chi-Square D. F. Significance 
44.6769 3 0.0000 
9 There is a statistically significant difference (P< 0.05) among the R1 of 
respective community and Non-community contracts. Not all the contexts 
within the community or non-community categories have the same mean Rl. 
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Table 8.13 Kruskal Wallis One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of R2 by 
contract contexts for community and non-community participated contracts 
Kruskal-Wallis 1 -Way Anova 
Community 
R02 
by Contexts of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
18.67 6 CONTEXTS =2 sip community 
11.50 2 CONTEXTS =3 cspu 
15.70 23 CONTEXTS =5 nhda community 
31 Total 
Corrected for ties 
Chi-Square D. F. Significance Chi-Square D. F. Significance 
1.0318 2 0.5970 1.0339 2 0.5963 
I Non-community 
I Kruskal-Wallis 1 May Anova 
R02 
by Contexts of contracts 
I Mean Rank Cases 
68.00 53 CONTEXTS 6 skaa non-community 
26.51 35 CONTEXTS 8 cmc drainage 
88.40 35 CONTEXTS 9 sip non-community 
123 Total 
Corrected for ties 
Chi-Square D. F. Significance Chi-Square D. F. 
55.3697 2 0.0000 55.4467 2 
Significance 
0.0000 
Observations 
* Due to the higher Significance value, 0.596, it is not evident that there is a 
statistically significant difference for R2 between the contexts under the 
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category of non-community contract. This indicates very similar R2 within the 
community contracts undertaken in the different organisations. 
For non-community contracts the difference between R2 is significant(P< 
0.05). 
8.4.8 Larger the contract the larger the R1 and R2? 
The possible relationship between the R1 (cost growth) and R2 (Duration growth) 
was explored to see whether the control gets less effective as the size of the 
contract increases. This could provide indirect indication of the capacities of the 
contractor involved in the micro-contracts to handle larger contracts. 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show scatter diagrams with regression lines imposed on the 
data. The value of the square of the correlation coefficient(Rsq) between the two 
variables is shown. The value of Rsq is also termed the coefficient of 
determination, and is used as indication of goodness of fit. The cost is given in 
equivalent UK Pound sterling(1996 conversion rates as given above) and the 
duration is calendar days. 
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Figure 8.4 Relationship between duration and R2. 
Observations 
Both the correlation lines in Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show a slight upward trend. 
This does indicate that as the cost and duration increase, R1 and R2 would 
also increase. 
e The indications are the shorter (less than 150 days ) the duration the tighter 
was the schedule control of the micro-contracts. 
o The less the cost of the micro-contracts the better was the cost control. 
* The R-square value for the relationship between the cost and R1 was 0.1656. 
The R-square value for the relationship between duration and R2 was stronger 
at 0.2945. 
The cost control performance is relatively less sensitive to the cost of the 
contract. While the schedule control is relatively more sensitive to the duration. 
This ties in with the finding that overall cost control performance is superior to 
that of schedule control. 
It was also observed that there was no proportional increase in the cost for the 
increase in duration. This is at first sight an unusual finding. The rationale is that 
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if time is money then any additional time of contact should be proportionately 
reflected in the cost. Statistical analysis was used to see whether the correlation 
for contract cost and duration holds for variation in the cost and duration as well. 
The correlation coefficients for the contract cost and duration and for the 
variations in the cost and duration are presented in Table 8.14. See Appendix 8 
for SPSS output. 
Table 8.14 Variation in Correlation coefficients of cost and duration 
Tests Coefficients P Value 
Contract cost-contract duration 0.8433 0.000 
Actual cost-actual duration 0.8636 0.000 
Change in cost-change in 
duration 
0.1471 0.000 
I 
Observations 
e There is marked reduction in the coefficient of correlation between change in 
cost and change in duration as compared to either contract cost and duration 
or actual cost and duration. 
9 Assuming a typical relationship (for example, Kaka and Price 1991), 
Duration = Function of cost, 
T=f (C) 
Where, 
T= Duration 
Cost 
a function 
The relationship between the change in cost and change in duration could be 
expressed as; 
AT=ý(AC) 
Where, AT= Change in duration 
C= Change in Cost 
ý=a function 
Assuming that the basis on which the initial contract duration was estimated 
and the basis on which the time extension is estimated are similar, it can 
be 
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argued the relationship between the variation in cost and variation in duration 
would be similar to that of relationship between the contract cost and contract 
duration at the time of award. The observed change in the correlation 
coefficient indicates that the relationship has changed. The change could be 
due to some other variables which have an influence on the relationship 
between the cost and duration. One possibility could be that the quality for 
which the contract was awarded had changed so that the time taken now for 
doing the job may be more, but it does not cost more. 
The other implication is that the initial contact duration was not realistic and 
time extensions were given without giving the cost associated with the time. 
However, the most serious implication could be that the additional cost is 
incurred by the contractor but it was borne by him by lowering the quality of 
the work. It is to be noted that if the additional time is not costing as such as in 
the main contract for the similar works then the situation may not be beneficial 
to the work. Due to non quantitative measurement of the quality it is quite hard 
to model relationship between cost and duration including quality. 
8.5 Socio-economic performance indicators. 
The administration of contract and procurement in general seeks to ensure that 
the objectives of time, cost and quality are attained. During the course of 
research and the interaction with the relevant people it became evident that there 
are some other impacts occurring where the community partnered procurement 
is adopted (section 7.8) 
Some of the impacts were: 
The participation process as a means of offering empowerment and greater 
control to households and community groups. 
Actual and potential income generation for low income groups who are paid for 
undertaking work associated with contracts. 
Enterprise development and local micro-contractors develop and exploit the 
niches created 
other benefits to the local economy such as new or increased business 
opportunities for construction related and construction generated activities. 
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The micro-contact appears to offer means to address the urban poverty agenda. 
However, certain indicators were developed in consultation with the field workers 
and the social development experts in a group discussion (section 3.6 and 6.3). 
Some preliminary testing of indicators was done on the SIPs micro-contracts in 
India. 
It is difficult to desegregate the impacts that are due to the micro-contracts and 
the one that would have occurred even if the micro-contracts had not been 
implemented. The judgement was made by the officials involved in the contracts 
in ascertaining that the impacts are in fact due to the micro-contracts. The data is 
based on the contract files and official notes. Some of the indicators were: 
1. Number of meetings with community at pre-implementation, implementation 
and post implementation stage of the contract. 
This indicator was to see whether there was interaction between the officials 
and the group. The interaction is taken as a first step of empowerment. 
However, that the holding of meetings does not mean good interaction. The 
quality of interaction is important, and is not mentioned by this indicator. 
2. Number of skilled and un-skilled training days provided. 
3. Number of formal and informal training provided. 
Some of the training may not be formally termed as training but being provided 
as on- the job-training. The cases of apprenticeship could come under this 
class. 
4. Number of incidence of small enterprise development. 
This is to indicate that the micro-contract provided the opportunity for the 
entrepreneurs. The activities could include such economic activities as 
opening of a canteen or hardware shop due to micro-contracts. 
5. Money circulation due to the micro-contract in the local economy. 
The circulation of money is seen as a sign of economic health especially if the 
money is coming from out side the local economy and is remaining with the 
local economy. 
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Table 8.15 presents the numbers of formal and informal meetings between 
officials and community. It is emphasised that this work is of preliminary nature 
only, and was undertaken in an attempt to explore possible avenues for 
developing poverty impact analysis for further studies. 
Table 8.15 Meetings of officials and community at different stage of micro- 
contract. SIP context. 
Stages Meetings 
Means 
(N=44) 
Formal Informal 
Pre-implementation 5.9 %5 8.63 
During implementation 3.75 14.06 
11 
Post- implementation 1 1.15 1 1.85 
Observations 
The frequency of the meetings varies with the stages of the contract. Most 
meetings were of informal nature. 
* There were a relatively low frequency of meetings after implementations. This 
indicates that either there was no requirement for interaction between the 
officials and the community or the participation was gradually abandoned. 
9 The figures do indicate that during the implementation stage there was a high 
degree of interaction. But the figures do not reflect what happened in each 
meeting. Further qualitative data needs to complement the figures. However, 
as compared to the non-community strategies, there was an increased 
interaction throughout the procurement stages. This is based on the finding 
that in non-community contracts there is no interaction with the community. 
The chances of having situations where the empowerment could be 
encouraged are therefore greater in the community partnered procurement. 
9 The interesting finding is that there is more informal interaction than formal. It 
is crucial to explore this fully in any impact assessment work. 
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Table 8.16 presents the finding related to the indicators 2,3, and 4 above. 
Appendix 9 provides more statistical information. For the calculation, mean 
values have been used. 
Table 8.16 Indicators related to socio-economic factors. SIP context of 
Micro-Contracts. 
Some indicators Means 
(N=44) 
Number of skilled labour days. 314.90 
Number of un-skilled labour days. 
_841.93 Number of formal training days. 0 
Number of informal training days. 53.18 
Number of incidence of small 
enterprise development I 
2.77 
Observations 
e Approximately 1157 labour days were generated on average by a micro- 
contract in the local economy. 
9 There was no formal training provided but approximately equivalent of 53 
training days were provided informally. 
9 On average approximately three incidences of small enterprise development 
were observed for each micro-contract. The financial and economic impact of 
such incidences could be very short term or could lead to a chain of economic 
activities. However, further studies are required to capture such impact. 
Tables 8.17 and 8.18 present the money circulation in the local economy due to 
micro-contracts. 144 calendar days is the mean contract duration for overall SIP 
micro-contracts. The relevant data is presented in appendix 9. 
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Table 8.17 Estimated money influx due to labour component for a micro- 
contract. SIP context. 
(N=44) 
1. Money influx in local economy due to 314.9 * 100 = IRS 31,490. 
skilled labour. 
2. Money influx in local economy due to 841.93 * 60 = IRS 50,518.5 
unskilled labour. 
3. Per-day money influx in the local (31490+50518.5)/144 = IRS 569.33 
economy due to labour component of 
the micro-contract. 
Note: Rate for one skilled labour day was approximately rupees 100 and for one unskilled labour 
day is rupees 60. 
Table 8.18 Circulation of money in the local economy due to micro-contract. OPP 
context. 
(N=32) 
Contribution per house. Average actual cost /Numbers 8906.16/14.56 = IRS 612 
(Pk. Rupees) ofhouses 
Circulation due to labour and Average labour and material 2854.19+5903.53=RS 8,758 
material. cost 
(Pk. Rupeacl 
Per-day financial transaction in Labour and material cost 8758/17.57 = IRS 498 
the local economy related to duration 
micro-contract. 
(Pk. Rupees) 
Observations 
9 People in a low income community could afford to contribute, as a client, up to 
a sum of RS 612 [E 9]. 
oA micro-contract could generate circulation of money of the order of IRS 8758 
per micro-contract. 
* On average approximately 500 rupees per could be circulated in the local 
economy due to a micro-contract. 
The calculation is quite conservative as this is based on only labour and 
material component estimations. If we also included the profits and overhead 
and assume that the contractor is located in the local economy, as much as 
50%(30-40% profits and overheads at different stages) of the contract cost 
could circulate in the local economy. The benefits of such circulation would be 
in addition to those associated with the infrastructure provision. 
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In the case of OPP the money did not come from outside but only circulated 
from households to the service and goods' providers in the local economy. 
The indications are that the micro-contracts procured through community 
partnered arrangement could be a powerful mean to increase the influx of 
money in the local economy and /or increase the circulation of the money 
within the local economy. 
8.6 Entry of community contractors in the mainstream public sector works. 
This section examines whether the possibilities exist for a community contractor 
to develop into a mainstream contractor. To answer the question the existing 
system of ICTAD was taken as an example. The reason is that In Sri Lanka there 
is a national system of registration of contractors. The processes had been 
described in chapter four. 
Table 8.19 provides the scores of the contractors already enlisted in ICTAD. 
Table 8.19 Capacity related scores of the 90 contractors in the lowest three 
categories of the contracts in ICTAD registration scheme. 
(n=30) (n=30) (n=30) 
Factors Category-M7 
Mean 
Category M8 
Mean 
Category M9 
Mean 
Financial 
capacity 
2.93 1.89 0.40 
Experience 2.53 1.67 None 
Plant and 
Equipment 
3.35 1.45 0.91 
Professional 
and technical 
staff 
2.03 None. None 
Supervisory 
staff 
2.25 1.23 1.03 
Total 12.21 5.32 1.51 
8.32 
Observations 
To enter into the lowest category the dominant factor are financial capability, 
supervisory staff and plants and equipment (section 4.2,4.5 & 5.3). A typical 
community group lacks the demonstrable financial capability and they do not 
keep plant and equipment except if they are professionally related to 
construction. Since the community group may not be a full time constructor 
they would lack the supervisory staff. 
* The experience becomes important in the category dealing with the works of 
more than a million rupees. 
With the present registration system it is not easy for community 
entrepreneurs to enter the system. 
However, it has been reported that some of the community development 
councils after experience of many years were able to get registration as 
contractors in ICTAD. 
With the better understanding of the community partnered approaches it is 
quite feasible that the authorities may feel confident to register experience 
community contractors into the mainstream contacting system. If and when 
that happens more frequently, and there is no reason why that should not 
happen, the avenues for micro-enterprise development would be increased. 
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9.1 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and recommendations 
The hypothesis of the study, that within the similar representative conditions of this 
study, ' community partnering' between the urban public sector and suitable urban 
communities is an appropriate procurement strategy, has been supported by the 
study. The following conclusions have been drawn from this programme of research 
into the procurement of tertiary level infrastructure for urban poor communities in the 
developing countries of the South Asia region. 
Roles and responsibilities 
1 The research has developed a clear understanding of how community-based 
initiatives for the procurement of infrastructure relate to and can link up with the 
formal procedures of urban government. The communities involved in the micro- 
contracts studied have demonstrated their capacity to participate in the 
procurement of infrastructure. 
2. Community groups take on a wide range of roles and responsibilities which 
correspond to those of client, engineer, and contractor in routine procurement. 
2.1 Community as promoter The community fully or partially finances the 
infrastructure at tertiary level. This is restricted to small value contracts, as illustrated 
by the Orangi Pilot Projects (OPP) works, Sind Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) 
internal works, Faisalabad Area Upgradation Project (FAUP) and Clean Settlement 
Programme Unit (CSPU). 
2.2 Community as Engineer The community undertakes planning, monitoring and 
supervision of the contract. Examples are Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) 
/Asian Development Bank (ADB), CSPU, and Sevanathe. 
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2.3 Community as construction contractor The community undertakes construction 
related tasks, partially or fully, such as material purchase, labor works or 
management. The examples are SKAA internal works, OPP, National Housing and 
Development Authority (NHDA), Slum Improvement Programme (SIP), CSPU. 
2.4 In both the cases of community as promoter and/or engineer, the community 
needs to be supported technically by either an NGO or the officials of the urban 
government. The requirement on the part of urban government is to encourage what 
is happening at the grass roots level and support the community in improving its 
performance. Changes in the regulatory framework, or alternatively not exercising 
the controls of the current framework, are implied if this process is to be developed. 
3. Innovation in the procurement process is required if the community acts as the 
contractor but this may well be possible from within existing government 
procedures which allow for alternative procurement strategies. These include 
Departmental Works and Entrustment of Works. The government of Sri Lanka 
has sustained innovations for over ten years and has started to assimilate them 
in its rules and procedures. 
4. The key conclusion to emerge is that there is no single identifiable role model for 
participation in urban infrastructure procurement; this diversity had not previously 
beenidentified. 
Community partnering 
5. Community Partnering is proposed to embrace a variety of roles and 
responsibilities in a relationship or contract (sections, 2.1,2.3 2.4,2.12,2.13 & 
6.2). Community partnering is an approach which emphasises a relationship 
among the stakeholders that is not adversarial for achieving mutually agreed 
objectives. This exhibits a clear parallel between the partnering in the 
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management and development disciplines (see section 2.13). In its broadest 
sense, it reflects both the continued involvement of people with the planning, 
implementation and sustenance of local infrastructure and service improvements, 
and with income generation, enterprise development and skills training. A key 
aspect in the community participated procurement was the achievement of 'goal 
alignment' thus producing the efficient contracts (see section 2.4 and 6.2) of 
promoter and the contractor. If an organisation is constructing or monitoring 
infrastructure for its own use, there is no reason for them to produce a lower 
quality, high cost and longer duration work. However, it is possible that some 
factors other than the intentions of the community may affect the work, for 
example lack of skill and management. 
6. The underlying implications of the community partnering are: 
Full acceptance of the urban poor as primary stakeholders in local infrastructure 
provision. 
The development of longer term more open-ended relationships, encompassing 
joint financing, planning, design, implementation, hand-over and maintenance. 
Promoting co-operation both formally and informally with government agencies 
and NGOs. 
The potential to target groups of the urban poor, rather than solely area-based 
dwellers in specific slums. This is relevant because local inhabitants do not 
necessarily carry out improvement works themselves because of lack of both time 
and relevant skills. 
7. Community partnering promotes the role of the community in the procurement of 
tertiary urban infrastructure Where community initiatives succeeded, with 
communities adopting the roles discussed previously, a similar approach was in 
operation. It is concluded that to reflect such relationships between the 
community and urban government, the term community partnering is justified. 
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8. Community partnering addresses the socio-economic factors making it further 
appropriate for the procurement of urban infrastructure. Through community 
partnering it is possible to look beyond the physical slum into different groups of 
the urban poor, where the skilled and unskilled labour pool necessary to 
contribute to the infrastructure improvements almost certainly exists. 
Implementing works through community partnering provides opportunities for 
targeting interventions in a way which integrates into wider strategies of urban 
poverty reduction. 
9. Community Partnering offers an opportunity to address the poverty agenda 
through income generation, enterprise development and creating employment 
opportunity. The case for community partnering in its broadest sense is strong. 
Not only does it compete favourably in terms of the traditional contractual 
performance measures of time, cost and quality, it offers a whole range of other 
potential benefits which can be targeted at low income groups to assist their 
empowerment and improve their economic conditions. 
1O. Government procedures offer a surprising amount of flexibility if applied 
appropriately, and the community partnering approach has been shown to be 
possible within the contexts of urban government programmes. 
1. Costs associated with the community partnering approach influence project 
management. There is a need for government and donor to allow for additional 
time and increased flexibility especially in the initial stages of the projects which 
involves community partnered procurement (CPP). This research has shown 
limited qualitative evidences to support this conclusion but further work to explore 
the wider impacts is warranted. 
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Performance of Micro-contracts 
12. Community partnering in procurement performs well in terms of the conventional 
performance contract performance objectives of the time, cost and quality. The 
performance is comparable in terms of time and cost with infrastructure procured 
through the routine tender contract process. 
13. There is indicative secondary source evidence that the quality of the 
infrastructure procured through community partnering is of superior quality as 
compared to that procured through the routine tender contract process. 
14. Important indicators for performance have been developed in this research. 
These can be measured relatively simply from existing information contained in 
typical contract files, and hence are readily usable. The key indicators are cost 
growth (ratio of actual and contract cost) and time growth (ratio of actual and 
contract duration). The research has found that the best average cost and time 
growths for the CPP and conventionally procured infrastructure are 0.67,1.37 
and 1.07,0.6 respectively. 
15. Benchmarking is now a widely used management tool for guiding improved 
performance, and it is appropriate to apply the concept to improve the 
performance of micro-contracts. The benchmarks for cost growth could be 
initially taken as 1.05, while for time growth a value 1.58 is appropriate for the 
region. 
Recommendations 
16. Further benchmarking needs to be performed on micro-contracts using the 
indicators and benchmarks developed in the research (Note: The Department for 
International Department, UK has agreed to fund a research project in line with 
this recommendation). 
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17. A framework and tools should be developed for the appraisal, monitoring and 
evaluation of micro-contracts for the procurement of local infrastructure. Such 
tools need to capture the wider impact of community partnered procurement, 
particularly socio-economic impacts. As part of this impact analysis, the process 
and actors involved in procurement through the micro-contracts could be further 
explored using stakeholder analysis techniques. It is important to investigate the 
effect of procurement strategy and community partnering on the performance of 
operations and maintenance of the tertiary level infrastructure and urban services 
at the neighbourhood level. 
18. Safety and risk involved for community groups need further exploration. This is 
particularly important should the community undertake relatively large contracts. 
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APPENDIX I 
Data base index 
It is to be noted that each item may represent more than one record. For example 
if thirty files were reviewed in an office set-up the notes related to the review was 
entered as an item. Therefore, the actual documents reviewed were many times 
more than the serial numbers of the data base index. 
1.1 Documentary Records 
1.1.1 India 
Entry Items 
- - 1 A -questionnaire related to procedures containing 38 questions filleFEC_F_6`y_T8_ 
Indian Engineers of the ranks of executive Engineers. 
Copy of conditions of contract used_in Calcutta, India. 
3. Copy of conditions of contract used in Zochin, India. 
4. Copy of conditions of contract used In Cuttack, SIP, India. 
5. Copy of conditions oTcontract used in VejayawaEFa, India. 
- - -_ 6. Co py oT file of construction of stores shed at Ran ingarithota(l3haskara-Rao 
pet), Rev. est. IRS. 949000, Original est.: IRS. 779400[Copy of file, notes 
included. ODA related], Vijayawada slum improvement project. [Submitted as 
an example of deviations in design during execution of work]. 
7. Copy offile of providing cc roads and drains in Greenland slum, est.: IRS. 
446000[Copy of file, notes included. ODA related], Vijayawada slum 
improvement project. [Submitted as an example delayed completion]. 
_ 8. Copy oTfile of Providing of NT roads and cc reads and drains in George pet, 
est. IRS. 320000[Copy of file, notes included. ODA related], Vijayawada slum 
improvement project. [Submitted as an example of delayed execution]. 
Copy of file of Providing of WBIVI surface and drains to feeder road second bit 
in Prakah Nagar, est. IRS 620000 [Copy of file, notes included. ODA related], 
Vijayawada slum improvement project. [Submitted as an example of delayed 
execution and deviations]. 
10. Copy oFfile of providing revetment to protection to protection bund-reach 5, 
est.: IRS. 286100[Copy of file, notes included. ODA related], Vijayawada slum 
_ 
improvement project. [Submitted as an example tender called four times]. 
TT_- Copy of file related project management unit, slum improvement project(ODA) 
Cuttack, pattapole and Hairanpor 
- - 12. - Fo pment Copy of file/other a-ocuments related to Calcutta Metropolitan Deve 
Authority, CSIP phase 1A and CIVIC ward No. 141, [ODA funded]. 
- - - - 13. - m e n t oF Copy of Kerala Gazette extraordinary published by authority, Govern 
Kerala, 1990[Kerala Municipal Corporations( Public works and supplies) rules, 
- _ 1 
1990]. 
i 4 _- Copy -of Proceedings of the Divisional co-operatives officer, ViJayawada, 
Rc. no. 1190/92F dated 21-4-92[permission granted to Labour contract co- 
operative society] 
File note exercise 12 participants revisited in August 1996. 
From Ganguly- Small 4 write-ups on the study areas for which the bench 
marks data was taken. 
From Mr. Brahamji- Copies of relevant documents from files of five contracts 
received from Vijayawada related to contracts for which benchmark. 
From Mr. Brahamji- Write up on study area with map. 
TT_ 
L-1 
From Mr. Brahamji-Copy of circular related to proposed work for phase 111 
slums -revised estimated by the Andhra University. [Working includes 
local 
- - 
language]. 
2u. From Mr. Gangadhara Rao-A short write up about a slum_Fn_V-jjaya-w-aEFaT0--r 
which the contract benchmark data was collected along with the map. - From OM77ra Rash and R. Ankaiah-Copies of relevant document m file-s-of- 
six contracts received from Vijayawada related to contracts for which 
- 
benchmark data was collected. 
-2T From OMPrakash-Copy of G. O. MsNo. 30. dated 17-2-94, titled I welf-a-re 
Department-Work programme for the benefit of scheduled Tribes-Allotment of Works in Tribal Sub-Plan area and other area to the local village development 
committees, (VDCS) Mahila Sangams/Societies/Ayacutdars/Beneficiaries- 
certain concession-Sanctioned' with annexe describing the procedure for such 
works. The order issue with the concurrence of Finance and planning 
(Fin. Wing) Department, vide their U. O. No. 1645/44/Expr. PWD/94 dated 2-2- 
94. The order was issued under the name of the Governor of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
23. From OMPrakash-Write-up on slum and works related to the benchmaFF-ing 
data. Map also provided. 
_24- From PKGhose-Copies of documents from Tile-in-c-Fuding design details, 
calculation and correspondence. A small write up on the study area is also 
provided. 
25. From-K. Yedukondala Rao- Copies of relevant documents from files of five 
contracts received from Vijayawada related to contracts for which benchmark. 
26. From-K. Yedukondala Rao-Tender notices, three numbers. 
27. From-K. Yedukondala Rao-Write up on study area with map. 
28. G ro-up-Tench marks based on the working of groups from, Vijay a, 
Calcutta, Cochin, Cuttack and Lukhnow. 
_29-. Notes related to focused group discussion of 12 Indian Engineers during 
workshop in UK. 
30. Out put Of Workshop participated by 13 Indian Engineers held in UK. SIP 
1996. It includes output of four groups from; 
1 Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority 
2Cochin 
3Cuttack 
4A Vijayawada 
4B. Vijayawada 
The output[From all 13 Engineers] included the; 
Worksheet-1 Analysis of process of conventional procurement 
Worksheet No. - 2 Analysis of the tender documents and the associated 
authority 
Worksheet-3. Analysis of requirement of sureties and insurance form 
contractors in conventional set-up 
Worksheet-4. 'What if analysis' in conventional set-up Worksheet-5. Workout 
the 'community partnering' features. 
Worksheet-6. 'What if analysis' in Community partnering set-up 
Worksheet-7 Identification of the area where community groups could be 
involved. 
Worksheet-8 Method of assessment of capacity 
A Model Note to higher authorities to institutionalise the community partnering 
concept[From all 5 Groups] 
31. Overall proposed Benchmarks by Indian officials 
32-. PEC (96): India: Cuttack urban services improvements project, 
PEC(96) 27: India7Cochin urban poverty reduction project. 
Y4--. Performance related [Benchmarking] data of 44 contracts. 
Refuse collection contract in Banglore, India. 
X. - Result of focused group discussion of 10 Indian Engineers validating the 
Preliminary finding and some measurements. The out put include the 
Worksheets [2 Nos. ] containing 21 statements. 
1.1.2 Pakistan 
Entry Items 
3rd Quarterly Report , July-September 1994, Sindh atchi -ABadis AuthoFifý-, Karachi, Pakistan. 
62nd Quarterly Report April-June 1995, Orangi Pilot Project, - Karachi, 
Pakistan. 
- 39. 63rd Quarterly Report July-Septe mber 1995, Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, 
Pakistan. 
40. 6th Quarterly Report , April-JUne 1995, Sindh Kachi Abadis Authority, Karachi, Pakistan. 
7th Quarterly Report , July-September 1995, Sindh Kachi Abadis Authority, 
- 
Karachi, Pakistan 
-- - - - 42. A certificate [LocaT a F n g uage using English terms written in Urdu] issued by 
the president of the Pakistan people Party [ruling party] ward-7 showing 
satisfaction with the work completed to Executive Engineer SKAA. [Related to 
Zia-ul-Haq Colony] 
43. A completed form of agreement, KMC 
- - 44. A copy of 'Completion CeffifiE a te' issued by Joint Director OPP to D. G. SKAA. 
. [Related to Zia-ul-Haq Colony] 45. copy of a note sheet approving the project as demonstration, FAUP. 
46. .; 
8ý - COPF 0 cou language using English terms written in Urdu] of agreement [Local between SKAA and the contractor for execution of work in Zia-ul-Haq 
colony[Development works]. 
47. A copy Fan agreement between FAUP and the committee, FAUP 
- - 48. A copy of application for enlistment as contractors, KMC. 
49. 7ý copy of correspondence torm director and Joint Director OPP to the 
Director General SKAA along with the 'brief study on the experiment carried 
out by SKAA and OPP to compare the work between contractors and 
departmental method'dated 5-4-95. 
' 50. A copy of correspondence form director and Joint Director OPP to the 
Director General SKAA along with the 'brief study on the experiment carried 
out by SKAA and OPP to compare the work between contractors and 
departmental method'dated 13-5-95 [Unsigned]. 
- ` ' 51. ' )W w-it F --A -copy of covering letter from Director OPP to Director general SK 
the progress report for the month of November of 1995 titled' No supervision 
in early stages of work in Baloch colony has created problems'. Dated 19-11 - 
95. 
52. A copy of executed contract, Karachi Metropolitan corporation, Corporation, 
general rules and directions for the guidance of the contractors, PWD-7 
including additional terms and conditions. 
53. A copy of expenditures related to the Omar Baloch Goth sewerage scheme, 
signature dated 25-5-95. 
54. - A copy of-fetter from Director OPP to Director Katchi Abadis, KMC related to 
KMC/ADB works dated 2-4-94. 
- 55. - KMC regarding A copy of letter from Director OPP to the Administrator 
maintenance of KMC/ADB works and extension of model dated 31-7-94. 
56. A copy of letter from director SKAA- to Director OPP to attend a review 
meeting regarding CKAIP. 
7-7. A copy of market rates collected by the Engineer KESC DATED 10-11-91 and 
updated by him on 29-12-95. 
-- - 58. with slow pace d A copy of newspaper cutting titled ' IBRD mission disappointe 
of work' DAWN dated 18-7-94. 
59. A copy of paper showing the people in attendance in a project ap roval 
committee, FAUP. 
60. A copy of proposed agreement on payment arrangement for secondary 
works[inter-organisational working arrangement ] 
-- - 61. conditions. T copy of the executed tender along with the schedule and 
-6T- A copy of The gazette of west Pakistan Ea7ore Friday, August, 29,1969[notification no. So-1 1(2)/ce9/39552)/68] The west Pakistan municipal 
committee(work rules) 1969. 
63. A newspaper cutting titled ' Pace on Kachi abadii reviewed, n, Nove-m--15-er 19,1995. [Related to the shelter programme and HMC]. 
64. A Note from the Manager to the Director mentioning the work t ad been 
checked by him and the work performed, dated 10-6-94[in local language 
related to KMC/ADB-SPA-1]. 
A questionnaire containing 32 questions filled for 25 local small contractors oT- KMC [94-95] 
66. A questionnaire containing 3 questions related to the procedures filled for 4 
local consultants related to KMC. [94-95] 
67. A questionnaire containing 71 Questions related to procedures filled by tFe 
Executive Engineer of SKAA[1 994-95]. 
-68. A questionnaire related to procedures containing 71 questions fillea for the 
officials of KMC, 2 Engineers and 2 Accountants. [94-95] 
69. A report on OPP creait programme by sarhad rural support corporation[An- 
NGO]. 
70. A sample copy of file including plans, estimates and description of the 
projects 
- 71. T ccess to credit for rural women in Pakistan, proceeding of a two day 
workshop, February 2-3,1994, Islamabad, organized by 
UNDP/UNIFEM/SUNGI. 
72. Application Form For Enlistment Of Contractor, S-ini-aTFa-tchi Abadis Authority 
Pakistan [Photocopy Provided By The Executive Engineer, Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority Pakistan] 
73. Brief on Karachi Abadis, Directorate of Katchi Abadis, Karachi Metropolitan 
corporation, March 1995. [Copy]. 
74. Completed Application form, Enlistment of contractor's rules, FaisaTa-EaT 
Development Authority along with the correspondence showing the enlistment 
of the contractors and requirement 
75. Contacts to the sources of the case studies to IIED study related cases. 
76. Copies of two Gallop tender notice signed by the Executive engineer 
SKAA[send for publications and posting on the board]. 
77. Copy of conditions of contract used in KMC, Pakistan. 
78. Copy of conditions of contract used in SKAA, Pakistan. 
- - 79. ra tion, -Co-py--o-f conditions Of Contract, Karachi Electric Supply Corp6 
Pakistan. 
80. Copy of corrigendurn to tender notice dated 8-1-95 by SKA Signed by the 
Executive Engineer.. 
- - 81. fU- Copy of Gallop tender notice published in the newspaper Dawn dated 2U- 
93 related to HIVIC Works, Hyderabad Municipal corporation. 
82. Copy of irýiformal Contracts in FAUP, Pakistan. 
83. Copy of minutes of review meeting held on 14-3-95 regarding Collaborative 
Katchi Abadis Improvement Programme conveyed to the Director OPP 
through letter from Director SKAA dated 9-3-95. 
Copy of minutes of review meeting held on 25-10-95 regarding Collaborative 
Katchi Abadis Improvement Programme conveyed to the Director OPP 
through letter from Director SKAA dated 1-11-95. 
85. Copy of minutes of review meeting held on 29-8-95 regarding Collaborative 
Katchi Abadis Improvement Programme conveyed to the Director OPP 
through letter from Director SKAA dated 3-9-95. 
86. Copy of minutes of review meeting held on 3-10-95 regarding CollaBorative 
Katchi Abadis Improvement Programme conveyed to the Director OPP 
through letter from Director SKAA dated 9-10-95. 
87. Copy of non-standard contracts used in SKAA, Pakistan. 
- - - 88. lals. 01fi c Copy of pages from document stating powers of different 
89. Copy of pages related to the water supply scheme at wahid colony and Zia- 
-1 
ul-haq colony signatures dated 18-8-95 and 1-8-95. 
Copy of Public notice published in a newspaper inviting-objections and 
suggestions and invitation to see the plans, dated 12-1-94, Karachi Abadis 
and Evaluation, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. 
Copy of PWD conditions of contract, Government Of -Pakis an -Pakistan 
Public Works Department, C. P. W. D. -7, Pakistan. 
Copy of PWD conditions of contract, Government Of Pakistan Pakistan 
Public Works Department, C. P. W. D. -8, Pakistan. 
Copy of schedule of rates for materials and labours and some tasks agreed 
upon by OPP and SKAA for estimation of the works. 
Copy of tender notice by M-unicipal committee West, KMC, publ-isfi-e-d- -in 
newspaper dated 29-7-92. 
- - - Copy of tender notice by, KMC, , 
To r published in newspaper dated 20-10-93. 
Details of 34 works related to the internal works procured by the coF-m--unity 
the actual expenditures and description of work and community group. 
Details of 6 contracts related to the internal works procured by the community 
, estimates provided and the actual expenditures and description of work and 
community group. 
-9T- Directory Civic agencies Karachi- 1994-95, Karachi admFnistration women 
welfare society. 
Draft of case study for IIED, Iyari, Karachi. 
_100. Draft of case study for IIED, 'Manzoor Colony, case study of Anj man-e- 
Falah-e-o-Behbood I sector, Manzoor Colony, Karachi'. 
_TGT_. Draft of case study for IIED, 'Welfare Colony, Karachi. 
TOZ. -_ Draft of case study for IIED, Ghaziabad, Karachi. 
-Tua-. Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project PC-lReport, Faisalabad development 
Authority, Faisalabad , Project Management Unit, 1992. 104. Form B-1 Public Works Department Circle Division Percentage Rate Tender 
And Contract For Works General Rules And Direction For The Guidance Of 
Contractors[Photocopy Provided By The Executive Engineer, Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority ] Pakistan] 
General Directions and conditions of contract for works on percentage 
tender[central PWD code paragraph 89] CPWD-7, Pakistan Public Works 
department, Government of Pakistan. 
i F General rules and directions for the guidance of the contractors, The Fa racF I 
electric supply corporation limited(Civil and works department), Karachi 
Pakistan. 
107. Government of Sindh housing town planning, local government and rural 
development department, notification Karachi dated 16-4-1980. [sindh council 
(contract) rules, 1980. 
-TMF- International seminar on development of construction industry 25th -27th 
September 1990 organised by Pakistan Engineering Council in Association 
with World Bank-UNDP-USAID 
109. Introductory Note About Sukkur Social Welfare Association, Sukkur, Pakistan. 
-TTU. - Item rate tender ad contract for works[Central PWD code, paragraph 891 
CPWD-8, Pakistan Public Works department, Government of Pakistan 
-TTf-- Katchi Abides Upgrading KSDP-Scheme, A. D. B-793 Pak SF., Progress report 
up to may 1993, Directorate of Katchi Abadis, Karachi Metropolitan 
corporation [Copy] - 112. code N -Laying of sewer line and re-laying of brick soling(street 
Neighbourhood 2-A/1, Rasool Nagar, Project No. 3, Activity proposal Team - 
A, project management Unit(PMU), Faisalabad area upgrading 
project(FAUP), FDA [Copy]and copies of related receipts 
- 7 17T. - 2-c/4, Noorpura, Laying of sewer line(street No. 8. Part-1) Neighbourhood 
Project No. 4, Activity proposal Team -A, project management Unit(PMU), 
Faisalabad area upgrading project(FAUP), FDA [Copy]. - 114. Abadis Leaflet- Good news for re ents of Katchi Abadis Sindh KatcFV 
Authority[local language] 
_TTT_ Leaflet Related To The Purpose of The Lease Camp, Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Authority[local language] 
-ff 6-. 
- 
Leaflet-Instruction For Lease, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authon oca anguage] 
-ffT 
- 
Leaflet-Lease Rates Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority[local language] 
- - TTS 
. 
Minutes Of Meeting Fe ld On 8th January, 1995 Under 1he_7ýF_airma_ns_h-1p-ZýF 
Additional Chief Secretary (P & D) To Discuss SKAA's Social Programme 
And Devise An Integrated Approach For The Development Of Katchi Abadis 
- 
In Sindh, Pakistan 
-fTF Mohsin Ali report on the reorganisation of Pak. PWD ( 1961-67), (3ov-ernment 
of Pakistan file No 196, GPPK-111/56-2/H(66)DCS7F-27-9-67-1500000. [Got 
- 
from the archive record of PWD], Islamabad Karachi. 
-TT07 Municipal Directory, Karachi administration women welfare society. 
- Note Sukkur is an example off community involvement and international donor- 
agency 
122. Notes Related To 7fie UNDP-UMP Sukkur Workshop Options For -Poverty 
Alleviation Actions At Municipal Level For Sukkur, Dec. 6-7,1994, Pakistan. 
123. Orangi pilot project NGO profile, Environment and Urbanisation, Vol., No. 2, 
October 1995. [Copy]. 
- 124. Orangi pilot Project, 60th quarterly report October -December 1994,. - - __125. Pakistan engineering council Acl 1976[Published in the gazette of Pa_ýistan 
Extraordinary dated the 14th January, 1976]. Pakistan Engineering Council 
_ _ _ 
Islamabad. 
T2 G 
. Pakistan Standard Conditions of contract for Civil Engineering Work-s -1n Pakistan(PSCC CIV), First Edition December 1992, Pakistan Engineering 
Council, Islamabad 
- - 127. Pamphlet -Katchi Abadis Of Ra rachi And Procedure For Leasing Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority[local language] 
128. Pamphlet-Regularisation Of Katchi Abadis In Sindh Katchi Al-a-U-s 
Authority[local language] 
129. Part 1 Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority Notification, 20 the Nov. 1993, The 
Sindh Government Gazette, Pakistan 
130. Performance related data of 10 contracts of SKAA through Departmental 
works. 
131. Performance related data of 30 small contracts of KMC. 
132. Performance related data of 53 contracts of SKKA through conventional 
procedures 
133. Performance related data of 56 contracts of KMC/ADB funded projects 
related to Katchi Abadis in Karachi. 
7-a-4 Photocppy of newspaper cutting titled 'NO, thank you, says SKAA to donors', 
dated 11-6-94, Dawn Karachi. 
135. Proceedings Of The National Workshop On UNICEF's Urban Basic Services 
Project, Sukkur, January 19-21,1994 Partnership In Development ( An 
Alternative Development Approach), Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority. 
7 TT_ Proceedings Of The Workshop On The Role Of Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Authority/Local Councils/NGOs/Community In The Regularisaton And 
Upgradation Of Katchi Abadis, June, 12,1994, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority 
& UNICEF. 
737- Project proposal for construction of a drain in Neighbourhood A street 7 of 
chak 7(punjward), FAUP[Copy] 
138. Siddique. S. & Hasan A., 1994[Draft Paper]Options For Urban Poverty 
Alleviation Actions At Municipal Level For Sukkur, Pakistan, Arif Hasan And 
Associates, Architects And Planning Consultants, Pakistan. 
_TTT_ Siddiqui, A. G. [Administrator Sukkur Municipal Corporation], 1994, SIVIC And 
Poverty Alleviation, UNDP-UMP Workshop, Pakistan. 
140. Siddiqui, S. 7 Hasan, A., Report on The UMP Sukkur Workshop on Poverty 
Alleviation Sukkur, December 6-7,1994(Draft, December 21 1994), Arif 
Hasan & Associates, Architects and Planning Consultants, Karachi Pakistan. 
141. Siddiqui, T. A., Nov., 1995, Katchi abi3-es the problem and ways to a 
solution. 
_ 142 Katchi Abadis Some necessary instruction for lease[Leaflet], Sindh 
Authority[local language] 
-T4T. -- 
- 
Tend er/C-ontract Document, 
T4T The Gazette of P tan extraordinary published by Aut-Fo-Tri-tT, -TsTa-mi-a-E-aýf, - 
Sunday, August 24.1986. 
145. The Gazette of Pakistan extraordinary published y Auffi-orby, Islaffia5a-d-, 
Wednesday, July 8.1987. 
146. The purpose of lease camps, [Leaflet], Sindh Katchi Abadis Auffi-o-rity[local 
language]. 
-147. The Sindh Government Gazette, 1997, P ublished by Authority, Sindh Kat-EFT 
Abadis Authority Regularisation, Improvement and Development) 
-1 - 
Regulations 1977. 
74 87 The Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, 1987 Sindh Act No. 11 Of 1987, Government Of 
Sindh , Pakistan 149. Workshop on Collaborative Katchi Abadis Improvement programme ( CKAIP)' 
pilot project in Hyderabad, February 14 1995. [Copy]. 
-150. Yeh Bastian A Magazine On Problems Of Katci Ab adis, Oct. -Dec. 1994, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority, Pakistan. 
1.1.3 Sri-Lanka 
Entry Items 
- - -- 151. A dv ance payment Bond, cylinco insurance Co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
-- 152. Tg reement form on community contracts[in sinhali], NHDA, Sri-Lanka. 
- _ _ _ 153. d, cylinco insurance Co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. Sid Eo n 
154. Blank summary sheet used for information regarding contractors 
155. Break down of the registration of the CDC year wise since 1979. 
- 156. CFe ansettlement programme pilot project no. l[Photo copy] from report 
Siddharthapura, kirillapone Colombo. 
157. Clean settlement programme unit, [pamphlet] Ministry of housing, 
construction and public utilities, Sri-Lanka. 
158. Client guide and explanatory hand book National grading and registration 
system, September 1995, ICTAD. 
159. -C-6-mmunity Action Planning: Formation Of Community Development 
Councils, December 1994, CAP Workshop Module Guidelines Series, , UNCHS/DANIDA Community Actions Planning Training Programme, National 
Housing Development Authority Sri-Lanka 
160. Community Actions Planning: Maintenance Of Common Amenities, 
December 1994, CAP Workshop Module Guidelines Series, December 1994, 
UNCHS/DANIDA Community Actions Planning Training Programme, National 
Housing Development Authority Sri-Lanka]. 
161. Community Actions Planning: Making Micro-Plans For Community 
Improvement, November 1994, CAP Workshop Module Guidelines Series, 
December 1994, UNCHS/DANIDA Community Actions Planning Training 
Programme, National Housing Development Authority Sri-Lanka. 
162. 7ý6 -mm uni ty managed sewer disposal system process and 
progress[pamphlet], 1993, Sevanathe 
163. Community-Based Monitoring And Evaluation Of Settlement Improvement, 
August 1994, CAP Workshop Module Guidelines Series, December 1994, 
UNCHS/DANIDA Community Actions Planning Training Programme, National 
Housing Development Authority Sri-Lanka 
164. Conditions of contract[in Sinhali], Sevanathe, Colombo, Sri-Lanka. 
165. - Constitution used in the registration of the CDC[local language] 
166. Contract between CSPU and community group, Sri-Lanka. 
__ 167. pport organisation, Sri- ka. Contract between CSPU and tFe__Su 
- 168. , Colombo 
Sri-Lanka. Contractors all risk policy, cylinco insurance UO. Lid 
169. Contractors recordF-book National registration and grading of construction 
contractors, ICTAD. 
170. Copies 30 evaluation sheels of M7 contractors 
171. 
- 
Copies 30 evaluation sheets of M8 contractors 
172. 
- 
Copies 30 evaluation sheets of M9 contractors 
- 173. Copies from files about the criteria of SO- assessment procedure and 
- - 
selection criteria. CSPU 
T72F Copies from files related to the women banks 
175. Copies from the project files of B. O. Q. CSPU 
176. Copies from the project files of the Bank payment receipts. CSP 
177. Copies from the project files of the contract conditions[local language]. CSPI 
178. Copies from the project files of the drawings. CSPU- 
179. Copies from the project files of the schedule. CSPU 
180. Copies of minute notes of a project file. [Local language and English]. -C-STU- 
181. Copy agreement for community assignment [to be used t-orcontractors or the 
organisations], Form No. CSPU/IF/CONS/1, Ministry of Housing, Construction 
and Public Utilities. CSPU 
182. Copy from the contract register of the contracts from 1992. NHDA 
183. Copy of conditions of contract used in CIVIC, Sri-Lanka 
184. Copy of contract agreement [to be used for contractors or the organ -1satio_n__sJ_, 
Form No. CSPU/lF/CONS/2, Ministry of Housing, Construction and Public 
Utilities. 
185. Copy of contract between CSPU and the Support organ isation[Local 
- - - 
language]. 
- TS 6. Copy of executed agreement[local language] 
187. Copy of guidelines tor small scale contracts to community organ isations[in 
_ _ 
sinhali], NHDA, Sri-Lanka. 
T8T Copy of letter 2/Gen/176 dated 6-7-95 by General Manager NRDA to 
Secretary Ministry of Housing, Construction and Public Utilities titled 'Award of 
small scale contracts to societies at village level without following competitive 
tender procedures'. Along with the draft letter by the DGM dated 21-6-95 and 
15-8-95. 
189. Copy of letter dated 28-6-95 by Secretary Ministry of housing, construction- 
and public utilities to Chairman ICTAD, Director of Buildings, GM NHDA, GM 
NWS&DB titled 'Award of small scale contracts to societies at village level 
without following competitive tender procedures. 
190. Copy of letter FIN-1085-335-7 dated 2-6-95 by Director General of Public 
Finance to Secretary Ministry of Housing, Construction and Public Utilities 
titled 'Award of small scale contracts to societies at village level without 
following competitive tender procedures'. 
Copy of letter FIN322, Treasury No: 1085-335-7(vol. -2), award of small scale 
contracts to approved societies dated 25-8-93. 
Copy of summary of coFt-ract related information dated 20-1-96[Local 
- 
language] 
79T. Copy of treasury Circular No: Fin-345 dated 16-1-96 titled' Award of small 
_ 
scale contracts to approved societies'. 
TT4_ Data related to 96 contract out of which 42 are community contract. 
195. Details of 26 contracts from the projects division of Colombo Municipal 
Council. 
- - - - 7DT-7 n c Ti Details of 42 contracts from drainage division of Colombo Municipal Cou 
197. Erection all risks policy, cyTi-nco insurance co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
- - 198. ic ipa Filled bill of quantities and schedule of prices as example, Colombo mun 
council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
t997- Form for payment vouchers, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
200. Form of agreement, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri Lanka 
2UT- Form of agreement, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
- 2M-. Form of bill of quantities and schedule of prices, Colombo municipal counciF, 
Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
203. Form of certificate to be furnished by the head of department in making 
payments, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
204. -Form of payment certificate, Colombo municipal council, Colombo SriTan a7-1 
205. Form of work note, Colombo municipal HI ýi !!!! !! ` ka. 
206. Form used for recommending the acceptance OT the quotation by _tfi_e_5_u`i27in_g_ 
surveyor, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
20t. Form used to convey the contractors about the shortcomings of their 
application form. 
208. Ganepola, P., 1987, Orangi pilot project A report ii:: i- a to a low cost 
- - 
sanitation project, NHDA, Sri-Lanka. 
T79 Guidelines for grading of construction of contra_cto_r_s, _FC7AD' 
_210. ICTAD institute for construction training and de-velopment Supervisory- and 
management training courses[Pamphlet] ministry of housing construction and 
public utilities. 
ICTAD profile[Brochure] Institution for construction training and-a-evei-Fo-pment, 
Ministry of policy planning and implementation, Sri-Lanka. 
212. Information related to the low cost sanitation programme of IDA credit 1707 
CE. CSPU 
213. Jayarathne, K. A., 1995, collaborative partnership between NG d local 
Government to Establish community construction contract procedure to 
improve the low income Neighbourhoods in Kandy Municipal Council, Report 
for Habitat International coalition. 
214. Jayarathne, K. A., 1996, Community built and managed sewer disposal system 
in Gajapura-BO Sevana, Colombo 
215. List of publication of ICTAD 
' 216. List of the community contracts since 1992 and some details--Tocal- 
_ _ 
language]. 
7T7 Majeed, M., Solid Waste Management In The City Of Colombo, [copy oFsome 
pages]. 
218. Manual for community construction contract, 1993, Hanna Nassif Community 
upgrading project Dar es Salaam/ 
- - 219. NIRDT Conditions Of Contract For Community Contracts, Sri-Lanka. 
220. Objects and code of ethic, [Pamphlet] Association of construction contractors 
of Sri-lank(estb. 1981) incorporated in 1989 under the companies Act No. 17 of 
1982, regular member of the international federation of Asian and Western 
pacific contractors' Association. 
221. One sample of executed application of Category M7[copies from files] 
222. One sample of executed application of Category M8[copies from files] 
223. One sample of executed application of Category M9[copies from files] 
224. Performance Bond, cylinco insurance Co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
225. Profile of the NGO, National forum for people organisation 
226. -Irroposal for constrictor's all risk insurance Fire department, cylinco insurance 
co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
227. Proposal for contract guarantee insurance, cylinco insurance co. Ltd, 
Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
- 228. _ nsation 75roposal to insure liability to Employees under workman's comp6 
ordinance or at common law. 
229. Questionnaires and proposal for erection all risks insurance, cylinco insurance 
co. Ltd, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
230. -Uu-otation for house drainage connections, General conditions, drainage 
division, Colombo municipal council, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
231- Refuse/public place cleansing contract Cajamarca. 
23 Role Of Urban Local Authorities In Promoting Low-Income Settlement 
Development Programmes, Guidelines, January 1995, UNCHS/DANIDA 
Community Actions Planning Training Programme, National Housing 
Development Authority Sri-Lanka 
233. Sealed quotafion notice, drainage division , 
Colombo municJpal council, 
Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
234. Sevanathe Urban resource centre Its evolution function-in the context of 
urban low income communities of Sri Lanka, , 
Colombo, Sri-Lanka. 
235 1995, Community action plann-ing eval ns aslessons, S. Srivardhana 
. , , 
report for UNCHS. 
_n, _6_. ___Srivardhana, S., 1996, Social mobilisation in the- Janasaviya programme: issue of a country wide process, chapters form forthcorn ing book to be 
_ 
Published by UNESCO. 
237. Susil Srivardana, Community Actions Planning(CAP). XCritical Perspective 
238. Susisl Srivardana, Community Actions Fianning((; AP) Works op Report 
Strategy Lessons For CAP Implementation In 1994 And Thereafter, 
- 
Workshop Held On 12-2-94, Colombo Sri-Lanka. 
-2T9. Training Modules for junior supervisors and contractors ACCSL(1 1 Nos. I 
_ _ 
day modules)[Photocopy]. 
_T4 T Treasury circular letter No. Finance 225 No. FIN-1085-3 14, awa-rcTof small 
scale contracts to rural development societies and similar societies dated 25- 
8-87. 
- 241. Treasury circular No. Finance 227 My No. FIR/1085T/335/14 CS)k -, award if 
small scale contacts to rural development societies and Gramodaya 
Mandalayas, dated October 1984. 
242. n's compensation policy, cylinco insurance Co. Ltd, Colombo SrF- 
Lanka. 
I 
1.1.4 Miscellaneous 
243. Contract Of Allocation Of Public Places Cleansing Services, Provincial 
- 
Municipality Of Cajamarca 
-2T4 Standard Form Of Contract For Piece Work-Civil Engineering Works 
conditions Of Contract, Ministry Of Works, The United Republic Of Tanzania 
1.2 Interviews and the field notes 
Interviews[INT] conducted and Notes [NTS] taken are summarized as follows. The transcript and 
the tape records are available with the researcher. 
Entry Reference and Name (as applicable) (Designation/Description) 
- -- 245. PKINT-1, Mr. Raza Ali puty Director Works, KMC Ue 
-- - - 246. PKINT-2, MT Jafri Finance/Computers, puty Director 96 
KMC 
- -R 247. PKINT-S, MT-Gul Hassan ecutive Engineer, SKAA Sx 
248. - PKINT-4, Mr. Mjeed Petty Contractor And Worker 
249. PKINT-5, Mr. Qaiser Bengali Research Associate, Applied 
Economic Research Centre 
250. - -PKWT--6, Mr. Tasneem Ahmed SiddiquI Director General, S 
- - - 251. PKINT-7 R Manage, NBP San 
252. PKINT-8, Mr. Hafeez Arain Joint Director, OPP 
253. PKINT-9, Mr Shahid Mehmood Executive Engineer/Social Organiser, 
FAUP 
254. PKINT-10 
' 
Ms. Feroza And Team Members 
- - - - - 255. PKINT-1 1, Mr. Zafeer-Ul-Haq 
_ 
erintending Engineer, PWD S x- S up 
256-. - PKINTS-1 
- 
FAUP Record 
- 25 1. -PRITrT-2 FTUI5 Record 
2SF- -PKNTS-3 Contractor, KMC 
259-. PKINT-1, Mr. Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui 
' 
Director General, SKAA 
- - - -- 260. PKINT-2, Mr. Gul Hassan cutive Engineer, S E x e 
261. PKINT-3, Ms. Perveen Rehman Director, OPP 
262. PKINT: 4, Saadia Faz-Fi And Mr. Aftal World Bank Shelter Programme 
- - 263. - PKINT-5, Mr. Jawed RTI Manager UP15 - 
264. PKINT-6, M 
_ 
r. S uleman Memon PFo'j-ect Director RIVIC 
- 
PKINT-7, M 
- 
r. S alim Cheema Contractors, 
266. PKINT-F, Mr. Ghulam Mohiud CBO Orangi 
Sharnsuddin 
267. 
- 
PKINT-9, M r. N oor Ahmed Saifi Manager, OPP-RTI 
268. PKINT-10, Mr. Aziz CBO Baloch Colony 
269. 
- 
PKINT-111, Mr. Ayub Sub-Engineer, SKAA 
270. PKINT-12, Mr Arif Construction Contractor 
271. PKINT-13, Mr Rasheed Welfare Colony 
272. 
- _ 
PKINT-14, Mr. Naeem Shah Welfare Colony 
2737 
- 
PKINT-15, 
- - 
Mr. Ibrahim Construction Contractor Baloch Colony 
274. 16, FKrlqT- Mr. Muhabbat Khan 
- 
CBO, Manzoor Colony 
'275. PKINT-17, Mr Shahid Saleem CBO, Orangi 
- 276. 
7 _ 
18, Mr. Anwar Mehmood AnsaF-i Ts--sistant Executive Engineer, K ESC7 
277 
. PKINT-19, Mr. Gul Ameen --C-o--ntractor KESC 278. PKINT-20, M. Z _ . Karim UNICEF 279. PKINT-21, 
_ 
Mr. Imtiaz Director Field Office, SKAA 
280. PXRqTM]-2 2, Mr Liaqat Ali Mr. Ghulam CBO Sukkur 
Mustufa Mr. Shamsuddin 
281. PKINT[GJ-2 3, Dr. Ali Ahmed staff Project Director CIVIC Sukkur 
_ ' 
Activist 
28 27 PKINT-24, 
- ' - 
Arif Hassan Consultant 
283. M RT- 25 Mr. Masood Anjum 
' 
Assistant Executive Engineer, P WD 
284. PKINT-26, Mr. Rafi Divisional Accounts Officer, PW D 
285. PKINT-27, Mr. Shahid lqbal Acting Superintending Engineer, PWD 
286. PKINT-28, 
- - 
Mr. Bashir Ahmed Sheikh Registrar, PEC 
_ 287. FKrRT- 29, Mr. Ijaz VV-aF'id Colony 
288. 
_ 289. MNT30, Mr. Ahmed Umer Baloch Colony 
290. PKINT-31, Mr. Nazeer Sub-Engineer, SKAA 
291. PKNTS-2, Gul Hassan Executive Engineer, SKAA 
_T9T_ PKNTS-3, Mr. Chaman Thalla Wala Orangi 
_ _ _ 293. -PRNTS-4 VV-o r Fshop, SKA 
- 294. PKNTS-5 M cords SFTA e 
- -- 295. -PRN7'9-6 OP15 Records 
296. PKNTS-7 OP157Records 
297. PKNTS-8 Weekly Meeting, OPP-RTI 
298. PKNTS-9 Shah Rasool Colony 
_ 299. -PRNTS-1 0 Nfieie-ting Consultant And NGO 
- - - 300. PKNTS-1 1 W n t fily Meeting, SKAA 
_ 301. 2 VVe7Fare Colony 
- 302. PKNTS-13 Wa nzoor Colony 
303. PKNTS-14, M. S. Sara SiddiqUi -Karachi Administration Women 
Welfare Society 
304. -15 Gol Tikri Sukkur - 305. PKINITS-16, Ms. Chughtai L-Frarian in Library, PWD 
306. PKNTS-1 7 Wahid Colony And Zia-Ul-Haq C olony 
307. - PKNTS-18 Baloch Colony 
- - 308. - SRINT-1, M r. U . A. F. H. Ganepola 
TTe puty General Manager, NHD A 
309. SR1NT-2 Ms. Dishna, CSPU 
- 310. - SRINT-3, M r. N. S. Jayasundera Wu-nicipal Engineer, CIVIC 
- 311-. SRINT-4, M r. S . G. V. D. 
H. Gunasekara CSPU Municipal Engineer, 
312. - SRINT[G]-5 ,U niversity 
Of Muratawa 
- 3T3-. SRINT[G]-6 Construction I Institution Of raining 
And Development 
314. - SRI NT-7., -M r. D harmashree Assistant GeneraFManager, HD A 
315. -8, M s. Kamudini Samara Singha Construction 
Engineer, CIVIC 
316. SRINT-9 C itractor, Cmu 317. SRINT-10 
318. SRINT-1 1 Siziperanium Coniractor, umu 
319. SRINT-12, Mr. An 
_w Lionel ConstrGic-Ition Engineer, Cmu 320. 13, Mr. George AsSTs-t-ant To DGIVI, National water 
supply and Drainage Board, Sri-Lanka 
321. SRINT-14, Mr. A. K. fayarat ne 
3ý_ SRINT15, Mr. Sunil Amendra Consultant 
323. 
- 
SRINT-16, W. P. J. Prishir District Manager, NHD e 324. SRINT-17, Mr. Tudor Construction Engineer NHUA Galle 72S. SRINT-18, Mr. Vejaygana Mayor Of City Of Galle 
326. SRTR71 9 Community Development Officer, GMZ7__ 
327. SRINT-20, Cosedd Desilva Executive Director, NationaF 
Construction Contractor Association 
328. 
- 
SRINT-21, Mr Chandre Fernando 
- 
Insurance Consultant 
329. SRTNT- 22[G] Insurance Company 
330. 
__ 
SRINT-23, Mr. H. M. Dyanand Assistant General Manager, NHDA 
77 
- - 332. SR RT 9-1 Sidaradhapur, Colombo 
333. SRNTS-T Kirulapura, Colombo 
334. SRNTS-3, Feriuvattta -Ta-U-e 
335. SRNTS-4 
_ 
Mahamotra Vatr Galle 
336. 7MTS-5, Takiyouvathe Galle 
337. SRNT,:; -R , 
Mr. Sugath Welivitigoda Community Development Officer, GMC 
M. S Gita 
338. SRINT-1, Mr. H. M. Dyanand Assistant General Manager, NHDA 
339. 
__ 340. 
-- 
Sý7 Mr. Susil Sri Vardhena -EX-7hairman, NHDA 
341. SRINT-3, Mr. N. S. Jayasundera Municipal-En--g-ineer, CIVIC 
342. SRINT[G]-4 Clean Settlement Programme Ministry 
Of Housing 
343. 
344. SRINT-5, Mr. G. A. P. H. Ganepola 
_ _ _ 
Deputy General Manager, NHDA 
345. S RTNT- 6, Mr. A. K. Jayarathne Sevenatha-NGO 
346. SRINT-7, Mr. GuIrathne Chief Medical EduE-ation officer, CIVIC 
347. SRINT-S, Mrs. Visaka Dais _Ue--puty Municipal Engineer(SWM), 
- 
CIVIC. 
348. 
- 
SRINT-9, Mr. Demel 77i[re_ctor, ICTAD 
349. SRINT-10, Ms. Kamudini Samara --C-onstruction Engineer, CIVIC 
Singha 
350. SRINT-11, Mr. NandasJn Presi ent, Women Bank 
351. - SRINT-12, Mr. Willie Gamagee National forum of peoples organisation 
__ _ 352. - SRINT-13, Mrs Gayashekara -0-eputy Municipal Engineer(Project sý , 
' 
CIVIC 
- - 353. SRINT-14, Mr. GuIrathne eMedical Education officer, CIVIC Uhi-i 
354. SRINT-15, Mr. Demel Director, ICTAD 
SRINT-16, Mr. G. A. P. H. Ganepola Deputy General Manager, NHDA 
T5-G-. SRINT-17, Dr. Ravi-F5r-e-ra National programme co-ordinator, 
Ministry of planning, ethnic affairs and 
- 
National integration 
SB7-. SRINT-18, Mrs. Visaka Dais Deputy Municipal Engineer(SW 
CIVIC 
- - - - SRINT-19, Mr. G. A. P. H. Ganepola and NHDA and 0 eputy General Manager, 
Mr. Hermal fernando Director Director General Public Finance' 
SRINT-20, Mr. Anura 
SS_CT_. SRINT-21, Mr. Demel ICTAD 
-- -3m- SRINT-22, Mr. A. K. Jayarathne 7ýe venaffia-NGO 
SRNTS-2 Nation-aT- Housing Development 
Authority 
SRNTS-3 meeting 
- - --SU5- -SRNTS-4 an Settlement Programme Ministry CTe 
Of Housing 
- - --ýýý -SRNTS-5 Iq-ational Housing Ne velopment 
Authority 
--ýS77- SRNTS-6 Govilaputra Colombo 
- - -RS- SRNTS-7 meeting P7uU Fic 
- - - - RNTS-8 dhapur Colombo S Rida rai 
APPENDIX 2 
Checklist for interviews 
" Let the interviewee talk and express 
" General background about contract, organization and person. 
" Background of interviewee, is qualified to make statements that he/she is making. 
" Atmosphere of the office/site and factual information. 
" Procedural framework. 
How he/she talks in between to other, tone and face expressions. 
Processes involved in procurement, who is doing what and when? 
" Stages in the procurement. 
" Duration and sequence of stages. 
" Can the documents or other evidence be shown in support of statement, ask politely 
and indirectly. 
" Experience in community participated experience. 
" Experience in routine procurement 
" Justification of officials for alternative routes, if applicable. 
" Attitudes/Behavior/Perception of micro-contractors and community towards officials and 
procurement's process. 
" Attitudes/Behavior/Perception of officials towards NGOs, C130s, micro-contractors and 
community. 
Performance of contracts; time, quality, cost and wider social objectives. 
Nature of relationships; adversarial or partnering. 
Nature of documentation. 
Satisfaction with the process and perceived satisfaction of other stakeholders. 
Parallel informal relationships. 
Social factors like involvement of politicians and bribery 
Suggestions for research and the procurement process, what would you do if? 
In case of person interviewed more than one try to raise issue again to see any 
difference and explore reasons. 
APPENDIX 3 
Steps in Hypothesis Testing. 
The steps in the test are(Norusis 1993): 
9A hypothesis was formulated that there is no difference in mean (null 
hypothesis) with its alternative hypothesis. 
eA test statistic is chosen to evaluate the null hypothesis. 
9 For the sample, the test hypothesis is calculated. 
e The probability, if null hypothesis is true, of obtaining a test value at least as 
extreme as the observed is determined, here the P-value. 
* If the observed significance level is judged small enough (here less than 0.05) 
the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Some Statistical Tests 
Binomial test: It is of goodness-of-fit type. It tells us whether it is reasonable to 
believe that the proportions (or frequencies) we observe in our sample could 
have been drawn from a population having a specified value of P. In this case the 
specified value of P is 0.05. 
Chi square: The technique is of goodness-of-fit type in that it may be used to 
test whether a significant difference exists between an observed number of 
objects or responses failing in each category and an expected number based on 
the null hypothesis. 
T-Test: The test is used to established whether the two means are equal. 
APPENDIX 
ROUTINE PROCUREMENT 
sKAA 
CON. Cos contract cost 
Valid cases: 49.0 Missing cases: 4.0 Percent missing: 7.5 
Mean 404723.9 Std Err 53020.94 Min 13445.00 Skewness . 9590 
Median 321556.0 Variance 1.38E+ll Max 1293994 SE Skew 
. 3398 5% Trim 379254.3 Std Dev 371146.6 Range 1280549 Kurtosis -. 1601 
95% CI for Mean (298118.2,511329.7) IQR 505041.0 SE Kurt 
. 6681 
CON. DU contract duration 
Valid cases: 53.0 Missing case s: .0 Perce nt missing: .0 
Mean 92.8302 Std Err 6.3770 Min 30.0000 Skewness . 4838 
Median 90.0000 Variance 2155.298 Max 240.0000 SE Skew . 3274 5% Trim 90.2201 Std Dev 46-4252 Range 210.0000 Kurtosis . 7498 95% CI for Mean (80.0338,105.6266) IQR 60-0000 SE Kurt . 6444 
KMC CONTRACTS 
CONCOS contract cost. 
Valid cases: 30.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 21930.47 Std Err 596.3565 Min 9486.000 Skewness -1.9213 
Median 22447.50 Variance 10669233 Max 24985.00 SE Skew . 4269 
5% Trim 22284.00 Std Dev 3266.379 Range 15499.00 Kurtosis 6.0393 
95% CI for Mean (20710.78,23150.15) IQR 4817.750 SE Kurt . 8327 
NHDA 
C. COST Contact cost 
Valid cases: 54.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 10254182 Std Err 2291287 Min 8050.000 Skewness 2.8977 
Median 3313623 Variance 2.83E+14 Max 79066826 SE Skew . 3246 5% Trim 7429942 Std Dev 16837450 Range 79058776 Kurtosis 8.6197 
95% CI for Mean (5658443,14849921) IQR 10205708 SE Kurt . 6389 
C. DUR contract duration 
Valid case s: 47.0 Missing case s: 7.0 Perce nt missing: 13.0 
Mean 229.1064 Std Err 22.3310 Min 19.0000 Skewness . 3433 
Median 240.0000 Variance 23437.75 Max 540.0000 SE Skew . 3466 
5% Trim 223.1560 Std Dev 153.0939 Range 521.0000 Kurtosis -. 9275 
95% CI for Mean (184.1563,274.0564) IQR 270.0000 SE Kurt . 6809 
CMC DRAINAGE DIVISION 
C-COST contract cost 
Valid cases: 42.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 15259.23 Std. Err 3631.505 Min 1740.000 Skewness 2.8793 
Median 6078.500 Variance 5.54E+08 Max 114000.0 SE Skew . 3654 
5% Trim 11556.42 Std Dev 23534.84 Range 112260.0 Kurtosis 8.4096 
95% cj for Mean (7925.252,22593.20) IQR 8942.750 SE Kurt . 7166 
C. DUR contract duration 
Valid cases: 36.0 Missing case s: 6.0 Perce nt missing: 14.3 
Mean 9.3056 Std Err . 6771 Min 2.0000 Skewness . 6265 Median 8.5000 Variance 16.5040 Max 21-0000 SE Skew 
. 3925 5% Trim 9.1852 Std Dev 4.0625 Range 19-0000 Kurtosis 
. 3768 95% CI for Mean (7.9310,10.6801) IQR 7.0000 SE Kurt 
. 7681 
CMC PROJECTS 
CON. COS contract cost 
Valid cases: 23.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 553796.3 Std. Err 219410.8 Min 2970.000 Skewness 2.4720 
Median 83160.00 Variance 1.11E+12 Max 4125000 SE Skew . 4813 5% Trim 396527.1 Std Dev 1052257 Range 4122030 Kurtosis 5.8114 
95% CI for Mean (98766.25,1008826) IQR 272665.0 SE Kurt . 9348 
CON. DUR contract duration 
Valid cases: 21.0 Missing case s: 2.0 Perce nt missing: 8.7 
Mean 76.2381 Std Err 20-6922 Min 7.0000 Skewness 1.8381 
Median 30-0000 Variance 8991.490 Max 360.0000 SE Skew . 5012 
5% Trim 64.6190 Std Dev 94.8235 Range 353.0000 Kurtosis 2.9058 
95% CI for Mean (33.0750,119.4012) IQR 99-0000 SE Kurt . 9719 
SIP 
CON. COST contract cost 
Valid cases: 37.0 Missing case s: .0 Perce nt missing: .0 
Mean 557549.7 Std. Err 64360.56 Min 36150.00 Skewness . 5823 
Median 460383.0 Variance 1.53E+ll Max 1361201 SE Skew . 3876 
5% Trim 542527.5 Std. Dev 391490.0 Range 1325051 Kurtosis -. 6440 
95% CI for Mean (427020.4,688079.0) IQR 603647.0 SE Kurt . 7587 
CONDUR contract duration 
Valid cases: 37.0 Missing case s: .0 Perce nt missing: .0 
Mean 161.1351 Std. Err 17.1908 Min 7.0000 Skewness . 6339 
Median 150.0000 Variance 10934.34 Max 360.0000 SE Skew . 3876 
5% Trim 158.4459 Std. Dev 104.5674 Range 353.0000 Kurtosis -. 7233 
95% CI for Mean (126.2706,195.9996) IQR 150.0000 SE Kurt . 7587 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATED 
Contract cost 
Valid cases: 6.0 Missing cases: 26.0 Percent missing: 81.3 
Mean 8307.500 Std Err 1140.297 Min 
Median 8505.000 Variance 7801666 Max 
5% Trim 8336.167 Std. Dev 2793.146 Range 
95% ci for Mean (5376.273,11238.73) IQR 
KMC/ADB 
4491.000 Skewness -. 2203 
11608.00 SE Skew . 8452 
7117.000 Kurtosis -1.7418 
5232.250 SE Kurt 1.7408 
CONCOS contract cost 
Valid cases: 56.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 3761196 Std Err 518040.3 Min 227000.0 Skewness 3.2567 
Median 2608500 Variance 1.50E+13 Max 23122000 SE Skew 
. 3190 5% Trim 3183456 Std Dev 3876658 Range 22895000 Kurtosis 12.9626 
95% CI for Mean (2723021,4799372) IQP 2847000 SE Kurt 
. 6283 
DUR duration 
Valid case s: 55.0 Missing case s: 1.0 Perce nt missing: 1.8 
Mean 227.7455 Std Err 25.2232 Min -449.000 Skewness . 9223 
Median 182.0000 Variance 34991.67 Max 894.0000 SE Skew . 3217 
5% Trim 215.9343 Std Dev 187.0606 Range 1343.000 Kurtosis 7.1957 
95% CI for Mean (177.1759,278.3150) IQR 119.0000 SE Kurt . 6335 
SIP 
CON. COST contract cost 
Valid cases: 6.0 Missing case s: 1.0 Perce nt missing: 14.3 
Mean 48500.67 Std Err 11707.40 Min 24500.00 Skewness 1.1300 
Median 40052.50 Variance 8.22E+08 Max 97745.00 SE Skew . 8452 
5% Trim 47098.24 Std. Dev 28677.16 Range 73245.00 Kurtosis . 6470 
95% CI for Mean (18405.83,78595.50) IQR 45201.75 SE Kurt 1.7408 
CONDUR contract duration 
Valid cases: 6.0 Missing case s: 1.0 Perce nt missing: 14.3 
Mean 38.6667 Std Err 12.6535 Min 7.0000 Skewness . 9941 
Median 30.0000 Variance 960.6667 Max 90.0000 SE Skew . 8452 
5% Trim 37.5741 Std Dev 30.9946 Range 83.0000 Kurtosis . 1832 
95% CI for Mean (6.1398,71.1935) IQR 54.5000 SE Kurt 1.7408 
CSPU 
CONCOST CONTRACT COST 
Valid cases: 4.0 Missing cases: .0 Percent missing: .0 
Mean 390668.9 Std Err 163364 .7 Min 
Median 366047.7 Variance 1.07E+ll Max 
5% Trim 387933.2 Std Dev 326729.5 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-129231,910568.4) IQR 
CON. DUR CONTRACT DURATION 
Valid cases: 4.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 62.5000 Std Err 16.0078 Min 
Median 65.0000 Variance 1025.000 Max 
5% Trim 62.7778 Std Dev 32.0156 Range 
95% CI for Mean (11.5560,113.4440) IQR 
89834.00 Skewness . 1494 
740746.0 SE Skew 1.0142 
650912.0 Kurtosis -4.9552 
603286.4 SE Kurt 2.6186 
0 Percent missing: .0 
30.0000 Skewness -. 0838 
90.0000 SE Skew 1.0142 
60.0000 Kurtosis -5.5181 
57.5000 SE Kurt 2.6186 
SKAA 
CONESTC contract cost 
Valid cases: 4.0 Missing cases: 6.0 Percent missing: 60.0 
Mean 250790.0 Std Err 81979.19 Min 87360.00 Skewness . 0437 
Median 247625.0 Variance 2.69E+10 Max 
5% Trim 250438.3 Std Dev 163958.4 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-10104.4,511684.4) IQR 
NHDA 
C. COST Contact cost 
Valid cases: 42.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 347794.1 Std Err 39759.85 Min 
Median 276845.0 Variance 6.64E+10 Max 
5% Trim 344314.3 Std Dev 257673.3 Range 
95% CI for Mean (267497.4,428090.7) IQR 
C. DUR contract duration 
Valid cases: 38.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 77.3421 Std Err 9.7016 Min 
Median 67.0000 Variance 3576.610 Max 
5% Trim 69.6491 Std Dev 59.8048 Range 
95% CI for Mean (57.6848,96.9994) IQR 
420550.0 SE Skew 1.0142 
333190.0 Kurtosis -4.9188 305905.0 SE Kurt 2.6186 
.0 Percent missing: .0 
9936.000 Skewness 
. 2934 749623.5 SE Skew . 3654 739687.5 Kurtosis -1.3937 
487877.7 SE Kurt . 7166 
4.0 Percent missing: 9.5 
7.0000 Skewness 2.8969 
352.0000 SE Skew . 3828 
345.0000 Kurtosis 11.9047 
50.7500 SE Kurt . 7497 
I, 
APPENDIX 5 
PARAMETRIC TESTS 
SIP 
t-tests for Independent Samples of T. O. CON type of contractor 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
CON. COST contract cost 
non-community 9 37 557549.702 391490.013 64360.562 
community group 6 48500.6667 28677.164 11707.403 
Mean Difference = 509049.0355 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 11.293 P= . 002 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 3.15 41 . 003 161510.037 (182872.9,835225.2) 
Unequal 7.78 38.12 . 000 65416.704 (376633.7,641464.4) 
t-tests for Independent Samples of T. O. CON type of contractor 
Variable 
Number 
of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
CONDUR contract duration 
non-community g 37 161.1351 104.567 17.191 
community group 6 38.6667 30.995 12.654 
Mean Difference = 122.4685 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 6.793 P= . 013 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 2.82 41 . 007 43.386 (34.849,210.088) Unequal 5.74 27.49 . 000 21.346 (78.707,166.230) 
NHDA 
t-tests for Independent Samples of T. CON type of contracts 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
C-COST Contact cost 
non-commu 54 
community 42 
10254181.8 16837450.3 2291286.77 
332317.900 263705.204 40690.596 
Mean Difference = 9921863.9019 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 22.606 P= . 000 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 3.81 94 . 000 2601390.964 
(4756741,15086987) 
Unequal 4.33 53.03 . 000 2291648.049 
(5325468,14518260) 
: 5-- 
t-tests for Independent Samples of T. CON type of contracts 
Variable 
Number 
of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
C. DUR contract duration 
non-commu 47 229.1064 153.094 22.331 
community 
38 77.3421 59.805 9.702 
Mean Difference = 151.7643 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 47.705 P= . 000 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 5.76 83 . 000 26.346 (99.364,204.164) 
Unequal 6.23 62.25 . 000 24.347 (103.098,200.430) 
NON-PARAMETRIC 
SIP 
-- Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
CON. COST contract cost 
by T. O. CON type of contractor 
Mean Rank Cases 
24.81 37 T. O. CON = 1.00 non-community groups 
4.67 6 T. O. CON = 2.00 community group 
43 Total 
Exact Corrected for ties 
uw 2-Tailed Pz 2-Tailed P 
7.0 28.0 . 0000 -3.6452 . 
0003 
-- -- - Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
CONDUR contract duration 
by T. O. CON type of contractor 
Mean Rank Cases 
24.38 37 T. O. CON 1.00 non-community groups 
7.33 6 T. O. CON 2.00 community group 
43 Total 
Exact Corrected for ties 
uw 2-Tailed Pz 2-Tailed P 
23.0 44.0 . 
0009 -3.1052 . 
0019 
NHDA 
-- -- Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
C-COST Contact cost 
by T. CON type of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
63.48 54 T. CON 1.00 non-community 
29.24 42 T. CON 2.00 community 
96 Total 
uw 
325.0 1228.0 
Corrected for ties 
z 2-Tailed P 
-5.9750 . 0000 
-- - Mann-Whitney U- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
C. DUR contract duration 
by T. CON type of contracts 
Mean Rank Cases 
54.17 47 T-CON = 1.00 non-community 
29-18 38 T. CON = 2.00 community 
85 Total 
Corrected for ties 
uwz 2-Tailed P 
368.0 1109.0 -4.6484 . 0000 
7 
APPENDIX 6 
SKAA CONTEXT 
TLlA Time lag-T. S &N. I. T, b-a 
Valid cases: 29.0 Missing cases: 24.0 Percent missing: 45.3 
Mean -27.8966 Std Err 13.2135 Min -362-000 Skewness -3.9870 
Median -9.0000 Variance 5063.310 Max 56.0000 SE Skew . 4335 
5% Trim -17.1513 Std Dev 71.1569 Range 418-0000 Kurtosis 18.4138 
95% CI for Mean (-54.9632, -. 8299) IQR 24.0000 SE Kurt . 8452 
TL2 Time lag-tender approval 
Valid cases: 45.0 Missing case s: 8.0 Perce nt missing: 15.1 
Mean 41.5778 Std. Err 6.3032 Min . 0000 Skewness 2.3074 
Median 26.0000 Variance 1787.840 Max 198.0000 SE Skew . 3537 
5% Trim 36.1728 Std Dev 42.2829 Range 198.0000 Kurtosis 5.0292 
95% CI for Mean (28.8746,54.2810) IQR 19.0000 SE Kurt . 6945 
TL3 Time lag -work order and 
Valid cases: 47.0 Missing case s: 6.0 Perce nt missing: 11.3 
Mean 6.1064 Std Err 1.9325 Min . 0000 Skewness 3.5956 
Median 2.0000 Variance 175.5319 Max 65.0000 SE Skew . 3466 
5% Trim 3.5792 Std Dev 13.2488 Range 65.0000 Kurtosis 12.9726 
95% CI for Mean (2.2164,9.9964) IQR 3.0000 SE Kurt . 6809 
TL4 time lag between actual s 
Valid cases: 42.0 Missing cases: 11.0 Perce nt missing: 20.8 
Mean 8.6429 Std. Err 1.9154 Min 1.0000 Skewness 2.9083 
Median 6.0000 Variance 154.0889 Max 56.0000 SE Skew . 3654 
5% Trim 6.7090 Std. Dev 12.4133 Range 55.0000 Kurtosis 7.5873 
95% CI for Mean (4.7746,12.5111) IQR 3.2500 SE Kurt . 7166 
TL5 Time lag- Actual date of 
Valid case s: 49.0 Missing case s: 4.0 Perce nt missing: 7.5 
Mean 165.3878 Std Err 23.0626 Min -2.0000 Skewness 1.2663 
Median 103.0000 Variance 26062.24 Max 607.0000 SE Skew . 3398 
5% Trim 150.7483 Std Dev 161.4380 Range 609.0000 Kurtosis . 9075 
95% CI for Mean (119.0173,211.7582) IQR 204.0000 SE Kurt . 6681 
TL6A Time lag- Work order and 
Valid cases: 27.0 Missing case s: 26.0 Perce nt missing: 49.1 
Mean 13.1481 Std Err 14.8528 Min -339-000 Skewness -3.6318 
Median 18.0000 Variance 5956.362 Max 158-0000 SE Skew . 4479 
5% Trim 20.8765 Std Dev 77.1775 Range 497.0000 Kurtosis 18.2631 
95% CI for Mean (-17.3822,43-6785) IQR 22.0000 SE Kurt . 8721 
TL7 act. date of comp. -actual 
Valid cases: 49.0 Missing cases: 4.0 Percent missing: 
7.5 
z 
Mean 164.6735 Std Err 23.0578 Min -2.0000 Skewness 1.2809 
Median 103.0000 Variance 26051.35 Max 607.0000 SE Skew 
. 3398 5% Trim 149.9546 Std Dev 161.4043 Range 609.0000 Kurtosis 
. 9355 95% CI for Mean (118.3127,211.0342) IQR 204.0000 SE Kurt . 6681 
TL8 Work Order-Actual start 
Valid cases: 45.0 Missing case s: 8.0 Perce nt missing: 15.1 
Mean 10.9333 Std Err 2.7751 Min 1.0000 Skewness 2.9726 
Median 6.0000 Variance 346.5636 Max 85.0000 SE Skew 
. 3537 5% Trim 7.8333 Std Dev 18.6162 Range 84.0000 Kurtosis 8.1441 
95% CI for Mean (5.3404,16.5263) IQR 2.0000 SE Kurt 
. 6945 
TLll Time lag -tender app-ten 
Valid cases: 48.0 Missing cases: 5.0 Perce nt missing: 9.4 
Mean 32.2292 Std Err 15.4832 Min -27.0000 Skewness 6.2350 
Median 10.5000 Vari ance 11506.95 Max 734.0000 SE Skew . 3431 5% Trim 15.1991 Std Dev 107.2704 Range 761.0000 Kurtosis 41.1223 
95% CI for Mean (1.0811, 63.3773) IQR 20.5000 SE Kurt . 6744 
TL12 Tender opening- Work orde 
Valid c ases: 46.0 Missing case s: 7.0 Perce nt missing: 13.2 
Mean 39.3478 Std Err 16.4703 Min -23.0000 Skewness 5.7087 
Median 12.5000 Variance 12478.50 Max 737.0000 SE Skew . 3501 
5% Trim 21.6691 Std Dev 111.7072 Range 760.0000 Kurtosis 35.5081 
95% CI for Mean (6.1749,72.5208) IQR 23.5000 SE Kurt . 6876 
TL13 Time lag NIT and work ord 
Valid cases: 43.0 Missing cases: 10.0 Perce nt missing: 18.9 
Mean 48.6047 Std Err 7.8968 Min . 0000 Skewness 2.1888 
Median 28.0000 Variance 2681.435 Max 204.0000 SE Skew . 3614 
5% Trim 42.4264 Std Dev 51.7826 Range 204.0000 Kurtosis 4.0565 
95% CI for Mean (32.6683,64.5410) IQR 26.0000 SE Kurt . 7090 
TL14 Tender open-technical san 
Valid cases: 28.0 Missing cases: 25.0 Perce nt missing: 47.2 
Mean -7.6786 Std Err 13.3653 Min -352.000 Skewness -4.5388 
Median 4.5000 Variance 5001.708 Max 70.0000 SE Skew . 4405 
5% Trim 2.8333 Std Dev 70.7228 Range 422.0000 Kurtosis 22.7168 
95% CI for Mean (-35.1020,19.7448) IQR 11.5000 SE Kurt . 8583 
TL15 Time lag-actual completio 
Valid case s: 27.0 Missing cases: 26.0 Perce nt missing: 
49.1 
Mean 198.5185 Std Err 38.7852 Min -274.000 Skewness . 2878 
Median 191.0000 Variance 40615.95 Max 640.0000 SE Skew . 4479 
5% Trim 196.5556 Std Dev 201.5340 Range 914.0000 Kurtosis . 5852 
95% cj for Mean (118.7943,278.2427) IQR 293.0000 SE Kurt . 
8721 
TL16 Time lag tender open-nit, 
Valid cases: 46.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 7.4130 Std Err 16.2129 Min 
Median 17.0000 Variance 12091.49 Max 
5% Trim 21.3696 Std Dev 109.9613 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-25.2414,40.0675) IQR 
Sjp CONTEXT 
TL1 time lag between nit and 
Valid cases: 37.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 125.1892 Std Err 37.0766 Min 
Median 9.0000 Variance 50862.88 Max 
5% Trim 112.3709 Std Dev 225.5280 Range 
95% CI for Mean (49.9944,200.3840) IQR 
TL2 time lag between acceptan 
Valid cases: 37.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 101.4324 Std Err 11-1804 Min 
Median 88.0000 Variance 4625.086 Max 
5% Trim 100.1456 Std. Dev 68.0080 Range 
95% CI for Mean (78.7574,124.1074) IQR 
TL3 time lag between work ord. 
Valid cases: 36.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 6.6389 Std. Err 6.1838 Min 
Median 5.0000 Variance 1376.637 Max 
5% Trim 9.0432 Std Dev 37.1031 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-5.9150,19.1928) IQR 
TL4 time lag between actual s 
Valid cases: 35.0 Missing cases: 
Mean -2.4000 Std Err 33.0059 Min 
Median 11.0000 Variance 38128.66 Max 
5% Trim 22.1825 Std Dev 195.2656 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-69.4761,64.6761) IQR 
TL5 actual contract duration 
Valid cases: 35.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 300.9429 Std. Err 25.5808 Min 
Median 309.0000 Variance 22903.29 Max 
5% Trim 301.7778 Std Dev 151.3383 Range 
95% ci for Mean (248.9563,352.9294) IQR 
TL6 time lag between admin. ap 
Valid cases: 36.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 250.3056 Std Err 35.4156 Min 
Median 179.5000 Variance 45153.42 Max 
5% Trim 238.6728 Std Dev 212.4933 Range 
10 
7.0 Percent missing: 13.2 
-706-000 Skewness -6.3015 
131.0000 SE Skew 
. 3501 837-0000 Kurtosis 41.8258 
9.5000 SE Kurt 
. 6876 
Percent missing: 
-141.000 Skewness . 9620 612.0000 SE Skew . 3876 753.0000 Kurtosis -. 5299 
356.5000 SE Kurt . 7587 
0 Percent missing: .0 
. 0000 Skewness . 3355 
232.0000 SE Skew . 3876 
232.0000 Kurtosis -1.3475 
132.0000 SE Kurt . 7587 
1.0 Percent missing: 2.7 
-185.000 Skewness -3.7954 
83.0000 SE Skew . 3925 
268.0000 Kurtosis 21.6306 
15.0000 SE Kurt . 7681 
2.0 Percent missing: 5.4 
-730.000 Skewness -2.9709 
335.0000 SE Skew . 3977 
1065.000 Kurtosis 10.6233 
33.0000 SE Kurt . 7778 
2.0 Percent missing: 5.4 
11.0000 Skewness -. 1609 
590.0000 SE Skew . 3977 
579.0000 Kurtosis -. 5979 
226.0000 SE Kurt . 7778 
1.0 Percent missing: 2.7 
-7.0000 Skewness . 8079 
717.0000 SE Skew . 3925 
724.0000 Kurtosis -. 4904 
95% CI for Mean (178.4082,322.2030) IQR 
TL7 time lag between physical 
Valid cases: 35.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 366.9143 Std Err 51.9099 Min 
Median 298.0000 Variance 94312.26 Max 
5% Trim 331.9206 Std Dev 307.1030 Range 
95% CI for Mean (261.4207,472.4079) IQR 
TL9 time lag between end of d 
Valid cases: 23.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 33.7391 Std Err 62.2157 Min 
Median 24.0000 Variance 89028.20 Max 
5% Trim -3.8116 Std Dev 298.3759 Range 
95% CI for Mean (-95.2883,162.7666) IQR 
TL13 time lag between nit and 
Valid cases: 36.0 Missing cases: 
Mean 108.1667 Std Err 12.5204 Min 
Median 103.5000 Variance 5643.343 Max 
5% Trim 110.7099 Std Dev 75.1222 Range 
95% CI for Mean (82.7490,133.5844) IQR 
364.2500 SE Kurt 
. 7681 
2.0 Percent missing: 5.4 
42-0000 Skewness 2.2720 
1320-000 SE Skew 
. 3977 1278-000 Kurtosis 4.9718 
203.0000 SE Kurt 
. 7778 
14.0 Percent missing: 37.8 
-364.000 Skewness 2.7603 
1182.000 SE Skew . 4813 
1546.000 Kurtosis 10.1749 
194.0000 SE Kurt . 9348 
1.0 Percent missing: 2.7 
-94.0000 Skewness -. 3054 
233.0000 SE Skew . 3925 
327.0000 Kurtosis -. 1640 
123.0000 SE Kurt . 7681 
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APPENDIX 
PERFORMACE INDICATORS-ROUTINE 
SKAA 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of completion cost 
and conract cost 1.07 1.01 . 48 1.98 . 24 
ratio of completion time 
and contract time 1.58 1.13 . 38 4.67 . 99 
ratio of time taken f rom. 
first procedural step 
to the work order and 
the contract duration . 12 . 20 -5.65 1.76 1.22 
ratio of technical 
sanction cost and the 
estimated cost 1.24 1.18 1.00 2.02 . 25 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the contract cost . 78 . 81 . 50 1.07 . 12 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the completion 
cost . 77 . 79 . 38 1.39 . 20 
KMC SMALL CONTRACTORS 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
Ratio of completion cost 
and contract cost . 94 . 96 . 
71 . 96 . 05 
ratio of estimated cost 
and contract cost . 91 . 92 . 
74 1.00 . 08 
ratio of estimated cost 
and completion cost . 96 . 98 . 
78 1.08 . 09 
CMC DRAINAGE DIVISION 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of actual cost and 
contract cost 1.00 1.00 . 86 
1.19 . 04 
ratio of actual duration 
and contract duration . 60 . 
43 . 10 
3.29 . 59 
17) ell, 
CMC PROJECTS 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of estimated cost 
to contract cost 1.67 1.01 . 93 9.50 2.35 
SIP 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ration of actual cost to 
contract cost 1.05 1.04 . 43 1.53 . 22 
ratio of actual duratoin 
and contract duration 2.35 1.97 . 37 6.71 1.38 
ratio of time taken f rom 
first admin. step to 
work order and 
contact duration 1.96 1.84 -. 02 6.03 1.49 
ratio of technical 
sanction cost and 
estimated cost 1.00 1.00 . 12 1.62 . 20 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the contract cost 1.07 1.02 . 67 1.57 . 20 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the actual 
completion cost 1.08 . 98 . 67 2.99 . 45 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS-COMMUNITY PARTICIPATED 
OPP 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of actual cost and 
contract cost 1.08 1.14 . 63 1.38 . 31 
ratio of estimated cost 
and completion cost 1.01 . 88 . 72 1.58 . 35 
KMC/ADB 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the contract cost . 87 . 
70 . 43 2.20 . 
46 
1 
SIP 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ration of actual cost to 
contract cost . 97 . 99 . 87 1.07 . 07 
ratio of actual duratoin 
and contract duration 2.06 1.97 1.07 3.32 
. 90 
ratio of time taken f rom, 
first admin-step to 
work order and 
contact duration 2.40 . 47 . 03 7.00 3.24 
ratio of technical 
sanction cost and 
estimated cost 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 00 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the contract cost . 98 . 95 . 69 1.47 . 28 
ratio of estimated cost 
to the actual 
completion cost 1.02 . 96 . 64 1.68 . 36 
CLEAN SETTLEMNT PROGRAMME UNIT (CSPU) 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of actual cost to 
contract cost . 97 . 97 . 95 . 98 . 02 
ratio of actual duration 
to contract duration 1.37 1.37 1.33 1.40 . 05 
SKAA DEPARTMENTAL WORKS 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of actual cost to 
contract cost . 67 . 67 . 65 . 69 . 02 
R5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 00 
ratio of estimated cost 
to actual cost 1.49 1.48 1.45 1.55 . 04 
NHDA 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
ratio of actual cost and 
contract cost . 88 . 
92 . 37 1.10 . 
17 
ratio of actual duration 
and contract duration 1.90 1.60 . 05 
7.00 1.40 
i 
APPENDIX 8 
- -- PEARMANC0RRELAT10NC0EFFICIENT 
CONDURO . 8433 
N( 170) 
Sig . 000 
CONCOSTO 
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
- . ', 
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
SPEARMANC0RRELAT10NC0EFFICIENTS 
ACTDURO . 8636 
N( 189) 
Sig . 000 
ACTCOSTO 
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
11 . "is printed 
if a coefficient cannot be computed 
SPEARMANC0RRELAT10NC0EFFICIENTS 
CHDU . 1476 
N 150) 
Sig . 071 
CHCO 
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 
11 . "is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
1,5' 
APPENDIX 9 
SIP MONEY INFLUX 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
number of commnity 
labour unskilled 841.93 109.00 . 00 8383.00 1597.32 
number of community 
labour skilled 314.90 37.00 . 00 2862.00 570.11 
Number of days of formal 
training . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 
number of days of 
informal training 53.18 4.50 . 00 350.00 78-96 
number of incidence 
existing and new 
enterpirse 
development related 
infrastructure 
provision 2.77 1.50 . 00 10.00 3.56 
contract duration 144 120 7 360 106 
OPP CIRCULATION OF MONEY 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std 
Deviation 
actual cost 8906.16 8922.00 1860.00 33000.00 5841.86 
actual number of houses 14.56 13.00 1.00 44.00 9.96 
labour, daily or 
contractors cost 2854.19 3000.00 100.00 11255.00 2094.51 
material cost 5903.53 5256.50 1260.00 21745.00 3932.94 
actual duration of work 17.57 7.00 3.00 76.00 22.62 
Iý 
